The COVID-19 pandemic wreaked havoc on African economies, hampering GDP growth and straining government budgets. The war in Ukraine now threatens to make things much worse, including by disrupting food supplies and compounding inflationary pressures, but when these shocks pass, many African countries will still be struggling with the effects of climate change — and with advanced economies’ failure to keep their commitments to help the continent cope.
Despite having contributed the least to global warming, Africa is the continent most vulnerable to its effects — a reality that has become impossible to ignore, as extreme weather events exacerbate food insecurity and destroy livelihoods, but most African countries lacked the fiscal space to invest adequately in adaptation even before the pandemic. Now, many are on the brink of debt distress.
Climate action was a key topic at the spring meetings of the IMF and World Bank, but somehow the world’s enduring failure to fulfill its climate-finance commitments — beginning with the US$100 billion developed economies pledged to deliver to their developing counterparts every year from 2020 to 2025 — did not get the attention it deserved.
In 2019 — a decade after that pledge was made — rich countries claimed they were approaching the target, having mobilized US$79.6 billion, but even this rather disappointing figure is controversial, with many believing that the numbers are inflated or that some money is counted twice.
In reality, the accumulated deficit of various climate-related promises since 2009 is probably already approaching US$1 trillion — and that figure is set to keep growing. It is now estimated that annual contributions will not reach US$100 billion until next year.
Only a small share of this will go to Africa. From 2016 to 2019, African countries received about US$20 billion annually from the unmet US$100 billion pledge and other funding sources are hardly picking up the slack. Just 37 percent of the Green Climate Fund’s portfolio — US$3.3 billion — is invested in Africa, while the Least Developed Country Fund, which supports mostly African countries, has provided a meager US$437 million to the continent since 2001.
From 2014 to 2018, African countries received less than US$5.5 billion in adaptation financing, or roughly US$5 per person per year — well below the estimated need. African countries are meeting only about 20 percent of their adaptation needs through domestic and international finance. A mere 5 percent of all flows from international climate funds have been disbursed for local climate-adaptation interventions.
Making matters worse, 57 percent of the adaptation funding Africa has received was provided in the form of loans.
The injustice is obvious. How can rich countries justify forcing poor, often highly indebted countries to cover the costs of adapting to climate hazards they have done little to cause?
However, this is also a practical problem, because loans for adaptation have a lower disbursement rate than grant-based funding.
This contributes to the very low disbursement ratio for adaptation-related finance in Africa.
Just 46 percent of the committed funding for adaptation was disbursed from 2014 to 2018, compared with 56 percent for mitigation and 96 percent for all development finance, the Stockholm Environment Institute says.
The Aid Atlas database presents an even bleaker picture.
From 2002 to 2019, funders disbursed just over US$8.1 billion in development finance to Africa for climate adaptation, less than one-third of the US$29.2 billion committed. This low disbursement ratio largely reflects barriers to project implementation, such as requirements for cofinancing and rigid climate-fund rules.
Even if the world fulfilled its climate-financing commitments, it would not be enough.
Based on data from the Africa Nationally Determined Contributions Hub, the continent needs US$715 billion for mitigation and US$259 billion to US$407 billion for adaptation from 2020 to 2030.
The African Group of Negotiators on Climate Change has called for US$1.3 trillion per year by 2030 in financing for developing countries to tackle climate change. Meanwhile, major multilateral development banks have committed a paltry US$38 billion to low and middle-income countries, with US$9 billion for sub-Saharan Africa.
Beyond boosting its climate-finance commitments, the international community must take steps to ensure a just and equitable transition. For example, Africa possesses metals and minerals that are needed to support the clean-energy transition, and boasts huge potential for green hydrogen production. Any effort to tap these resources must minimize the relevant sectors’ social, environmental and climate impact, and advance structural transformation that elevates Africa’s position in global value chains.
A just climate transition requires support in all sectors. For example, South Africa’s agricultural sector is extremely vulnerable to climate change, but highly concentrated, well-resourced and largely white agro-industrial producers are much better positioned to adapt than rural smallholder farmers.
The US$8.5 billion Just Energy Transition Partnership offers a good model.
Launched at last year’s UN Climate Change Conference in Scotland, the Partnership would help South Africa accelerate its clean-energy transition, with the support of the EU, France, Germany, the UK and the US. The deal combines new investment in renewables, electric vehicles and green hydrogen with measures to protect workers and communities tied to fossil-fuel industries.
Rich countries have reaped massive rewards from environmental destruction. The least they can do is use some of that wealth to support adaptation in countries that have not. Africa cannot afford more broken climate-finance promises.
Carlos Lopes, a professor at the Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance at the University of Cape Town, is a member of the Global Commission on the Economy and Climate.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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