Media reports over the past few weeks have shown that a lieutenant colonel surnamed Hsieh (謝) from the army’s Aviation and Special Forces Command was approached by a Chinese espionage group led by retired military officer Chen Yu-xin (陳裕炘). After Hsieh’s contact with the group, Hsieh allegedly planned to defect to China by flying a helicopter to a Chinese aircraft carrier near the median line of the Taiwan Strait. Fortunately, the entire plan was foiled and Hsieh was arrested.
The incident shows that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has grown its scale of infiltration in Taiwan’s armed forces. It also proves that Beijing is continuing to carry out “united front” operations to achieve its goal of annexation.
Taiwan’s military is just one target. We should investigate whether Taiwanese life and culture have already come under the CCP’s influence. China Central Television (CCTV) and other Chinese media have been exporting content to Taiwan’s food industry and social media platforms to promote the idea that people living on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are connected through a shared cultural gene. Videos of Chinese songs and dances circulating on TikTok are examples. This kind of cultural infiltration is worthy of our attention and we should be wary of what its influence might be. Last year, a soup product made in China triggered a series of debates in Taiwan due to the “united front” propaganda wording on its packaging.
Taiwanese have different views on the importation of Chinese products and culture. For decades, Taiwan’s culture has been influenced by Japan, South Korea, the US and others. The circulation and reception of Chinese culture, however, are always coupled with political attention and sensitivity. In the beginning, self-produced media content from China was positively received by Taiwanese. Before long, though, China’s government began manipulating it, trying to send political messages on national identification through commercial channels and cultural products.
This should be considered propaganda. Beijing’s goal is to gradually dismantle the ways Taiwanese define the national borders between Taiwan and China, and clearly, the CCP has designed its tactics for long-term and enduring infiltration.
Taiwan could deal with this by referencing Ukraine. Last year, Ukraine’s borscht cooking culture was inscribed on UNESCO’s Lists of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy tried bolstering Ukrainians’ national affinity through aspects of everyday life. Through international recognition, he attempted to separate Ukrainian cooking and culture from Russian ones. The cultural communication between Taiwan and China is mostly carried out through daily life and cultural practices. We should think about how to confront the Chinese government’s employment of culture as a tool to influence Taiwan’s society, and meanwhile, we must establish our own defensive mechanisms to protect our own culture.
Along with the rapid development of social media platforms, we should be more attentive to building an all-out defense and enhancing our awareness. The CCP’s “united front” tactics evolve daily, and it is no easy task to immediately recognize China’s most updated strategy. In facing such a serious offensive, we must upgrade and consolidate countermeasures to protect ourselves from the “united front.” In the digital age and with globalization, Taiwan must remain vigilant, so it does not get caught up in the anxiety and danger resulting from Beijing’s “united front” encirclement.
Lin Chih-hung was a photographer for the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps’ Education Center in Hualien and is now a military product trader.
Translated by Emma Liu
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