On Friday, the world woke up to the unexpected news that Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega had decided to put an end to the relationship between his country and Taiwan, to immediately establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
To add insult to injury, the joint statement in which the announcement was made said that the PRC is the only legitimate government that represents all of China and that Taiwan is a part of its territory.
To say that no one was expecting the rupture would be an understatement, after all, everyone was focusing on Honduras and what would happen there after Xiomara Castro, a left-wing presidential candidate who had vowed to switch ties from Taiwan to China, was declared victorious.
While Ortega’s decision came as a surprise, there is evidence to suggest that Nicaragua’s switch is an isolated incident, and that its decision is not something that other countries in Latin America might necessarily imitate.
Nicaragua’s political situation has been unstable for many years. In last month’s election, there was a reported abstention rate of up to 81 percent, probably the highest in recent memory, which has led many inside and outside the country to believe that Ortega’s support is wavering even among members of his own political party.
In addition, the “sham” election, in which the Nicaraguan regime jailed its political opponents to remain in power, isolated it even further from the international community.
Just a few days after the election, the US, Canada, the UK and EU imposed sanctions on the Nicaraguan Public Ministry and on many Nicaraguan officials as a mechanism to support the Nicaraguan people and try to coerce Ortega’s government to return its country to a real democracy.
While the sanctions were well intended, the souring in the relationship between Nicaragua and the democratic world also left these countries with little to no leverage to be used against a government that has shown no sign of remorse for the repression that it has exerted on its citizens, and which has basically been ignoring these sanctions for a long time now.
The Nicaraguan government has a strong affinity with the PRC, given that Ortega had already established diplomatic relations with it in 1985. The ties were later restored in favor of Taiwan by a right-wing government, but now that both countries have autocratic leaders with no intention of leaving office through democratic means, the switch should not be entirely shocking.
Finally, both countries are still promoting communist ideas, and since there are very few allies in Latin America who can, or would, support Ortega’s ideology, it should come as no surprise that he eventually decided to get support from a country that can provide the economic resources he needs to stay in power.
China would undoubtedly provide all the assistance that Ortega requires, and would do so without any moral concerns about abetting the repression of Nicaraguans.
All of these circumstances are essentially different from the rest of the allies that Taiwan has in the region, because even though the president-elect of Honduras is often labeled as a socialist, she has just been elected in the most transparent election in Honduran history, and has vowed to return the country to democracy.
In addition, the economic influence that the US has in Latin America is undeniable, so besides Nicaragua, there are virtually no other countries on that continent that can ignore the effects that a skirmish with the US and its enforcement of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act would cause.
The switch of ties at this moment might even have unintended negative consequences for the PRC’s campaign to completely isolate Taiwan on the international stage.
Nicaragua is well-known as a dictatorship, and by throwing its support behind a regime that openly jails its political opponents, China might have made the people in the countries that still support Taiwan wary of considering any kind of switch that points toward autocracy.
The Honduran media have not made much of the news, and besides reporting the switch the day it happened, they seem to be more focused on US Undersecretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights Uzra Zeya’s visit to meet with Castro.
This seems to give a clue about where the Central American country’s priorities lie.
For its part, the Paraguayan government has already said that it intends to continue to have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and that while it respects the decision that the Nicaraguan government made, it is not planning to follow in its steps.
This is some of the evidence of why a “domino effect” in the region seems unlikely, and if history can be used as a guide, the case of the Pacific Islands might have been the only time when two countries from the same region have broken ties with Taiwan since President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) took office in 2016.
Each country has their own government with its own priorities, and to assume that one of them would immediately follow what its neighbor does would be to ignore their sovereignty. As Federico Gonzales, adviser to the Paraguayan president, has stated, the Nicaraguan government’s decision is its and its alone.
This is not to say that there is no reason to be concerned; all evidence suggests that the Chinese government will continue with its campaign to poach all of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies.
This should serve as a reminder to Taiwan’s government that it must always remain vigilant, even when there does not seem to be a reason to be so, and that it must redouble its efforts to prevent the Chinese Communist Party’s efforts from being successful.
The US and all democratic nations also have a role to play. There is no better time for them to demonstrate their support for this beacon of democracy in Asia, because just as it was observed in Honduras, their influence might be the strongest deterrent against switching ties for the remainder of Taiwan’s allies.
Fernando Herrera Ramos is a Honduran lawyer residing in Taiwan. He has a master’s degree in business administration.
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