As political fallout rains down on London and Washington amid the absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, another controversial justification must also be revisited: economic sanctions directly responsible for the deaths of at least 1.5 million Iraqis.
For nearly 13 years, the UN Security Council imposed an all-encompassing embargo on Iraqi imports and exports, intending to force former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein to destroy stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons, and to dismantle a burgeoning nuclear weapons program. Several weapons inspectors on the ground in Iraq claimed that disarmament was virtually complete by the mid-1990s. The sanctions, however, were removed only last month when the US declared victory after its latest invasion.
According to UN aid agencies, by the mid-1990s about 1.5 million Iraqis -- including 565,000 children -- had perished as a direct result of the embargo, which included "holds" on vital goods such as chemicals and equipment to produce clean drinking water.
Former assistant secretary general of the UN Dennis Halliday quit in protest in 1998 after one year at the helm as the UN humanitarian coordinator in Iraq. He described the sanctions as "genocidal."
"I've been using the word `genocide' because this is a deliberate policy to destroy the people of Iraq. I'm afraid I have no other view," Halliday told journalist David Edwards in an interview in March last year.
Halliday's successor in Iraq, Hans von Sponeck, also resigned citing the same reasons after 18 months. The two former UN staffers, with 64 years combined experience working at the world body, said what was inflicted on the Iraqi people during the more than 12 years of sanctions was tantamount to crimes against humanity.
Both said changes to the UN's sanctions procedure must be made to ensure that what occurred in Iraq from 1991 to this year never happens again.
Where the real
power lies
The UN adopted economic sanctions in 1945 as a measure to keep trouble-making regimes in line. Iraq, however, was the only nation ever to have its imports and exports under complete control of the 15-member UN Security Council. The real decision-making power over Iraq's sanctions, however, was in the hands of veto-wielding permanent members -- France, China, Russia, Britain, and the US.
Joy Gordon, from Fairfield University in Connecticut, spent three years researching the economic sanctions and interviewing UN staff involved in Iraq. In a Harper's magazine story last November, Gordon concluded most resistance holding up vital goods into Iraq came from the US and the UK.
US officials routinely claimed "dual-use" (having both civilian and military applications) items needed to be "held" and contracts reviewed to ensure Saddam's regime could not use imports for weapons programs. Gordon, Halliday, von Sponeck, among numerous others, accused the US of deliberately withholding aid vital to the health and welfare of the Iraqi people.
Last year, for example, the US blocked contracts for water tankers on the grounds that they might be used to haul chemical weapons. Yet the arms experts from the UN Special Commission had no objection to the tankers, Gordon reported in the Harper's article. This was at a time when the major cause of child deaths in Iraq was a lack of access to potable water, and when the country was in the middle of a severe drought.
Award-winning journalist John Pilger -- who produced the documentary film Paying the Price -- Killing the Children of Iraq -- said up to July last year, US$5.4 billion in vital humanitarian supplies for the people of Iraq were being obstructed by the US, backed by Britain.
The UN humanitarian reports on the blockade's effects on Iraqi children tell a grisly tale. In December 1995, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization reported 567,000 Iraqi children had died as a direct consequence of economic sanctions. In March 1996, a World Health Organization study released found the blockade had caused a six-fold increase in the mortality rate of Iraqi children under the age of five. UNICEF reported in October 1996 that 4,500 Iraqi children under five were dying every month as a result of sanctions-induced starvation and disease. Statistics such as these are not hard to find.
Then US secretary of state Madeline Albright was adamant during her tenure about maintaining the tough sanctions despite the horrific reports coming out of Iraq. She was interviewed about the UN sanctions in a 1995 television interview with American TV magazine 60 Minutes.
Assessing the price
of sanctions
Asked by interviewer Lesley Stahl: "We have heard that a half-million children have died [in Iraq, as a result of the sanctions] ... I mean, that's more children than died in Hiroshima. And you know, is the price worth it?"
