Sun, Nov 24, 2024 page8

• Falling into China’s ‘bilateral trap’

  • By Dion Maulana Prasetya
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  The recent joint statement between Indonesia and China has ignited sharp criticism, particularly concerning a contentious clause on joint development in areas of “overlapping claims” in the South China Sea. This agreement marks a potentially seismic shift in Indonesia’s position on the issue, raising critical questions about Jakarta’s diplomatic strategy and its implications for regional stability.

  For decades, Indonesia has maintained that it has no overlapping territorial claims with China in the South China Sea. This assertion is rooted in the 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which invalidated China’s expansive “nine-dash line.”

  However, by consenting to joint development in areas Beijing claims under the “nine-dash line,” Indonesia risks undermining its long-held stance. Critics argue that this could be interpreted as tacit validation of China’s claims, which contradict the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

  Furthermore, Indonesia’s willingness to engage in bilateral negotiations over contested waters might set a troubling precedent. China has long championed a bilateral approach to resolving disputes in the South China Sea, systematically sidelining multilateral frameworks like ASEAN. The inclusion of this clause in the joint statement could signal Indonesia’s gradual acquiescence to this “bilateral trap,” a strategy designed to fragment regional unity and weaken collective responses to Beijing’s maritime assertiveness.

  China’s strategic use of bilateralism in the South China Sea is a calculated challenge to the liberal world order. Beijing’s preference for one-on-one negotiations is no accident — it is a deliberate maneuver to assert control over the narrative and erode multilateral frameworks like ASEAN, which advocate for collaborative, rules-based solutions.

  China’s preference for bilateral negotiations in the South China Sea reflects a deliberate strategy, offering distinct advantages that strengthen its hand in regional disputes.

  First, this approach allows Beijing to exploit power asymmetries by isolating states in one-on-one talks. Without the collective backing of multilateral frameworks like ASEAN, smaller nations face an uphill battle negotiating with a powerful neighbor.

  Second, bilateralism grants China remarkable diplomatic flexibility. It enables Beijing to craft tailored approaches for each state, combining lucrative economic incentives with subtle strategic pressures. This adaptability allows China to secure agreements on its terms, while maintaining an image of cooperation and partnership.

  Finally, China’s bilateral approach subtly challenges the liberal, multilateral world order that has long dominated international relations. By presenting bilateralism as a practical and efficient way to resolve disputes, Beijing positions itself as a viable alternative to the Western preference for rules-based, collective solutions.

  In this way, China’s strategy is more than just a negotiation tactic — it is a calculated move to reshape the regional order, one bilateral agreement at a time.

  Indonesia’s decision to agree to joint development could be seen as a pragmatic move to maintain strong economic ties with China, its largest trading partner.

  This approach carries significant risks. By engaging bilaterally, Indonesia could inadvertently weaken ASEAN’s collective bargaining power, emboldening China to press its claims even more assertively.

  This shift also raises questions about Indonesia’s leadership role in the region. As Southeast Asia’s largest economy and a key player in ASEAN, Jakarta has long been expected to champion multilateralism. A perceived retreat from this principle could undermine its credibility within ASEAN and on the global stage.

  Moreover, the optics of this agreement might embolden other claimant states to pursue bilateral arrangements, potentially dismantling the fragile unity ASEAN has worked to maintain on the South China Sea issue.

  To counter China’s bilateral strategy, ASEAN must redouble its efforts to maintain unity and relevance in the South China Sea dispute. Collective action — whether through the implementation of the Code of Conduct or by strengthening ASEAN-led mechanisms — remains the most effective way to address the issue.

  Additionally, external actors such as the US, Japan and Australia could play a crucial role by supporting ASEAN’s multilateral efforts and providing alternatives to China’s economic incentives. This could include increased investment in the region, greater security cooperation and a more robust commitment to upholding international law.

  For Indonesia, balancing its economic ties with China and its commitment to multilateralism would be crucial. Jakarta must ensure that its actions do not inadvertently undermine its leadership in ASEAN or its ability to advocate for a rules-based order. Clear communication of its intent and adherence to international law are key to maintaining its credibility.

  Dion Maulana Prasetya is an assistant professor in the department of international relations at the University of Muhammadiyah Malang in Indonesia.
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