Last month, two well-known US scholars, Kenneth Lieberthal and David Lampton, published an important article entitled Heading off the Next War in The Washing-ton Post. This article says that a cross-strait confrontation must be avoided and advocates a mid-term framework similar to the past cross-strait framework.
If recent statements by US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia James Kelly and US Defense Ministry officials are also considered, the level of cross-strait tension becomes clear.
The US has repeatedly said that independence will bring disaster for Taiwan -- that it will destroy Taiwan, harm China and affect the US. Washington has even made it clear for the first time that the US will not tolerate either side changing the status quo as defined by the US.
It seems the US feels a crisis nearing, and wants to use a more aggressive approach and a clearer stance to prevent a confrontation.
The US sees the cross-strait and the US-Taiwan-China relationships as part of a dynamic status quo. A future misstep by any of the parties might bring it out of control.
Taiwan consciousness and Chinese collective frustration are increasing. Unreasonable statements and actions are increasing on both sides. Unless diplomatic preventive measures are adopted quickly, there is a risk that the situation will become uncontrollable. In order to head off a confrontation, many people lean towards establishing a mechanism that will limit the scope of current cross-strait and US-Taiwan-China relationships.
The Post article advocates the establishment of an improved framework. A major point in the framework proposed long ago by Harry Harding and Stanley Roth was that China should not use military force and Taiwan should not declare independence.
Although this has remained unchanged for several decades, it implies the vision of a final development toward unification.
The framework advocated by these two US scholars still specifies that China should not use armed force and Taiwan should not declare independence, and advocates establishment of a mechanism built on mutual trust.
An important new point is that Beijing can continue to assert that there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of it, but it must give up its threat to use military force to change Taiwan's status.
Similarly, this perspective allows that Taiwan can continue to assert that it is an indepen-dent, sovereign country -- ie, beyond China's control -- but that it must give up its pursuit to turn this into a juridical fact.
In other words, the two sides can continue to maintain their different viewpoints.
Furthermore, this improved framework does not imply a future unification. It also requires that the international community assist Taiwan's return to participation in international organizations. These are all positive propositions.
Beijing has never ruled out the concept of a mid-term framework, although it may not have given it thorough consideration. The US has once again put this suggestion forward.
If both Taipei and Beijing are willing to take this opportunity and consider or accept this framework, and if they -- agreeing not to declare independence or use military force -- quickly stabilize the cross-strait relationship under US supervision, allow Taiwan more international space, and establish a mechanism built on mutual trust, this might be the ideal result.
Both Taiwan and China should make good use of the creative thinking particular to the Chinese people and utilize this window of opportunity.
George Tsai is a research fellow of the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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