The administration of US President Joe Biden on Feb. 11 announced its new Indo-Pacific Strategy. The 19-page document stated: “Our objective is not to change the PRC [People’s Republic of China] but to shape the strategic environment in which it operates, building a balance of influence in the world that is maximally favorable to the United States, our allies and partners, and the interests and values we share.”
On the evening of March 18, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習進平) had a videoconference with Biden. According to the Chinese readout of the meeting, Biden reiterated the commitments he made during his videoconference with Xi in November last year: that the US does not seek a new cold war with China; it does not aim to change China’s system; the revitalization of the US’ alliances is not targeted at China; the US does not support “Taiwanese independence”; and it has no intention to seek conflict with China.
What is worth noting was the comment that the US does not aim to change China’s system.
Whether the US seeks to change China’s system has been an age-old question. In 1972, the Shanghai Communique categorically stated: “There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.”
This is enough to show that then-US president Richard Nixon thought that China had its own sense of uniqueness, while then-US secretary of state Henry Kissinger has stressed China’s “singularity.”
Committed to be the enforcer of the geopolitical order, the US has always been concerned with global strategic benefits. Even though China has become the greatest geopolitical challenge of this century, the US has always stuck to its path — the US has never attempted to change China’s system.
In an interview with Voice of America, Aaron Friedberg, a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, said that the West’s strategy of engagement with China has failed. It was wrong to have assumed that political freedom would follow new economic freedoms in China, and it has also underestimated the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) unwavering determination to crush opposition, accumulate national power and realize its ideological ambitions.
Friedberg also said that Xi’s approach is not a fundamental departure from his predecessors, but that he is striving to fulfill those initial goals set out by the CCP’s founders.
Indeed, China’s meteoric rise to superpower status over the past decade has not sat well with the US and its allies. Nonetheless, the catch remains: Has the US sought to change China’s one-party system?
The West’s approach to China — with the US in the lead — has not aimed at changing China’s system, but to nudge China into accepting the rules and norms of the international rules-based order established after World War II. With such a goal in sight, the US, along with other Western nations, has been trying to help China with reform so that it could gradually integrate into the global economy through foreign trade and investment.
This vision is enough to explain why the West — as opposed to its move to end communist political regimes of the Soviet Union — has adopted a humoring attitude toward China, even after the Tiananmen Square Massacre. The aftereffects of this policy inclination only started to manifest themselves after Xi came to power in 2012.
Since then, China has used its rapid economic growth to facilitate its massive increases in military spending, and as a means of coercing and rewarding other nations. For the past few years, Xi, spurred by his “Chinese Dream,” has stepped up his ambition to supplant the US as the global superpower and bring down US hegemony. Despite former US president Donald Trump’s and Biden’s differences, both see eye-to-eye on one particular issue: the need to counter China’s rising power.
From Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) and Jiang Zemin (江澤民) to Hu Jintao (胡錦濤), Chinese leaders have always claimed that China’s development does not pose a threat to any other nation and that it would not pursue hegemony regardless of how powerful it becomes. Nevertheless, even this rhetoric has been lost in the sound and fury of “wolf warrior” diplomacy under the leadership of Xi.
Xi has been overwhelmed with the idea of “rise of the East, decline of the West.” From the Confucius Institutes, the Belt and Road Initiative, and Huawei Technologies to the crackdowns in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, Xi is swiftly altering the West’s conception of China.
When Trump came to power in 2017, the first National Security Strategy directly addressed the US’ need to deal with competition from Russia and China. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China could become the US’ only rival.
Looking at the history of the US-China rivalry, there is already a limitation in place: China could be the world’s factory and market, but it could never be a member of the democratic camp. The notion of not changing China’s system could benefit China, but does not favor it in the long run. No matter how powerful it becomes, as long as Beijing maintains its one-party rule, it could never be a hegemony that democratic nations could concede to.
Lately, China’s export of its governance model has jolted awake democratic nations and opened their eyes to China’s aggression.
In the current world order, China could easily champion the side of autocracies, as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. However, China is akin to Russia in that both autocracies could never supplant the US place in the democratic camp. The only rival that has the potential to supplant the US as the dominant influence is the EU, a fellow member of the democratic alliance.
China has kept the US at bay and held on tight to its one-party rule to serve the CCP’s long-term rule and interests. Nevertheless, its autocracy has put a constraint on its pursuit of hegemony.
Propagandizing itself in “wolf warrior” language, China claimed it has been implementing “democracy” with Chinese characteristics. However, there should be no misunderstanding when it comes to the term “democracy”: The US has implemented its style of democracy, while Germany and France theirs, but what China has is autocracy with Chinese characteristics.
The rivalry between the China-Russia camp and the US can be perceived as a battle between autocracy and democracy. If China were to use brute force, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine could serve as a bloody example as to what the outcome would be.
To displace US hegemony, Xi would have to reform China in accordance with universal values. Only in this way can China stand a chance of superseding the US.
Otherwise, in a confrontation pitting democracy against autocracy, Xi would only become the next Hitler or Stalin.
In an interview with the Russian Satellite News Agency, economic adviser to Putin, Boris Titov, said that even though China has made great strides, the technology of the US and Europe is still ahead.
As a result, in the US-China rivalry, the US’ biggest threat would be Beijing’s complicity with Moscow, while China’s adversity would be self-realization amid besiegement and opposition.
Translated by Rita Wang
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