In recent years, the concept of digital public infrastructure (DPI) has gained significant attention from the international community, including the UN and the G20, as a new policy paradigm for development. However, understanding the risks of DPI is crucial to ensuring that its potential benefits materialize.
The risks stem from the fact that “digital public infrastructure” lacks a clear definition. The term encompasses the many digital technologies that serve as economic and social infrastructure, from digital identification and payment systems to data exchanges and health services. As a policy initiative, though, DPI refers to a vague vision of using these technologies to serve the public interest. That could result in the Internet and technological innovation working for everyone — or just as easily turn them into tools for political control.
In discussions about DPI, policymakers often point to cases that highlight how technology and connectivity can spur development. They frequently cite India’s Unified Payments Interface, which has expanded financial inclusion and reduced the costs of digital transactions for its hundreds of millions of users.
It is also understood that such infrastructure is to be built with digital public goods, a concept that encompasses open-source software, open standards and other nonproprietary components. That definition is partly intended to position DPIs as being “for the public,” but also to enhance competition and mitigate concentrations of power in the global digital economy.
Lastly, proponents point out that DPI could bolster international cooperation, particularly as the 20-year review of the World Summit on the Information Society approaches. That important UN initiative has provided the framework for countries to collaborate on digital development. Although authoritarian states have previously sought to assert greater control over the Internet’s governance during these negotiations, a focus on promoting DPI could avoid that politicized debate and instead foster a constructive agenda to bridge digital divides.
However, basing policy on such an ill-defined concept poses significant risks. Ideally, governments would convene other stakeholders to create an enabling environment for DPI and safeguard users’ rights and interests. However, it is easy to imagine that some governments would place their own interests above civil liberties and fundamental rights, using that infrastructure for surveillance and targeting in the name of law enforcement or national security. An especially pernicious example could involve the monitoring and regulation of individual behavior through dystopian social credit systems.
Moreover, while many proponents hope that DPI could chip away at Big Tech’s outsize power, it has also been associated with narratives of digital sovereignty that could contribute to the Internet’s fragmentation — a systemic threat to global communications. For example, one can imagine scenarios in which some governments challenge the multi-stakeholder model for governing global Internet resources such as IP addresses and domain names on the grounds that they constitute DPIs.
In fact, we recently witnessed something similar in the EU when it proposed an amendment to the Electronic Identification, Authentication and Trust Services regulation that would have empowered governments to mandate the recognition of digital certificates that did not adhere to stringent industry standards. That risked undermining the global governance model for browser security and could have allowed European governments to surveil communications within and beyond their borders.
The policy vision of DPI would continue to evolve, and ongoing discussions, it is hoped, would help identify and clarify further opportunities and risks. Initiatives such as the UN’s Universal DPI Safeguards Framework, which seeks to establish guardrails for DPI, are a promising start. However, much more must be done. For example, the UN’s framework has recognized the need for continuous learning to ensure that the right safeguards are in place.
As the concept of DPI gains traction in the UN system and other multilateral organizations, vigorous and informed debate regarding its potential advantages — and pitfalls — would be essential. With clear-cut policy guidelines and protections, we could help prevent these technologies from becoming tools for surveillance and repression, ensure that everyone benefits from the burgeoning digital economy, and keep the Internet open, globally connected and secure.
Carl Gahnberg is director of policy development and research at the Internet Society.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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