Tue, Sep 09, 2014 page3

• INTERVIEW: Negotiators need loyalty tests: ex-MAC head

  To end potential leaks of state secrets to Beijing, the government must review how it manages its cross-strait negotiation team, former Mainland Affairs Council chairman Chen Ming-tong — who now leads National Taiwan University’s Graduate Institute of National Development — said in an interview with Tzou Jiing-wen, a staff reporter at the Liberty Times, the Taipei Times’ sister paper

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  Liberty Times: What are your opinions on the case of former Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) deputy minister Chang Hsien-yao (張顯耀)?

  Chen Ming-tong (陳明通): To be frank, I am still uncertain what actually happened in the Chang case.

  If we take the case as the Mainland Affairs Council or the Presidential Office termed it, a case of selling out state secrets, then it is a grave matter, as it means Taiwan’s primary negotiation representative had “sold information” to the opposite side, which is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime that has not given up hopes of assimilating Taiwan through the use of force. How is that any different from treason?

  

  Former Mainland Affairs Council chairman Chen Ming-tong, head of National Taiwan University’s Graduate Institute of National Development, speaks during an interview with the Liberty Times (the Taipei Times’ sister newspaper) on Aug. 28 in Taipei.

  Photo: Wang Yi-sung, Taipei Times

  My heart is heavy in view of what is being reported and I would rather not believe it is true.

  LT: Representatives on both sides handle the first line of negotiation. How should they handle the delicate balance between meaningful interaction with their counterparts and loyalty to their own nation when fulfilling their duties?

  Chen: There are many techniques in negotiation, one of which is to clearly state the bottom line on our side. For example, Beijing has always wanted to initiate political talks with Taiwan and its bottom line for initiating that type of negotiation is to unify with Taiwan.

  They stated this bottom line a very long time ago and it is an overt ploy. It is not impossible to state your bottom line at the very start of the negotiation, but it must first be assessed by the entire negotiation team and afterward, gain consent from the authorities. If such consent is not sought, it is considered a crime of leaking secrets. If the nation has a prime representative that leaks secrets, what need is there for Taiwan to have enemies? How would the general public be able to place its faith in the entire team?

  From a certain perspective, negotiation is to arrive at a decision with your counterpart. The primary goal of course is to reach an accord between both parties after some give and take on both sides. The usual result is one that is not quite satisfactory, but is acceptable.

  To arrive at a consensus, the most important part is to assess the situation your side is in.

  One has to consider the target goal of negotiation, the subjects to be discussed based on such a goal, the understanding of each subject and what negotiation programs to have, among other things, and then asses the other side’s situation and find common ground where both sides can benefit, such as what we want from the other side, what they want from us and so on, ensuring that both sides have some room to maneuver during the negotiation.

  This is the standard operating procedure for negotiations and as long as such preparatory work is done well, it is not difficult to interact with the other side — as long as the other side truly wishes to negotiate and is not using negotiation as a tool, as the communists did during the Second Chinese Civil War, when they continued the war while negotiations were taking place.

  Thinking you will be able to increase mutual trust by building a closer social relationship with the other party is not only impractical, but also causes the negotiator to become more susceptible to diplomatic honeytraps.

  Beijing is known for trying to build relations with negotiators on the sidelines of events through dinner meetings, where they seek to undermine Taiwanese negotiators’ caution by being courteous. Sometimes individualistic heroism or the idea of having a place in history cause negotiators to play right into the hands of the other side and cause unintentional information leaks.

  LT: How should the Mainland Affairs Council or the National Security Council prevent these things? What should be the punitive measures after such incidents occur? How can the situation be salvaged?

  Chen: I think the most important thing is that the leader of the group must know who to trust, and who not to.

  I know this kind of response is somewhat vague, but isn’t it the most important thing? The human mind is alive, but the system is dead; if the person appointed to the position does not walk the straight and narrow, all the systemic measures preventing corruption or protecting secrets are useless.

