Indonesia will officially have a new president today with the inauguration of Prabowo Subianto.
Prabowo, who has experience studying abroad, had a bright military career, and a controversial connection to the civil unrest and revolutionary protests in 1998 which led to his dismissal from military service, is to become the eighth president of Indonesia.
Many observers wonder how Prabowo would govern Indonesia and what foreign policy the nation would have under his leadership.
Prabowo has a good understanding and substantial knowledge of international issues. In various international forums, unlike former Indonesian president Joko Widodo — widely known as Jokowi — Prabowo seems confident in giving speeches in English and at ease interacting with state leaders. Prabowo is likely to focus his attention more on foreign policy issues and seek to make Indonesia a key player in the international fora.
Prabowo demonstrated his ambition by traveling to 20 countries in just six months following his election victory, visiting China, Japan, Germany, Jordan, France, Serbia, Turkiye, Russia, Australia and all ASEAN countries except Myanmar.
These trips signal that Prabowo is highly likely to change Indonesian foreign policy from an inward-looking orientation under Jokowi, who primarily focused on domestic issues, to a more outward-looking orientation. However, it is not yet clear which region Prabowo would focus his pivot, whether on ASEAN, which is in the first concentric circle surrounding Indonesia, or to a region further afield.
Nonetheless, compared with Jokowi, it is almost certain that Prabowo would exert stronger international influence.
During a speech he gave in November last year on Indonesia’s foreign policy strategy hosted by the Indonesian Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in front of many ambassadors to Indonesia, Prabowo reiterated his commitment to continue an independent foreign policy if elected.
He said that he subscribes to an independent foreign policy program for Indonesia guided by the principles of non-membership and non-alignment to geopolitical blocs, and that he would not join any military alliance.
He said that Indonesia’s pursuit of an independent foreign policy is the correct stance, and non-membership and non-alignment are not only in the tradition of Indonesian foreign policy, but also the wish of the majority of Indonesians. More importantly, it is in the national interest of Indonesia.
Prabowo said he wants to maintain good neighborliness in the region and globally, and that a web of strong friendships would be a pillar of the nation’s foreign and defense policy.
He also said that he seeks peace and stability, because Indonesia needs foreign investment and the economy to flourish, as the nation is situated along important trading routes and strategic waterways, and depends on trade to prosper.
Thus, it is important to have a tradition of a “good neighbor policy,” he said.
Prabowo believes that “one thousand friends are too few and one enemy is too many,” which is comparable to the “zero enemy and a thousand friends” strategy of former Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
Prabowo said that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is important for Southeast Asia and Indonesia and that the PRC has contributed to the Indonesian economy. He also said that he would continue the path carried out for 10 years by the Jokowi administration of maintaining close economic links with China.
Therefore, Prabowo would likely continue Jokowi’s policy of building relations with the PRC and Taiwan.
However, Indonesia’s relationship with the PRC would be comparatively more friendly, especially if the PRC secures greater sympathy from Prabowo.
Meanwhile, there is no signal yet on how the Prabowo administration would build closer ties with Taiwan.
Knowing that Prabowo has designated the modernization of the Indonesian armed forces as a top priority of his administration, and because China’s ambition is to improve defense relations with Indonesia, there is a high possibility that Beijing would approach Prabowo with the offer of strategic military equipment in the form of warships and submarines, which would be attractive to Indonesia.
Prabowo would continue to maintain positive relations with countries, irrespective of ideology, alliances and state border disputes, if the relations would benefit Indonesia.
This orientation can be seen when Prabowo visited China and met Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) in early April after his election victory. Prabowo also visited Moscow and met Russian President Vladimir Putin in August, despite Putin being an out-of-favor figure due to Russia’s ongoing war with Ukraine.
Prabowo’s international friendliness would be a major element of his foreign policy, especially when he believes it is in Indonesia’s pragmatic interests.
With his background as a retired lieutenant general and an ex-commander of special forces, Prabowo might also have an assertive and confident character on the world stage.
The attitudes can be seen in his response to a question by the Japanese ambassador during the CSIS forum. Prabowo was asked how he planned to resuscitate international free trade while Indonesia maintains restrictions on exports and imports.
Prabowo said that it is not only free trade that Indonesia needs, but also fair trade and equality on the playing field. Indonesia has been “too nice” to other countries, he added.
With European ambassadors also present, he said that Indonesia feels EU policies toward the nation have been unfair.
Indonesia was barred from exporting palm oil, rubber, coffee, tea and cocoa, due to EU accusations of deforestation, he said.
Yet it was Europeans who once forced Indonesians to plant those commodities during their colonization of the country, he added.
Indonesian foreign policy in the Prabowo era is likely to be more friendly, pragmatic and confident than under the Jokowi administration. At the same time, a possible shift is that the Prabowo administration would be nuanced, such as by pursuing a more assertive and critical foreign policy.
Raden Mokhamad Luthfi is a PhD candidate in international relations in the International Doctoral Program in Asia Asia-Pacific Studies at National Chengchi University and a tenured lecturer in the International Relations Department at Al Azhar Indonesia University, Jakarta.
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