China's decision to control the pace of political reforms in Hong Kong is a reflection of the difficulty it has in stomaching the rise of democracy in both Taiwan and the territory, analysts say.
The ruling by China's legislature last Tuesday that any electoral change in Hong Kong must first get its approval would also sound the deathknell of the "one country, two systems" formula that Beijing wants to use in taking over Taiwan, they say.
"This is an issue that has to do with the Chinese leadership and how they approach politics," said Joseph Cheng, a China scholar at the City University of Hong Kong.
"Basically their frame of mind is that they cannot accept any situation in which they do not have control. This is not conducive to democracy," he said.
A lack of control has pushed communist leaders in Beijing to use extreme measures when confronted with democracy, often to disastrous effect and to international condemnation, he said.
The bloody quelling of the 1989 Tiananmen democracy protests is probably the best example of Beijing's extreme distaste for democracy, he added.
China's lack of savvy in electoral politics was also highlighted during the 1996 and 2000 presidential vote in Taiwan, when it shocked the region by using war games and missile tests in an attempt to sway people away from pro-independence candidates.
The result was just the opposite. Voters flocked to candidates opposed to Beijing's overtures for reunification, most notably President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), who was re-elected last month.
Now Beijing is betting that by stifling Hong Kong's aspiration for electoral reforms, political turmoil of the kind that erupted in the territory last summer would be quelled, Cheng said.
"The situation in Hong Kong and Taiwan are very different," said Wong Ka-ying, a specialist on China-Taiwan dynamics at the Chinese University in Hong Kong.
"In Hong Kong, Beijing has used its control through legal methods to stop democratic reform, but this legal aspect does not exist in its relations with Taiwan," Wong said.
Whereas China can use its legislature to stop Hong Kong democracy, in the absence of saber-rattling, Beijing has had to resort to pressure on countries like the US to curb Taiwan's calls for independence, he said.
This has led to grave uncertainties in the Taiwan issue, Wong said.
"With the re-election of Chen Shui-bian and amid US presidential elections this year, Beijing has to decide to either ratchet up a harder response against Taiwan or to cave in with a more moderate response," Wong said.
"A military response cannot be counted out," he said.
China is likely to hold its fire on the Taiwan issue until after Chen's inauguration on May 20 or even until after the December legislative elections, Wong said.
Beijing may also seek to help pro-China figures get elected, in the hope that a legislative bloc could be formed to stop any move by Chen toward Taiwan independence, he said.
For Hong Kong, China's goal is to put an end to a noisy democracy debate that has led to calls for the removal of Beijing-appointed Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa (董建華), Wong said.
However, Cheng said this would be difficult to achieve.
"Hong Kong democrats are already planning a march for this July 1 and they want at least as many people on the streets as last year," when more than 500,000 marched.
"Beijing also has to worry about September legislative elections [in Hong Kong] in which pro-Beijing parties could do very badly because of this," Cheng said
Moreover, the heavy-handed measures on Hong Kong will mean an end to Beijing's efforts to woo Taiwan, Cheng said.
"This is the price Beijing has had to pay, if there is no democracy in Hong Kong it is obvious that the `one country, two systems' will have no appeal in Taiwan," he said.
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