In the first half of The Path to Taiwan’s Democracy: Memories of an American Diplomat, former US diplomat Nat Bellocchi describes his early life through his ambassadorship in Botswana in the late 1980s. The second half of the book covers his years as chairman of the board of the American Institute in Taiwan (1990-1995) and contains his writings, analyses and anecdotes about a particularly turbulent and exciting period in US-Taiwan relations.
Born of Italian immigrants in upstate New York, Bellocchi grew up during the Depression and World War II. His father lost his job early in the Depression and passed away in 1938, leaving Bellocchi’s mother to raise her son and his sister. After finishing high school at the end of the war, Bellocchi studied engineering at Georgia Institute of Technology, driving ambulances and doing other odd jobs to pay his way through college.
When the Korean War broke out in 1950, he joined the Army and after six months of training was sent to Korea, where he and his men were hit hard by wave after wave of Chinese attacks.
After completing his stint in the Army, he enrolled in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and decided to become a diplomatic courier. This work took him to Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle East and the Far East, giving him a wealth of experience in foreign lands and with foreign cultures. It also almost cost him his life: Once his plane developed engine trouble and had to crash land in the Mediterranean.
After five years of globetrotting, Bellocchi settled down into the “regular” Foreign Service. Hong Kong was the first of a long list of postings, which also included Laos, Taiwan (Chinese-language training in Taichung and the embassy in Taipei), Washington and Vietnam during the height of the Vietnam War.
A second round of senior postings in the late 1970s and 1980s included Tokyo, Washington, India, and finally as ambassador in Botswana.
Then, at an age when most people retire, Bellocchi accepted an appointment as chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan, the agency formally representing the US in its informal relations with Taiwan. It was to become, in his own words, “the most difficult and historic journey of my entire life.”
The second half of the
book begins with a bit of historic overview on the 1979 de-recognition of the Kuomintang (KMT) government as the government of China, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and subsequent vagaries in US policy toward Taiwan.
A main theme in this section is that the US policy establishment, and particularly the State Department, had problems adjusting itself to the new reality when Taiwan made a momentous transition to democracy, and had become “an entirely different kind of entity” from 1979, when the TRA was written.
Bellocchi doesn’t argue for changing the TRA, but says that “policies that better accommodate ... a democratic Taiwan could be pursued with the support of the Act as written.” He gives the examples of human rights and membership in international organizations — to which the TRA refers in specific clauses — and faults Washington for not mustering the political will to take a more principled and supportive stance on these issues.
He also has some poignant words about the “one China” policy: “One should know that although we have a ‘one China’ policy, we have never defined ‘China’ (there have been many in China’s long history); that we recognize the government in Beijing as the government of China; that we have never said that Taiwan is part of China; that the US position on the sovereignty of Taiwan is that it is yet to be determined; and that we have no preference for any resolution on the issue between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait other than it be peacefully resolved.”
One would wish that some of the subsequent and present-day policymakers would have remained a bit closer to this original definition, instead of getting stuck in endless reiterations of the confusing “one China” mantra or drifting off into unhelpful formulations such as “no support for Taiwan independence” or “no support for membership in international organizations that require statehood.”
Bellocchi also has few kind words for Washington’s “guidelines” that rule contact with Taiwan. He writes that these guidelines, which are reiterated by the State Department in official codes to US embassies abroad every year, “range from the inefficient to the silly.” For example, they prohibit using US government stationery in correspondence with Taiwan and prohibit US officials from receiving Taiwan counterparts in their offices or attending official functions organized by Taiwan.
Bellocchi gives a year-by-year account of his chairmanship at AIT and describes in detail policy discussions, in particular the ill-fated Taiwan Policy Review of 1993-1995, which was in Bellocchi’s view a lost opportunity to adapt US policy to the fast-changing situation in Taiwan. “[T]he important changes that were turning Taiwan from an authoritarian political system to democracy were given rhetorical support but brought no differences managing the bilateral relations.”
The book also contains personal accounts by Bellocchi of two key meetings with then-president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝). The first was during Lee’s stopover in Honolulu in May 1994, when the US government did not allow him off the airplane for meetings with the local community, forcing him to stay on the Boeing 747 while refueling and angering him in the process.
The second meeting was in June 1995 at Cornell University, and took place under totally different circumstances: Congress had prevailed on the administration of former US president Bill Clinton to allow Lee to visit his alma mater and give a speech there. The House had voted 396 to 0 and the Senate 91 to 1 to grant Lee a visa. Bellocchi presents new insight into the US decision-making process and reactions within the US government to the visit.
The Cornell episode prompted China to ratchet up tension in the area by launching missiles into the seas surrounding Taiwan. The tension didn’t abate until March 1996, when — during the first ever Taiwan presidential elections — China repeated missile firings that finally prompted the US to move aircraft carrier battle groups into the region.
Bellocchi spends quite a number of pages going through the various scenarios for Taiwan’s future and describing the US policies needed to move in that direction. In particular he argues for stronger support for democracy in Taiwan, and for the country’s membership in international organizations. “Its diplomatic isolation is very broadly and very deeply felt,”
he writes.
Overall, this is a comprehensive book, with many insights into US policymaking — or lack thereof — in the 1990s, and an excellent account by a US diplomat who stood for basic American values and principles.
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