  If the leader of the group does not possess the ability to perceive character and appoints the wrong sort of person to the job, the team itself would have to simply take the next best thing, which is the establishment of a system moderating the negotiators’ loyalty during the entirety of the negotiation.

  Aside from that, negotiation is essentially a highly fluid process and the person in charge of the negotiation must have a clear strategic view of the matter, as well as an exact direction to follow. Despite the rigidity of purpose, the methods of approach must remain flexible and agile to better accommodate the fluidity of negotiation.

  The way to maintain such a contract is to set up a clear ranking structure within the negotiation team from the very start, to better control the negotiation process. The establishment of such a structure could also help mitigate the risks of a breakdown of a negotiator’s moral integrity.

  If information leaks during negotiations, how it is handled could have effects on three levels.

  First is the management of the government’s image, where the government seeks damage control. On that level, the government must convey to its citizens that it is taking responsibility for the incident while maintaining open channels to the public to better explain the matter. The government must communicate the incident to the public, including how it occurred and how it is being dealt with, as well as how the government intends to handle the accords made by the negotiating group in the past.

  Granted, there is going to be difficulty in clarifying the truth at the beginning, but the attitude of the government is decisive in the issue and it must convince people that it is sincere in its effort to take responsibility over the incident and not attempting to bury the whole thing.

  The second level is judicial responsibility. In a nation governed by the rule of law, judicial responsibility has its appropriate handling units and due process, meaning that all procedures should follow the legal system and not dissolve into infighting among different political organizations or opportunistic attacks on political opponents.

  The final level on which the incident’s handling could have an effect is that of political responsibility. We are a democratic nation; the political responsibility for errors in administrative policy by political officials — whether the cause is team discipline, implementation or planning — lies with whoever leads the team.

  As for how the government can salvage the situation, the first step is to re-establish the management system over the negotiation team to stop any similar incidents from occurring again. This includes actions against the members of the team and on the incident at hand.

  Actions against the team should focus on a loyalty test for all the members involved, as well as standardizing regulations on what actions are acceptable during negotiations.

  The government should establish an oversight system in which information during the negotiation is recorded, such as who has access to what kind of information at which level, when they accessed the information and the like.

  The second step is to re-establish the people’s trust in the government and, by proxy, the team authorized by the government. The quickest way to do this is to assemble a brand new negotiation team from scratch.

  Thirdly, the re-established team must reaffirm the relationship with the other negotiating party. From a certain perspective, negotiation is to arrive at a decision with your counterpart, but if one side has stolen information, whether it was because our side had violated rules and provided the information or whether the other side bought the information, it constitutes a breach of trust. Unless trust can be restored, it will be difficult for both sides to remain at the table and continue the negotiations.

  LT: During the investigation of the Chang case, different legal interpretations arose as to whether the Chinese Communist regime is a foreign government, which would make the case an allegation of treason. However, there should not be a “no-man’s-land” when it comes to safeguarding national interests. What are your thoughts on the issue?

  Chen: The Ministry of Justice’s Bureau of Investigation originally took the information it had on Chang to the Taiwan High Prosecutors’ Office hoping that the office would head the investigation and charge Chang with treason, but was turned down by the office on grounds that the data provided were not conclusive.

  The denial by the office had caused debate on whether the Chinese Communist regime could be considered a foreign government and whether the Chang case can be subjected to charges of treason.

  In our nation, which is heavily divided in terms of identity, this kind of debate would yield no answer.

  President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) administration does not view China as a foreign country, nor the Chinese Communist Party as a foreign government, which greatly decreases the chance that Chang is to be brought up on charges of treason. However, that does not mean that the case should not be handled; it is as you say, that there should be no “no-man’s-land” in terms of national interests.

  If Chang is found guilty of having leaked information to the other party, it should not be considered simple leaking of information, but rather collaboration with the enemy and a severe breach of national security.

  He should not be let off the hook with a simple case of information leaking and should be made an example of, or governmental authority cannot be restored and the conduct of officials cannot be kept in line.

  Translation by Jake Chung, staff writer
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