On July 6, US National Security Council Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific Kurt Campbell told a virtual meeting of the Asia Society that the US does “not support Taiwan independence.”
His remark was met with dismay by those who were hoping the momentum of increased US support for Taiwan would lead to a more full-throated advocacy for independence, as well as anger among those who thought it morally reprehensible that US President Joe Biden’s administration is not more explicitly getting behind Taiwan.
Analyses of Campbell’s words have since proliferated. However, before hackles are raised, it is important to consider the context in which they were said.
Campbell was responding to a question from Asia Society Policy Institute vice president Daniel Russel, who asked: “How much love is too much love for Taiwan?” now that incremental moves toward increasing engagement with Taiwan mean that the US is edging closer to the line separating unofficial and official relations, “which in effect hollow out America’s ‘one China’ policy.”
Campbell predicated his answer by saying that he needed to be very careful, as the US is dealing with a “delicate and dangerous” balance, and has extraordinarily important interests in the maintenance of peace and stability. He added that other nations are coming to realize that, too, naming Japan and the UK.
Voicing support for Taiwanese independence would disturb this delicate balance.
Campbell had to be careful because he was not offering a personal judgement or official desired objective. He was maintaining official US policy, as a representative of the US administration. He would have been keenly aware of the audience he has beyond the three other participants in the virtual meeting. His words were designed to send a signal to Beijing, Taipei and members of the US Congress pushing for more official support for Taiwan.
Russel’s point about the blurring of the lines between official and unofficial US-Taiwan ties is central. Starting with the administration of former US president Donald Trump, Washington has made incremental moves to increase engagement with Taiwan, and the Biden administration has continued on this trajectory of blurring official/unofficial exchanges with Taipei, doing away with the appearance of clearing these with Beijing first, as would be expected if the US recognized Beijing’s jurisdiction over Taiwan.
The US’ donation of COVID-19 vaccines to Taiwan is a good example of this.
In addition, with the Biden administration’s encouragement, a G7 communique last month stressed the importance of maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait, as did the joint statements from meetings between Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga in April and with South Korean President Moon Jae-in in May.
Much has been made of the Chinese Communist Party’s “salami slicing” in the South China Sea, achieving its aims by incremental steps that individually do not constitute a provocation. The Biden administration is slicing some salami of its own by getting more countries to support peace across the Taiwan Strait. The more voices speak up for peace, the more difficult it would be for Beijing to direct its anger at any one actor.
While Campbell did not voice support for Taiwan’s independence, neither did he say the US supports unification, a position far more consistent with adherence to a “one China” policy.
This is how the policy defended by Campbell seeks to protect Taiwan without risking regional, and perhaps global, disruption — or even war — that nobody in their right minds would want.
Many Taiwanese would like independence for their country. However, would they want to risk war, especially when it is by no means the only solution? It is easy commenting on Taiwan’s problems when you do not live in Taiwan.
As the war in Burma stretches into its 76th year, China continues to play both sides. Beijing backs the junta, which seized power in the 2021 coup, while also funding some of the resistance groups fighting the regime. Some suggest that Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) is hedging his bets, positioning China to side with the victors regardless of the outcome. However, a more accurate explanation is that China is acting pragmatically to safeguard its investments and ensure the steady flow of natural resources and energy for its economy. China’s primary interest is stability and supporting the junta initially seemed like the best
Numerous expert analyses characterize today’s US presidential election as a risk for Taiwan, given that the two major candidates, US Vice President Kamala Harris and former US president Donald Trump, are perceived to possess divergent foreign policy perspectives. If Harris is elected, many presume that the US would maintain its existing relationship with Taiwan, as established through the American Institute in Taiwan, and would continue to sell Taiwan weapons and equipment to help it defend itself against China. Under the administration of US President Joe Biden, whose political views Harris shares, the US on Oct. 25 authorized arms transfers to Taiwan, another
The US election result will significantly impact its foreign policy with global implications. As tensions escalate in the Taiwan Strait and conflicts elsewhere draw attention away from the western Pacific, Taiwan was closely monitoring the election, as many believe that whoever won would confront an increasingly assertive China, especially with speculation over a potential escalation in or around 2027. A second Donald Trump presidency naturally raises questions concerning the future of US policy toward China and Taiwan, with Trump displaying mixed signals as to his position on the cross-strait conflict. US foreign policy would also depend on Trump’s Cabinet and
Navy Commander Admiral Tang Hua (唐華) said in an interview with The Economist that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been implementing an “anaconda strategy” to subdue Taiwan since President William Lai (賴清德) assumed office. The Chinese military is “slowly, but surely” increasing its presence around Taiwan proper, it quoted Tang as saying. “They are ready to blockade Taiwan at any time they want,” he said. “They give you extreme pressure, pressure, pressure. They’re trying to exhaust you.” Beijing’s goal is to “force Taiwan to make mistakes,” Tang said, adding that they could be “excuses” for a blockade. The interview reminds me