South Korea is to hold its 20th presidential election on March 9.
Multiple opinion polls show former South Korean prosecutor general Yoon Suk-yeol, the candidate of the opposition People Power Party, to be slightly ahead of Lee Jae-myung, a former governor of Gyeonggi Province and the candidate of the ruling Democratic Party, although Yoon’s lead is within the margin of error.
As the campaigns enter the final furlong, two incidents at the Beijing Winter Olympics — one involving the appropriation of traditional Korean clothing, the other a perceived biased judging decision — have enraged young South Koreans and boiled over into nationwide anti-China sentiment.
South Korean social media is awash with angry accusations of “cultural plunder” and “cultural engineering” after a female performer wearing a traditional Korean hanbok was presented as a Chinese ethnic minority during a Chinese national flag-passing routine at the opening ceremony.
Beijing has a history of putting ethnic minorities on display at set-piece events to promote the concept of unity of one big “Chinese family,” and performers wearing hanbok have featured at China’s national celebrations for some time.
Given this, why did so many young South Koreans view hanbok being worn at the opening ceremony as a naked provocation that constituted a “plundering” of their cultural identity?
The problem runs much deeper than the clothing itself, which was just a touch paper for deep-seated anti-China sentiment among South Koreans that has been bubbling under the surface for a long time. This long-suppressed anger reached a tipping point.
An opinion poll conducted by a South Korean think tank last year found that 74 percent of the population held a negative sentiment toward China, up from 52 percent in 2019.
Anti-South Korean protests orchestrated by the Chinese government in 2017 over the US’ deployment of its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea and multiple bans of K-pop entertainers in the past few years are still fresh in the memories of many in the country.
Additionally, Beijing’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy, and the extreme nationalism that gave birth to it, coupled with the Democratic Party’s perceived pandering to China, has offended many South Koreans.
These factors are the fundamental cause behind the anti-China backlash during the Olympics.
However, how will this sentiment affect the presidential election?
Yoon has registered the shift in national mood and is playing the anti-China card. He has pledged to strengthen the US-South Korea alliance, mend fences with Japan, deploy additional THAAD units in the country and even said that he would push for membership in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, also known as the “Quad.”
Yoon’s unequivocal anti-China, pro-US stance is rare for a South Korean presidential candidate, encapsulated by his blunt statement that “most South Koreans, especially young people, dislike China.”
During a television debate prior to the Olympics, Lee criticized Yoon’s pro-US stance and his THAAD deployment pledge, warning that it would severely damage trade relations with China.
However, after the firestorm created at the Olympics, Lee changed his tune and in an interview said that Chinese fishing vessels that illegally cross into South Korean territorial waters should be sunk.
Lee’s U-turn shows that he, too, has registered the shift in national mood and is worried it could scupper his campaign.
The Chinese embassy in Seoul issued a congratulatory message after South Korea won its first gold medal at the Games — a clear indication that Beijing is trying to dampen the fire, unleashing a charm offensive on the South Korean public in an attempt to prevent the installment of a pro-US, anti-China president in the Blue House.
Washington would be able to further consolidate its strategic advantage in Northeast Asia if Seoul moves away from Beijing.
The presidential election will have far-reaching geopolitical ramifications that directly affect Taiwan and the security of the region.
Yang I-pin is an assistant university professor
Translated by Edward Jones
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