Fri, Nov 17, 2000 page3

• Lieberthal says new US leader to protect freedom

  In the second part of 'Taipei Times' staff reporter Nadia Tsao's interview with the former senior director of the US National Security Council, Kenneth Lieberthal points out that the key to solving the cross-strait impasse is to resolve the "one China" issue while giving some reasonable protection to the people of Taiwan.

  • By Nadia Tsao / STAFF REPORTER IN WASHINGTON
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  Taipei Times: You were the first one to initiate the term "interim agreements," which was later picked up by Stanley Roth. Do you still believe it is a good formula?

  Lieberthal: What Stanley Roth talked about and what I have talked about are different. The comment from Roth is not the 50-year proposal I made. He simply suggested if both sides could not reach an agreement on big issues, why not try to reach agreements on smaller issues. People think that Lieberthal's idea has become US policy; that is an incorrect linkage. I think it is a good idea for the two sides to resume dialogue and try to sort out what are the core requirements that each side have and see if there is a way to meet those requirements that will finally resolve the cross- strait issue.

  I noticed that the phrase used by [China's vice premier] Qian Qichen (錢其琛) several times, that there is "one China," of which both Taiwan and the PRC are a part, at least opens up a possibility to reach an agreement to meet Taiwan's core need, because that phrase suggests logically the possibility that Taiwan and China are equal partners under "one China," whatever "one China" is. So you can construct some sort of framework that fully meets Taiwan's need for security, democracy and its own economic system within a "one China" framework.

  I have heard that framework several years ago in Shanghai but it was rejected in Beijing. Now Beijing is using that formula. It seems to me there is some possibility that dialogue could move forward to a resolution basis, as long as you move to a resolution, whether it is an interim agreement or something else, it is up to the two sides to find a peaceful way to create the trust and work out the arrangement.

  TT: This framework could only work within a "one China" principle, but so far President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) has not accepted it.

  Lieberthal: I believe that what he said is you can resume the dialogue based on the spirit of 1992, and one of the agenda items is to try to resolve the differences over "one China." As far as I understand, one of the key objections that China has to the formula is the indefinite duration over which each one could have their own definition of "one China," but you never have to resolve the differences.

  What Chen said is that the purpose of dialogue is trying to resolve the difference, so Chen's formula should attract more attention from China. But in reality, they have stuck to their position that Chen has not accepted "one China" as a precondition to talks. I do not know what concern each side has, but if they have some mutual trust, they can find a way to talk.

  TT: What do you think is the core issue of the cross-strait debate?

  Lieberthal: To China, I think the core issue is "one China." There is a very fundamental sense in the Chinese political system that the legitimacy of revolution is based on unifying China and Taiwan. That is a part of their definition of China.

  On Taiwan's side, I think the issue there is that people in Taiwan determine their own destiny, so you can construct your own political, economic and security systems. So the question is whether there is a way to resolve the "one China" issue while providing some reasonable protection to the people of Taiwan.

  Whatever form it should be, I would leave it to people on both sides, but I think that framework may need some kind of international recognition to confirm that both sides would not violate it, because there is so little trust at this point. China has said many times that under the premise of "one China," anything could be discussed.

  TT: So do you think that no matter who becomes the next US president, Taiwan independence would be impossible?

  Lieberthal: Yes. If you look at public opinion in Taiwan, you would find out what I suggest as core issue there. On the one hand, people think a formal declaration of independence is dangerous and they do not want to go there. On the other hand, they do not want to give up their ability to determine their own fate, so that can be translated as maintaining the status quo.

  I would have a hard time imagining that any US president would indicate the formal declaration of independence by Taiwan would be supported by the US because it would unfortunately produce the very instability and military conflict that all of us seek to avoid.

  I understand that there is always a portion of people who will support independence, but the polls show very consistently that the majority do not want any action which could bring about a wild reaction from China.

  However, I do not think any US president, either Al Gore or George W. Bush, would do anything to jeopardize the democratic freedom of people in Taiwan, so if their policies are different, it would be a difference in judgment how best to assure the situation that Taiwan would not be forced to accept an arrangement that would jeopardize its own freedom.

  TT: What kind of balance do you think the US should require for the next round of arms sales talk in Washington?

  Lieberthal: I have to leave it to the new government to explore that issue. I think the Clinton administration's arms sales policy to Taiwan is correct.

  We are obligated by our law to provide Taiwan with sufficient defense capabilities, so we have to assess what Taiwan needs to be able to do militarily to make it very difficult for the Chinese to impose its will militarily on Taiwan. When you look at that, you have to be sensitive to the nature of the equipment and the capability that China has. Secondly there is the nature of the equipment and capability that Taiwan has. When you have a certain piece of equipment, it does not mean that you know how to use it, so currently Taiwan is devoted to the capability side.

  Thirdly, there is a diplomatic context to this. If the object is to maintain Taiwan's security, then you do not want to sell things that would not be necessary to the security of Taiwan and would have the effect to increase the chance for China to use force.

  There are sometimes items that fall into that category, they are not militarily necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient capability.

  There are always judgments to be made. You must have agreement from the Pentagon, the State Department and the White House. Ultimately, it is the president who has to make the decision if there is no agreement.

  My personal experience in the government has only been two years, and as I remember, in the last two rounds of arms sales meetings, the final agreement was reached at the level of deputy. When you get down to the lower levels, they might have disagreements, but these people do not have the responsibility for the overall situation.
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