Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi’s (王毅) visit early last month to war-torn Myanmar to cohost the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) meeting suggests that Beijing sees the military junta as the best bet to safeguard its economic investments in the Southeast Asian country. Centered on economic cooperation, the meeting brought together the foreign ministers of the six nations sharing a river that runs across their borders.
As the first multinational meeting held in Myanmar since the junta ousted Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) administration, it was a crucial opportunity for the new regime to consolidate its international position. Myanmar, which has seen its foreign direct investments dry up since the coup, has been crippled by the COVID-19 pandemic and Western-led sanctions. The nation has faced widespread civil war, mass human rights abuses, refugee outflows and an economic collapse.
Despite sharing a close relationship with the NLD government, China did not recognize the military takeover as a coup, viewing it instead as a “reshuffling of Cabinet” — much in line with its desire to “return to business” within Myanmar. However, rising anti-Chinese sentiment, coupled with an increasingly volatile domestic environment, has caused a spike in vicious attacks on Chinese-invested factories. Wang held talks with his Burmese counterpart, Wunna Maung Lwin, on the sidelines of the LMC meeting to address these concerns, calling for Myanmar’s State Administration Council to seek “political reconciliation” and to “adhere to rational consultation” with all parties in Myanmar amid concerns of escalating violence.
In hopes that the domestic political environment would stabilize, China and Myanmar have pledged to boost cooperation in a number of key infrastructure projects, especially those within the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor — one of several economic corridors under China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. Reviving projects under this initiative within the region has been a top priority for Beijing as it emerges from the COVID-19 pandemic, and Myanmar’s strategic geopolitical location — ie, giving China access to the Indian Ocean — is crucial to advancing Beijing’s national interests.
The State Administration Council has said that China is committed to supporting 200 million yuan (US$29.4 million) of development projects in Rakhine, notably the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone. The two nations have agreed to continue connecting their power grids, expedite construction of cross-border interconnection schemes and develop hydropower projects in Myanmar to reinforce the infrastructural capability of the economic corridor.
Beijing in April launched a new land-sea trade corridor to further improve its access to the Indian Ocean via Myanmar. Traveling through four Mekong countries — China, Thailand, Laos and Myanmar — the trade corridor is expected to cut current transport times in half. The new route would also look to enhance Chongqing’s connectivity with ASEAN and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership members.
Moreover, China has announced that it would provide more than 40 million yuan to the military junta to fund more than 20 new projects under the LMC framework. These projects include providing financial support to strengthen a wide variety of sectors, including agriculture, science, culture and tourism. To assist in this objective, the China-funded Mekong-Lancang Cooperation National Coordination Unit (Myanmar) has been established to oversee the progress of these investments.
Beijing, with its evident backing of Myanmar’s State Administration Council, has seemingly decided that the military junta is its best bet to protect its considerable economic investments in the Southeast Asian country. China will continue to push its hegemonic influence throughout the Mekong region, while other key regional democratic players such as Japan, Singapore and India continue to pull out of investment projects in line with the set of unilateral sanctions imposed against Naypyidaw.
China and Russia — which has also emerged as one of the “most visible backers” of the military junta — have utilized their diplomatic influence to assert greater control over the country. On May 5, the two authoritarian powers used their seats in the UN Security Council to veto the issuing of a statement expressing concern regarding the serious humanitarian situation and escalating violence in Myanmar. Furthermore, Beijing and Moscow have allegedly provided new weaponry to the regime’s forces, a UN Human Rights Council report says.
By continuing to utilize its economic might and businesslike diplomatic maneuverability, Beijing’s relationship with Myanmar has assumed a strategic character built upon economic and geopolitical security. Wang cohosting the LMC meeting in Myanmar underscores this sentiment, as Beijing looks to continue to resolutely back the country “no matter how the situation changes.”
With the military junta’s bloody crackdown on dissent showing no signs of slowing, China’s and Russia’s support in propping up the illegitimate regime will further strengthen the junta’s iron fist and oppressive control over the Burmese people. Their support of the regime has only deepened the growing divide between the world’s autocracies and democracies.
Callum Thomas is an intern at the Taiwan NextGen Foundation.
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