Tuesday marked a significant, although not particularly glorious, first-decade milestone for the Agency Against Corruption (AAC). At the insistence of then-president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), the AAC was created as part of the Ministry of Justice on July 20, 2011, modeled after Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC).
The government at the time made a serious mistake by taking a short-sighted approach, focusing more on setting up the commission than on setting it up properly, making it a third-tier agency of the ministry.
Although the law gave some of its officers the status of judicial police and created Taiwan’s first resident prosecutor system, the power to appoint the director and deputy director was vested in the justice minister, a position that can still be influenced by others in the hierarchy.
Further restraints were added by the Legislative Yuan, which limited the budget and statutory staffing from the proposed 800 to 222. As a result, the AAC has from its inception had to face questions from both domestic and foreign experts about its lack of independence, and its capacity to handle cases.
According to the Organic Act of the Agency Against Corruption (法務部廉政署組織法), the three statutory responsibilities of the AAC are to “enforce anti-corruption measures, prevent corruption and eradicate corruption.”
The AAC has a strong track record in all three areas, which are addressed yearly in its annual report, and can be found on its Web site. However, in addition to objective indicators of government performance, the key subjective indicator is what the public thinks about it.
For many years, I have taught a university course on global governance, and every semester I ask the class an important question: “If you encounter corruption in Taiwan, where would you report it?” Fewer than 20 percent answer “the AAC.” Most would report corruption to the police or the news media. If the same question were asked in Hong Kong, nearly 100 percent would say “the ICAC.” It is clear that younger people’s awareness of the AAC is vague and needs to be promoted.
Commentators have noted that the AAC has devoted a great deal of attention to educating the public about anti-corruption measures, often mobilizing local government ethics offices to distribute information and organize exhibitions, making it an important indicator of local government performance.
Unfortunately, the target audience is usually government officials. While these efforts are always big spectacles, they do not have much of an effect on public education. The five international reviewers of the 2018 UN Convention Against Corruption Initial Country Report concluded that the government should incorporate anti-corruption education into character education starting in elementary school and even kindergartens.
There have been successful examples of anti-corruption education in Taiwan. When Vice President William Lai (賴清德) was mayor of Tainan, he used a lively computer animation to ask children to join elementary and junior-high school anti-corruption classes. Impressively, some students even told their parents that they should end vote buying and that selling one’s vote was tantamount to betraying one’s soul.
Since the AAC, unlike Hong Kong’s ICAC, lacks the financial resources to make a series of films on government integrity, it could consider using the unique advantages provided by the 3,000 government ethics officials nationwide to improve the link between local ethics units and public education.
Going into the community and educating children is another way to influence parents. This would be more pragmatic and meaningful than asking government officials to participate in the “integrity achievement exhibitions.”
Punishing corruption is the easiest way to make people feel that the government is doing something. However, the AAC has focused on preventing rather than eradicating corruption, and it has not shown a determination to handle major cases, not to mention results. This in turn has affected the public’s awareness of the AAC’s existence.
There has been a lack of political will from the head of the commission — which has been frequently changed — as well as a shortage of capacity to handle cases. The AAC has a lot of information, but not enough resources in the corruption eradication unit, and a lack of sincere cross-agency coordination. Although there are regular liaison meetings between the AAC and the Bureau of Investigation, there are rumors of discord or fighting for credit.
In 2013, I arranged for then-Transparency International Portugal president Luis de Sousa to visit the AAC. This expert in national anti-corruption efforts was looking forward to sharing his experience of the failure of Portugal’s corruption agency. Unfortunately, the AAC head at the time was too keen to explain their governance ideals to listen to any suggestions from this European expert.
Portugal’s anti-corruption agency, the Alta Autoridade Contra a Corrupcao, had a lifespan of about 10 years from its establishment in 1983, when it was supported by the country’s major parties. Its abolition came by an overwhelming parliamentary vote in 1992.
The reasons for its failure included the director’s lack of professionalism and independence, a severe lack of staff and resources, a lack of horizontal judicial coordination and cooperation, and a lack of public support, as it neglected anti-corruption education and promotion.
Anti-corruption agencies are financed by parliaments, but parliaments are also their enemies. When public sentiment is favorable, a parliament may pass legislation and budgets to set up such an agency. If it does not perform well and public opinion changes, it quickly becomes a cross-partisan target and either loses staff or is closed down.
The AAC has already surpassed the lifespan of Portugal’s agency, and it is heading into its second decade. Looking to the future, the government should ask itself a series of questions: Is it necessary to repeat mistakes and replace the director five times in a decade? How can the injustice of differential treatment of AAC judicial officials be resolved? How can the antagonistic relationship between the AAC and ethics officials — and rumors about unfair staff rewards, punishments, promotions and factional lobbying — be avoided through transparency and institutionalization? What can be done to greatly improve on-the-job training and overseas exchange studies for AAC officers?
Minister of Justice Tsai Ching-hsiang (蔡清祥) once made the bold statement that he hoped Taiwan would surpass Hong Kong in the international Corruption Perceptions Index. Having a dream is beautiful, but the question is how to make it come true.
In the absence of a fundamental solution to the AAC’s status as a third-tier administrative agency, the decisionmaking level should be raised, and the Cabinet should invite retired ethics officials and external academics and experts to hold a national conference on integrity. They are insiders who know the ins and outs, and can propose solutions to these problems and dilemmas.
After 10 years, it is time to take another big step forward.
Ernie Ko is a member of Transparency International’s Membership Accreditation Committee.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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