After the Central Election Commission (CEC) formally
announced the re-election of President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and Vice President Annette Lu (呂秀蓮), the US on March 26 issued a statement to congratulate Taiwan. The statement reads, "We recognize that there are pending legal challenges to the results of the March 20 election. We applaud the people of Taiwan for embracing established legal mechanisms and rejecting extra-legal options to resolve their differences. We reject calls for violence, which threaten the very democratic principles to which we and the people of Taiwan are committed." The US statement is the best possible blessing for a democratic Taiwan.
The pan-blue camp had used US ambiguity to highlight what it called the unfairness of the presidential election. However, what pushed Washington to change was precisely the poverty of the blue camp's post-election strategy.
First, the legal basis of the pan-blue complaint is thin. Given a narrow margin of only 0.228 percent between the two camps, a demand for a recount was reasonable. But the blue camp then tried to gain more from the green camp after its demands were met with goodwill. Not only did the pan-blue camp call for a new election, it also vetoed a green camp proposal to amend the law and add a provision allowing for an "administrative recount," insisting instead that a "judicial recount" be imposed. As a result, a reasonable demand became unreasonable. The recount was not the blue camp's real purpose, because the result would not necessarily fall in its favor. Its real purpose was to engineer a mass movement to force Chen and Lu to step down. This could be considered an attempted coup d'etat.
Second, the blue camp's use of violence eroded its credibility. Certain legislators have been stirring up violence ever since Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) and People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) protested against the result on election night. Taiwan has brought about a democracy through several decades of "quiet revolution." Are these politicians -- notably PFP Legislator Chiu Yi (邱毅) -- trying to revolt against it? And could such a revolution legitimize itself through violence?
Before the US congratulated Chen, China's Taiwan Affairs Office changed its low-key attitude and warned that "we will not sit by watching should the post-election situation in Taiwan get out of control, leading to social turmoil, endangering the lives and property of Taiwan compatriots and affecting stability across the Taiwan Strait."
The statement also stressed that "we have noticed that Taiwan's electoral agency already announced the election results, disregarding the strong opposition from one of the two camps, and that the opposition camp has refused to accept the results while continuing its protest." We can interpret this as a statement of support for the pan-blue camp.
I believe that such interference also pushed the US to clarify its stance. Otherwise, backed by Beijing, some politicians could be tempted to start riots and subversive behavior to trigger Chinese military interference. Washington had to clearly recognize the results of this election before such military interference could eventuate. It was also an indirect warning to the pan-blue camp, advising it to resolve the matter by legal means.
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) should sincerely communicate with the public, approaching those who oppose it with humility. Nor should the DPP get carried away over the US message. Nor should it be too nervous about Chinese threats. Taiwan needs internal solidarity. This is where Taiwan's strength will lie if it wants to save itself from further instability.
Paul Lin is a commentator based in New York.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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