Like some modern-day Gulliver that is tied up by powers large and small in a region that it needs to understand better, the US confronts a Middle East in a period of extraordinary change. But it does so with fewer illusions and a clear determination to reorder its priorities in a region that has unduly preoccupied its attention for the past several decades. The growing importance of the Indo-Pacific region, an increasingly aggressive Russia, independence from Arab hydrocarbons and a sense — following the failed trillion-dollar social science experiments in Afghanistan and Iraq — that most of what ails the region is beyond the US’ capacity to repair have forced a welcome downgrading of the Middle East in US foreign policy. And when a great power recalibrates, smaller powers will readjust in ways that both advance and harm its interests.
Five features define the region’s new political landscape. They have been emerging for quite some time, and correctly reading the changed terrain is vital if the US is to maximize the chances of protecting its interests in a region where, more often than not, US ideas go to die.
THE ARAB WINTER
Illustration: Yusha
To paraphrase the 1st-century Roman historian Tacitus, the best day after the death of a bad emperor is always the first day. Despite the promise and possibility of the so-called Arab Spring more than a decade ago, when Arabs young and old rallied in the streets to oppose several authoritarian regimes’ cruel and arbitrary political and economic policies, there ultimately was no redemption or deliverance, only backlash. In Bahrain and Syria, the old regimes hung on. In Egypt, the military seized power after a year of chaotic Islamist rule. In Yemen, a brutal civil war is ongoing. Even in Tunisia, the only country to have emerged with the real possibility of democratic reform, an authoritarian now holds near-absolute power. And in Lebanon, Libya and even Iraq, intractable internal disputes and outside meddling have made functional and equitable governance almost impossible.
In short, much of the Arab world remains in disarray and mired in seemingly impervious dysfunction. Iraq and Syria, in particular, are vulnerable to jihadist terror organizations and Iranian influence. With forces deployed in Iraq and Syria, the US is engaged in an intensive counterterrorism policy. However, with respect to other areas, its role is largely confined to supporting UN and other multilateral efforts, reflecting a lack of bandwidth, desire and interest in taking the lead on regional problem-solving.
There was a time when three key Arab states — Egypt, Syria, and Iraq — competed for power and influence in the Middle East. All are still important countries, but they lack the heft, influence and capacity to project power that they once had. The Arab Spring and various internal challenges have taken them offline, and new power centers have emerged.
One important development is the rise of non-Arab power centers. Despite their own internal challenges, Turkey, Israel and Iran have all managed to emerge as relatively functional states with tremendous economic potential and competent military and intelligence organizations. One of them (Israel) is the US’ closest ally in the Middle East, notwithstanding the tensions between their current governments; one (Iran) is the US’ longtime adversary; and one (Turkey) is a NATO member that cooperates with the US on some issues, but goes its own way on others, notably Syria.
Most importantly, each of these countries has the capacity to project its power abroad in ways that affect regional stability and US interests there. How the US deals with these governments, especially Iran and Israel, will shape the region’s politics for years to come.
MIND THE GULF
The one Arab power center that has emerged is the Persian Gulf, and it is easy to see why. The Saudi and Emirati regimes both weathered the Arab Spring unscathed and, in contrast to their neighbors, have come to represent competence and stability. As leading hydrocarbon exporters, they have been among the main economic beneficiaries of Russia’s war, which increased global dependence on Gulf oil and sent prices upward. Add to that the Abraham Accords (which normalized Israel’s relations with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain), the enduring threat from Iran and more risk-ready leaders like Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS), and it is clear why the Gulf looms larger in regional and US calculations.
And yet, while the Gulf’s importance has waxed, the US’ influence over it has waned. This is largely owing to MBS’ recklessness — from his disastrous war in Yemen to the blockade of Qatar and ongoing human rights abuses, not least the murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. To those who were watching closely, the cooling of relations was also evident in the US’ failure to offer a strong response to Iran’s attacks on two Saudi oil facilities in September 2019. Even then, before US President Joe Biden’s election, there was a growing sense among the US’ regional allies and partners that the US foreign-policy establishment had other priorities.
Accordingly, many regional players, adjusting to the great power’s recalibration and recognizing that they must reduce their dependence on it, have been reaching out to one another. This process will have complex and long-lasting consequences, but there is no denying that Russia and China have been among the biggest beneficiaries so far.
With heightened tensions between MBS and the Biden administration (on everything from oil prices to human rights), Saudi Arabia has been deepening its relations with Russia and China. This is no mere ploy to get US policymakers’ attention. Rather, it reflects a broader strategy to establish Saudi policymaking independence. MBS wants to be able to pivot, as needed, toward any number of regional and global players. He has a clear interest in cooperating with Russia on oil pricing (through OPEC+), as well as a natural affinity for autocrats who will not press him on human rights abuses, and who are not accountable to legislatures that may restrict arms sales.