Albright replied: "I think this is a very hard choice, but the price -- we think the price is worth it."
The real threat posed by Saddam, and the need to disarm him of alleged stockpiles of deadly arms, remains a contentious issue. The main justification for the US-led invasion this year was the threat of his weapons of mass destruction. After 82 days in Iraq, not a single banned weapon has been found.
"The only weapon that Iraq has is oil and its revenues," Halliday said in an interview last December with Cairo's Al-Ahram Weekly newspaper.
That sentiment is backed by former chief UNSCOM weapons inspector Scott Ritter who spent seven years in Iraq. He has insisted the Iraqi regime was "fundamentally disarmed" between 1991 to 1998, with 90 percent to 95 percent of its unconventional weapons eliminated by December 1998.
He said the fact Saddam was a tyrant should not cloud over the outrage inflicted by the Security Council on the population of Iraq.
"He [Saddam] is a brutal dictator. He may torture to death 1,800 people a year. That's terrible and unacceptable. But we kill 6,000 a month. Let's put that on a scale," Ritter said in a June 1999 interview.
Evidence exists indicating US planners recognized early on the devastation sanctions would deliver upon the Iraqi population.
A declassified document from the US Defense Intelligence Agency in 1991 -- titled Iraq's Water Treatment Vulnerability -- outlined with deadly precision the effect economic sanctions would have on Iraq's water supply.
"Iraq depends on importing specialized equipment and some chemicals to purify its water supply," the agency report, dated Jan. 22, 1991, said. "Failing to secure supplies will result in a shortage of pure drinking water for much of the population. This could lead to increased incidences, if not epidemics, of disease.
"Although Iraq is already experiencing a loss of water treatment capability, it probably will take at least six months [to June 1991] before the system is fully degraded," the report said.
Thomas Nagy, a professor at George Washington University who discovered and brought the agency's document to the media's attention, said the US government knew the sanctions would result in water-treatment failure and, consequently, would kill an incalculable number of Iraqis.
As outlined by the Geneva Conventions, he says, that is a war crime.
A gap appears to be emerging between Washington’s foreign policy elites and the broader American public on how the United States should respond to China’s rise. From my vantage working at a think tank in Washington, DC, and through regular travel around the United States, I increasingly experience two distinct discussions. This divergence — between America’s elite hawkishness and public caution — may become one of the least appreciated and most consequential external factors influencing Taiwan’s security environment in the years ahead. Within the American policy community, the dominant view of China has grown unmistakably tough. Many members of Congress, as
The Hong Kong government on Monday gazetted sweeping amendments to the implementation rules of Article 43 of its National Security Law. There was no legislative debate, no public consultation and no transition period. By the time the ink dried on the gazette, the new powers were already in force. This move effectively bypassed Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. The rules were enacted by the Hong Kong chief executive, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security — a body shielded from judicial review and accountable only to Beijing. What is presented as “procedural refinement” is, in substance, a shift away from
The shifting geopolitical tectonic plates of this year have placed Beijing in a profound strategic dilemma. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepares for a high-stakes summit with US President Donald Trump, the traditional power dynamics of the China-Japan-US triangle have been destabilized by the diplomatic success of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Washington. For the Chinese leadership, the anxiety is two-fold: There is a visceral fear of being encircled by a hardened security alliance, and a secondary risk of being left in a vulnerable position by a transactional deal between Washington and Tokyo that might inadvertently empower Japan
After declaring Iran’s military “gone,” US President Donald Trump appealed to the UK, France, Japan and South Korea — as well as China, Iran’s strategic partner — to send minesweepers and naval forces to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. When allies balked, the request turned into a warning: NATO would face “a very bad” future if it refused. The prevailing wisdom is that Trump faces a credibility problem: having spent years insulting allies, he finds they would not rally when he needs them. That is true, but superficial, as though a structural collapse could be caused by wounded feelings. Something
RSS