Sat, Nov 18, 2000 page4

• Japan watchful of China's ambitions

  Were China to attack Taiwan, the former colonial power may feel compelled to come to the aid of its neighbor. in the first of a two-part series, 'Taipei Times' staff reporter Monique Chu spoke in Brunei to Yoichi Funabashi, chief diplomatic correspondent and columnist at the 'Asahi Shimbun' as he described Japan's perception of a rising china and the country's military role in any future cross-strait conflict

  • By Monique Chu / STAFF REPORTER
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  Taipei Times: China is on the rise, and Japanese attitudes toward China have hardened considerably in recent years. In strategic and economic terms, to what extent has the rise of China triggered a sense of suspicion and insecurity in Japan?

  Yoichi Funabashi: It's natural for any society or country to feel uneasy when it's confronted with a rapidly rising country in its neighborhood. It's only human nature.

  I think that the way China has behaved -- such as China's use of missiles to intimidate Taiwan in 1996 -- has also furthered Japan's uneasiness toward China.

  

  Yoichi Funabashi, pictured at the APEC meeting in Brunei recently.

  PHOTO: LIAO RAY-SHANG, TAIPEI TIMES

  After all, Japan is also a seafaring island like Taiwan. In a way, Taiwan is a smaller version of Japan. So some people perhaps envision the predicament of Taiwan as that of Japan in the future.

  It has crystallized [Japan's] perception of China as a threat.

  During the past 30 years -- since Japan normalized its relations with China in the early 1970s -- the 1996 missile crisis alone considerably changed Japan's perception of China.

  Perhaps another case was the Tiananman Massacre of 1989.

  The very rigid political regime and ideology of the Chinese polity troubles the Japanese greatly. Unless and until [China] changes, the Japanese will always feel uneasy when they remember the Tiananman incident.

  Adding to this uneasiness, particularly in the latter part of the 1990s, is the lack of transparency of the Chinese military.

  But having said that, China still is not perceived by the Japanese as a threat. And I for one also think that China is not a threat.

  China is confronted with enormous problems and I don't think that it will continue to develop in a linear fashion over the next 100 years.

  The rapid development of China already has caused a lot of discrepancies within its society.

  There are many widening gaps -- an income gap, wealth gap, opportunity gap and geographical gap. Sooner or later the Chinese government will have to address these issues.

  I think China will remain preoccupied with domestic issues over the next 20 years, and it will take a long time for China to really strike a balance domestically. It will face minority issues, even separatist issues, perhaps revolts in certain areas.

  A lot of energy will be consumed in maintaining domestic order and stability, leaving little left over for aggression by the military.

  But the problem is that there will always be temptation for China's political leaders to use "foreign problems" to divert the people's attention from those serious domestic issues.

  Both Japan and Taiwan might become easy targets in that respect.

  The best way for the people and government of Japan to remain secure is to ensure that they do not make China an enemy through taking an antagonistic approach.

  We must try our best to live peacefully with China, and although this may seem like a difficult proposition, it is the best way forward in my view.

  TT: In your book Alliance Adrift, you detailed US-Japan alliance interaction in the wake of the 1996 missile crisis across the Taiwan Strait. Taking into account Japan's perception of a rising China, if a war across the Taiwan Strait were to take place, to what extent do you think Japan will get involved?

  Funabashi: First, it would depend upon how such a war started. If a war were to be triggered by a unilateral act of aggression by the Chinese side, then international opinion, including that of the Japanese, would be sympathetic toward the Taiwanese. We would also see strong pressure from the US and Japanese public on their respective governments to do something to help the Taiwanese. It would be very difficult for both governments to resist that pressure.

  But if a were to start in unclear circumstances, it would be difficult for the public and political leaders of those two countries to commit themselves to Taiwan's defense.

  Second, it would depend on what kind of political leadership Japan would have at that time. If the Japanese leadership was a weak one -- as it is at the present time -- it would be almost impossible for Japan to come to Taiwan's aid.

  In such circumstances, if the US were to demand strong action from Japan, it could strain Japan-US security ties.

  But my guess is that Japan would not engage in any military activity in the event of a war across the Taiwan Strait.

  First, Japan has no legal obligation to defend Taiwan, whereas the US is obliged to maintain Taiwan's defense capability through the Taiwan Relations Act.

  Second, you need to put the situation into context considering Japan's history.

  Even though the Japanese have close links with Taiwanese that date back to the colonial era, we should not make the mistake that we are obliged to militarily come to the rescue of former colonies.

  So those are two critical differences that would make Japan's response far different from that of the US in the event of a cross-strait war.

  On the other hand, many Japanese do feel strongly that Japan and Taiwan are linked through bonds formed in the colonial era, and that ignoring Taiwan's needs in a time of war would bring great shame upon the Japanese people.

  Thus guilt may be one force that would prompt Japan to intervene in such circumstances.

  At the same time, many Japanese also know that if outside forces were to intervene in a limited war between two sides, the consequences could be disastrous.

  Japan's involvement could escalate such a conflict to proportions where Taiwan might be completely destroyed.

  So there are various contradictory emotions and psychology involved here.

  But in my view, we should not give the illusion to Taiwan that we will offer military assistance in the event of war.

  If we were to promise that -- and then were unable to deliver on our promise in the event of such a conflict -- Japan would be completely discredited.

  So we need to be careful not to give the wrong signals to the Taiwanese, and Japan must decide for itself whether it has the power and the will to come to Taiwan's aid in times of adversity.

  Yoichi Funabashi has been described as "one of Japan's most influential and prolific journalists."

  At 55, the veteran reporter has won many awards and writes frequently for journals such as Foreign Affairs. His three major books include Managing the Dollar: From the Plaza to the Louvre, Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan's Role in APEC and Alliance Adrift.

  The numerous references to personal interviews in these insiders' stories are indicative of his access to the world's major political leaders.
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