Moreover, MBS wants to make Saudi Arabia one of the world’s top 15 economies, and China, by virtue of its size, inevitably fits into that plan. However, another key ingredient is stability in the Gulf, which requires defusing tensions with Iran. China thus was pushing on an open door when it brokered the recent detente between Riyadh and Tehran. And now that Saudi Arabia is pursuing membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization alongside Iran, Russia and China, we can expect China’s influence to grow.
These developments have been quite stunning. Far from leading a pro-Western coalition against its Iranian archenemy, Saudi Arabia is reestablishing diplomatic relations with Iran and reaching out to the US’ other adversaries. While the US remains Saudi Arabia’s primary security partner, the kingdom has also purchased Chinese military equipment. As then-Saudi minister of foreign affairs Saud al-Faisal told David Ottaway of the Washington Post back in the 2000s: What we want is neither a Catholic marriage nor a divorce from Washington, but rather a Muslim marriage where we can have other wives.
That said, it is unlikely that China could fully replace the US in the Middle East, even if it wanted to — which it does not. Why try to fill those shoes when the US Navy already takes care of China’s principal security concern in the region — protecting the flow of Persian Gulf oil?
IRAN AND THE BOMB
Even if it lasts, the Iranian-Saudi detente hardly guarantees a stable Persian Gulf or Middle East. Of all the potential sources of instability in an already-volatile region — from the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict to jihadist terror and great-power rivalries — the most significant is Iran’s nuclear program. This is the issue that could drive oil prices sky high, derail financial market, and culminate in a wider regional war.
Even after former US president Donald Trump’s administration scrapped the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, it seemed safe to say that none of the region’s major powers, principally Iran and Israel, wanted a major confrontation. That judgement probably still stands for now, but there is no longer any expectation that Iran’s enrichment capacity will be constrained through a diplomatic offramp. On the contrary, US animus toward Iran has only hardened further, owing to the regime’s brutal domestic crackdown and support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. Sanctions relief has become much more difficult to imagine, especially now that a hardline Israeli government is pushing for credible military options.
Neither the headlines nor the trend lines seem to favor an alleviation of tensions. If Iran is not already a nuclear-threshold state, it will soon be one. And when it is only days away from producing enough fissile material for several nuclear weapons, we will have to wonder if the International Atomic Energy Agency’s limited monitoring has been sufficient to detect its diversion to an undeclared site, where the assembly of a nuclear weapon could take as little as two years.
It is worth recalling that five consecutive US presidents have committed themselves to stopping Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, presumably by force if necessary. Moreover, Israel’s threshold for military action (even if it only delays Iran’s program) is considerably lower. However, the inconvenient, brutal truth is that there is no solution. Policymakers are simply clinging to the hope that Iran can be deterred from crossing Israeli or US red lines, and that some unanticipated Israeli or Iranian action in the region would not escalate into a wider confrontation.
WHAT THE US MUST DOe
The central conundrum facing the Biden administration is the same one that has dogged its predecessors, and that will surely plague its successors, too. The US has learned in recent decades — sometimes at a frightful cost — that it can neither transform the region nor extricate itself from it. The Middle East is littered with the remains of great powers that mistakenly believed they could impose their schemes and dreams there. But like it or not, the US has interests, friends and adversaries in the region. The fact that “withdrawal” is often mooted as an option does not mean that it is a viable one.
But if neither transformation nor extrication is possible for the US, what is left? The short answer is risk management. Since the Middle East has lost its place atop the hierarchy of US strategic interests, it is understandable that Biden’s team wants to keep the region’s issues off his plate, especially now that he is officially running for re-election. Governing is about setting priorities, and the US has its hands full enough with Russia and China.
In practice, this means that the US will focus on managing problems rather than solving them. “Must-haves” like counterterrorism, Gulf hydrocarbons and constraining Iran’s nuclear program will receive relatively more high-level attention, while “nice-to-haves” will get much less. Issues concerning Israel will also continue to command a high degree of White House attention, even if that is the last thing Biden wants.
The best that the US can do right now is to focus on its truly vital interests. On most other issues, it will have to limit itself to what former US secretary of state George Shultz called “tending the garden” in cooperation with credible local partners and strategic allies. It also must heed the words of another great secretary of state, James Baker, who warned that if you go looking for a fight, you are more than likely to find one.
If Biden had his druthers, he would not hear another word about the Middle East at least until 2025. But Iran’s nuclear program and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict — the two most intractable issues — are both simmering and will soon come to a boil, perhaps as early as this year. In neither will there be any chance of a happy ending, regardless of what the administration does. The US may be finished with the Middle East, but the Middle East is nowhere close to being finished with the US.
Aaron David Miller is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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