After the Central Election Commission (CEC) formally
announced the re-election of President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and Vice President Annette Lu (呂秀蓮), the US on March 26 issued a statement to congratulate Taiwan. The statement reads, "We recognize that there are pending legal challenges to the results of the March 20 election. We applaud the people of Taiwan for embracing established legal mechanisms and rejecting extra-legal options to resolve their differences. We reject calls for violence, which threaten the very democratic principles to which we and the people of Taiwan are committed." The US statement is the best possible blessing for a democratic Taiwan.
The pan-blue camp had used US ambiguity to highlight what it called the unfairness of the presidential election. However, what pushed Washington to change was precisely the poverty of the blue camp's post-election strategy.
First, the legal basis of the pan-blue complaint is thin. Given a narrow margin of only 0.228 percent between the two camps, a demand for a recount was reasonable. But the blue camp then tried to gain more from the green camp after its demands were met with goodwill. Not only did the pan-blue camp call for a new election, it also vetoed a green camp proposal to amend the law and add a provision allowing for an "administrative recount," insisting instead that a "judicial recount" be imposed. As a result, a reasonable demand became unreasonable. The recount was not the blue camp's real purpose, because the result would not necessarily fall in its favor. Its real purpose was to engineer a mass movement to force Chen and Lu to step down. This could be considered an attempted coup d'etat.
Second, the blue camp's use of violence eroded its credibility. Certain legislators have been stirring up violence ever since Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) and People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) protested against the result on election night. Taiwan has brought about a democracy through several decades of "quiet revolution." Are these politicians -- notably PFP Legislator Chiu Yi (邱毅) -- trying to revolt against it? And could such a revolution legitimize itself through violence?
Before the US congratulated Chen, China's Taiwan Affairs Office changed its low-key attitude and warned that "we will not sit by watching should the post-election situation in Taiwan get out of control, leading to social turmoil, endangering the lives and property of Taiwan compatriots and affecting stability across the Taiwan Strait."
The statement also stressed that "we have noticed that Taiwan's electoral agency already announced the election results, disregarding the strong opposition from one of the two camps, and that the opposition camp has refused to accept the results while continuing its protest." We can interpret this as a statement of support for the pan-blue camp.
I believe that such interference also pushed the US to clarify its stance. Otherwise, backed by Beijing, some politicians could be tempted to start riots and subversive behavior to trigger Chinese military interference. Washington had to clearly recognize the results of this election before such military interference could eventuate. It was also an indirect warning to the pan-blue camp, advising it to resolve the matter by legal means.
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) should sincerely communicate with the public, approaching those who oppose it with humility. Nor should the DPP get carried away over the US message. Nor should it be too nervous about Chinese threats. Taiwan needs internal solidarity. This is where Taiwan's strength will lie if it wants to save itself from further instability.
Paul Lin is a commentator based in New York.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
The narrative surrounding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attendance at last week’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit — where he held hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin and chatted amiably with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) — was widely framed as a signal of Modi distancing himself from the US and edging closer to regional autocrats. It was depicted as Modi reacting to the levying of high US tariffs, burying the hatchet over border disputes with China, and heralding less engagement with the Quadrilateral Security dialogue (Quad) composed of the US, India, Japan and Australia. With Modi in China for the
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has postponed its chairperson candidate registration for two weeks, and so far, nine people have announced their intention to run for chairperson, the most on record, with more expected to announce their campaign in the final days. On the evening of Aug. 23, shortly after seven KMT lawmakers survived recall votes, KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) announced he would step down and urged Taichung Mayor Lu Shiow-yen (盧秀燕) to step in and lead the party back to power. Lu immediately ruled herself out the following day, leaving the subject in question. In the days that followed, several
The Jamestown Foundation last week published an article exposing Beijing’s oil rigs and other potential dual-use platforms in waters near Pratas Island (Dongsha Island, 東沙島). China’s activities there resembled what they did in the East China Sea, inside the exclusive economic zones of Japan and South Korea, as well as with other South China Sea claimants. However, the most surprising element of the report was that the authors’ government contacts and Jamestown’s own evinced little awareness of China’s activities. That Beijing’s testing of Taiwanese (and its allies) situational awareness seemingly went unnoticed strongly suggests the need for more intelligence. Taiwan’s naval
RSS