Every Afghan and Syrian refugee who has sought asylum before a Rwandan court over the past few years has been turned away. Many others have not even lodged their claims because the Rwandan government has “clandestinely” relocated them to neighboring countries. This places these refugees at risk of refoulement: being returned to the country they had fled for fear of persecution, torture or death.
These were two of the key observations made by UK Supreme Court President Robert Reed as he delivered the judgement striking down the government’s policy of removing asylum seekers from the UK and sending them to Rwanda.
The Supreme Court justices unanimously found — on the “basis of the evidence and established legal principles,” that Rwanda was not a safe third country.
Illustration: Mountain People
The question of Rwanda’s safety for asylum seekers was the core issue before the justices. Under international and British law, a government can relocate asylum seekers — forcibly or otherwise — to another country, but only if that country is willing to receive them and safe.
Given the financial inducements offered to Rwanda’s authoritarian regime by the British Home Office, Rwandan President Paul Kagame was willing. The UK paid Rwanda ￡140 million (US$175.4 million) before a single refugee was relocated there, while the government promised to pay Rwanda more than ￡100,000 for each asylum seeker it took.
Even with such a large down payment, and with the promise of more to come, Kagame’s government failed to introduce the safeguards required to process asylum seekers properly.
Reed said that this was a breach, not only of treaties, fundamental norms of international law and the European Convention on Human Rights, but also of British law.
For example, the Asylum and Immigration Act 2004 and the Immigration Act 1971 require the government to uphold the 1951 Refugee Convention and to safeguard refugees’ “life and liberty.” Refoulement is prohibited, whether it is done directly or by “indirect return via a third country.”
This prohibition is absolute. There are no exemptions or loopholes that permit states to return asylum seekers to their place of origin while their claims are outstanding.
By contrast, the agreement between the UK and Rwandan governments has no legal force. It is a purely political arrangement, based on a memorandum of understanding that offers no protections for relocated refugees’ rights. It is neither “binding in international law” nor “justiciable in any court of law.”
Free of legal obligations, Rwanda’s only reason to respect relocated refugees’ rights was to keep the money flowing from the Home Office.
If Rwanda had proven its ability to house asylum seekers safely and to uphold their rights, this memorandum might have been enough, but the court scrutinized Rwanda’s track record and found that it had demonstrated no such thing. The entire arrangement hung on the fact that a “senior official” from the British Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office was “confident Rwanda would honor its obligations.”
Unlike in cases such as Begum v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, where the court was willing to defer to the government’s decision to strip an Islamic State recruit of her citizenship on national security grounds, the question of asylum did not lie “within the exclusive province of the executive.”
The evidence before the Court of Appeal, which was reviewed by the Supreme Court, showed egregious issues within Rwanda. Despite the country’s “great progress” since 1994, when it endured “one of the most appalling periods of violence in modern history,” its human-rights record “has been much criticized.”
In 2021, the British government itself condemned Rwanda’s “extrajudicial killings, deaths in custody, enforced disappearances, and torture,” and in 2018, Rwandan police fired “live ammunition at refugees protesting over cuts to food rations.”
Those events might have been enough to give the justices pause — and should have been more than enough to make then-British home secretary Suella Braverman reconsider the arrangement — but it was Rwanda’s recent record on asylum policy that revealed it could not be trusted.
The court’s exhaustive review observed that Rwanda has a “surprisingly high rejection rate for [asylum seekers] from known conflict zones” and a “misunderstanding ... of the concept” of refoulement.
Under a broadly similar asylum agreement with Israel, it also engaged in refoulement, with refugees “routinely clandestinely moved to Uganda” in breach of the policy. Much like the UK’s plan, the Israeli arrangement also ended when its Supreme Court struck it down.
A tone of disbelief pervades the Supreme Court decision.
The word “surprising” — a euphemism used by judges when they really mean “outrageous,” “absurd” or “idiotic” — appears throughout the judgement, and one can almost see the justices’ raised eyebrows over Braverman’s suggestion that Rwanda’s “past and present” conduct does not matter.
By refusing to add any caveats to their judgement, the justices unambiguously signaled their contempt for Braverman’s argument. There is no suggestion that the policy could be made lawful if Rwanda were to offer more specific, legally binding commitments.
Their damning judgement is a fitting coda to Braverman’s tenure as home secretary. The day before the decision came down, she was sacked, ostensibly for accusing police of being too soft on pro-Palestinian protesters.
The defenestration of her flagship policy, which she had tried to persuade other countries to emulate, is further confirmation of her incompetence — and a fitting denouement to her failed tenure.
Nicholas Reed Langen, a 2021 re:constitution fellow, edits the LSE Public Policy Review and writes on the British constitution for The Justice Gap.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
Two major Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-People’s Liberation Army (PLA) power demonstrations in November 2024 highlight the urgency for Taiwan to pursue a military buildup and deterrence agenda that can take back control of its destiny. First, the CCP-PLA’s planned future for Taiwan of war, bloody suppression, and use as a base for regional aggression was foreshadowed by the 9th and largest PLA-Russia Joint Bomber Exercise of Nov. 29 and 30. It was double that of previous bomber exercises, with both days featuring combined combat strike groups of PLA Air Force and Russian bombers escorted by PLAAF and Russian fighters, airborne early warning
For three years and three months, Taiwan’s bid to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) has remained stalled. On Nov. 29, members meeting in Vancouver agreed to establish a working group for Costa Rica’s entry — the fifth applicant in line — but not for Taiwan. As Taiwan’s prospects for CPTPP membership fade due to “politically sensitive issues,” what strategy should it adopt to overcome this politically motivated economic exclusion? The situation is not entirely dim; these challenges offer an opportunity to reimagine the export-driven country’s international trade strategy. Following the US’ withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership
On Tuesday, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) issued a statement criticizing Song Siyao (宋思瑤), a student from Shanghai’s Fudan University, saying she had offended the sensibilities of Taiwanese. It also called for the Ma Ying-jeou Foundation — established by former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) — which had organized the tour group, to remind group members to be careful with their statements. Song, during a visit to a baseball stadium in Taichung, said that the tour group “would like to congratulate China, Taipei team (中國台北隊) ... we wish mainland China and Taiwan compatriots can be like the team Chinatrust Brothers and
“Integrated Diplomacy” (總和外交) is the guiding principle of Taiwan’s current foreign policy. It seeks to mobilize technology, capital and talent for global outreach, strengthening Taiwan’s international connections. However, without a robust information security mechanism, such efforts risk being reduced to superficial courtesy calls. Security clearance serves as the “entrance examination results” for government agency personnel in sensitive positions, qualifying them to access sensitive information. Senior aides in the US Congress must also possess security clearance to assist lawmakers in handling classified budgets. However, security clearance is not an automatic right or a blanket necessity for accessing sensitive information. Access is granted only
RSS