When Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping (習近平) met earlier this year to affirm their close ties, it was difficult to imagine that the Russian strongman clearly informed his Chinese buddy of his plan to invade Russia’s sovereign neighbor, Ukraine. As the undeclared war enters its ninth month, Putin is running into headwinds both abroad and — more muted — at home. Xi has continued his friendship with the Russian autocrat, but has not explicitly endorsed Putin’s war.
As I write this in mid-October, Xi is expected to gain a third five-year term in office at this week’s CCP Party Congress, on his way to establishing himself as ruler for life. Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) must be rolling in his grave, as one of his most significant legacies was to establish firm term limits for top party and state leaders. Xi may succeed in the short term, but he had better watch his back. The cadre of senior party officials who inhabit the Politburo and other top positions could well be troubled by this break in tradition and its implications for their future ambitions.
I suspect my friends in Taiwan are following all this carefully, particularly as they try to understand what impact Putin’s folly might have on Mr. Xi’s ambitions regarding Taiwan.
The Chinese strongman is in an awkward position. China’s delicate political situation requires him to avoid any signs of weakness. His economy is cooling, amidst some signs of unhappiness in various corners of his vast realm. Rural and isolated parts of China have benefited less than the center economically. This also applies to the perpetually restive centers of minority ethnic groups like the Tibetans and the Uyghurs, the latter centered in far western Xinjiang. At the same time, President Biden and his political and military team have signaled continuing willingness to push back on China regarding Taiwan. Perhaps somewhat too candidly, Mr. Biden has several times publicly repeated a willingness to get involved militarily, should China launch an unprovoked attack on the island.
To his credit, the Chinese leader has been careful here. He has not openly supported or encouraged Putin’s reckless adventurism in Ukraine. Nor has he shown any real desire to emulate Putin’s tactics in the Taiwan Strait, beyond his peevish reaction to Speaker Pelosi’s visit, when he tested ballistic missiles over the island, as well as to its north and south.
The question of greatest concern right now is how much further Putin is willing to go to salvage something short of utter defeat in his quixotic invasion of Ukraine. He has hinted at possibly escalating to the use of tactical nuclear weapons, something unheard of for over 75 years. As it is, Putin’s barbaric tactics in his war against Ukraine have united almost the entire world against him, with significant economic and political sanctions throttling the already shaky Russian economy. Even longstanding ally India has thus far been reluctant to offer much real encouragement or support to Putin in his time of trouble.
What does this all mean for Taiwan and its security? My sense is that Xi has enough on his plate that he will not shake up the current uneasy peace in the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese leader has undoubtably closely followed the global reaction to Putin’s Ukrainian folly. Any unprovoked aggression against Taiwan, including its outlying islands, would be as much or even more of an outrage in the eyes of the world as Putin’s misguided war against Ukraine. Specifically, it could trigger a military reaction from the United States, quite possibly with the active support of Washington’s alliance network in the Far East.
Japan, in particular, would find it difficult to avoid being drawn into any cross-strait conflict, because American bases on Japanese territory would almost certainly be an active part of the US kinetic response. Japan, with long historical ties to Taiwan, could well view such an attack as a direct threat to its national interests. Australia and other southeast Asian countries would also find it difficult to stay out of such a conflict.
In short, Mr. Xi should think very carefully before he risks his nation as well as his personal standing by ratcheting up tension with the island nation to his east. Xi’s overriding goal has been to gain a third term as Chinese Party Secretary and President. All this at a time when China’s growth rate is slowing, demographic and ethnic tensions persist, and many of Beijing’s neighboring countries remain vigilant, if not alarmed, by the politics of China under Mr. Xi. The last thing he needs now is a crisis over Taiwan, one which would probably end badly for him both militarily and politically.
Xi should carefully reflect on the lessons of Putin’s war on Ukraine. First, the military goals that prompted Putin have been meager and have come at a great cost, in human and material sacrifice. Second, the Russian economy is under water, sanctions are exacting a real cost both to the man in the Kremlin and his people — particularly those fighting and dying every day as this conflict enters its ninth month. Third, the West’s commitment to extract a huge price has not wavered; if anything, the coalition backing Ukraine’s effort is only getting stronger. From NATO to the UN General Assembly to public opinion around the world, the revulsion against Putin and those who keep him in power has only grown. Putin’s recent decision to draft large numbers of young Russian men into his flailing effort appears to be widely unpopular in Russia, despite the tight control of objective reporting on the war within the Russian Federation.
China has its own problems, with an ageing population, wealth inequality and growth rates that have fallen steadily from their earlier (and unsustainable) 7-8 percent levels. Gauging public opinion in a closed society like the PRC is never easy. But I suspect many Chinese citizens would rank a serious attempt to attack Taiwan, with all that entails, far down on their personal list of priorities. Stabilizing the economy, increasing the availability of goods and services, improving infrastructure, maintaining cordial relations with its neighbors, addressing health care and old age infrastructure (in a steadily ageing population) would likely score much higher on any genuine polling of the people.
These are the kind of issues all the propaganda People’s Daily spews out cannot substantially alter. It is what we often call “bread and butter” issues. To the extent China’s citizens travel abroad these days, for tourism or scholarship, they probably bring home a very different — and less favorable — perception of Mr. Xi’s policies and their impact on the people back home. Even in a harshly authoritarian regime, that should be cause for concern.
Ambassador Stephen M. Young (ret.) lived in Kaohsiung as a boy over 50 years ago, and served in AIT four times: as a young consular officer (1981-’82), as a language student (1989-’90), as Deputy Director (1998-2001) and as Director (2006-’9). He visits often and writes regularly about Taiwan matters. Young was also US Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan and Consul General to Hong Kong during his 33-year career as a foreign service officer. He has a BA from Wesleyan University and a PhD from the University of Chicago.
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