The Legislative Yuan’s passage of the Anti-infiltration Act (反滲透法) on Dec. 31, 2019, as well as amendments to the National Security Act (國家安全法) passed earlier that year, which impose longer sentences and fines on people convicted of spying for other nations, were hailed as crucial measures to shore up Taiwan’s defenses against Beijing’s threats.
More than a year later, the effectiveness of such legislation seems questionable given the slaps on the wrist handed out to people who have since been found guilty of working for Chinese intelligence.
On Thursday, a Taiwanese businessman surnamed Huang (黃), who had been working in China, was found guilty by the Taipei District Court of working with Chinese intelligence. He was given a three-month jail sentence — convertible to a fine.
The Taipei District Prosecutors’ Office had charged Huang with attempting to “develop an organization” for the official use of a foreign government, although it said that his actions had not actually led to the transfer of any intelligence to China and that his efforts to recruit Taiwanese officials were unsuccessful.
On Oct. 27 last year, the same court sentenced Lee Wan-ping (李宛平) to one year in prison for attempting to obtain classified information on behalf of Beijing by targeting military, legislative and other government officials as he helped former legislative aide Fu Wen-chi (傅文齊) arrange meetings for lawmakers and their aides on trips to China with Chinese intelligence officers.
That ruling came just one month after the Taiwan High Court sentenced a retired army lieutenant colonel surnamed Lan (藍) to two years and three months in prison, reversing the Pingtung District Court’s decision to give him a suspended sentence for supplying China with the names and activities of personnel at intelligence agencies.
The Pingtung court had said that Lan’s spying activities had not “caused real damage to Taiwan’s national security,” but the High Court ruled that “the leaked intelligence materials were highly sensitive” and resulted “in serious harm” to national security.
The High Court criticized the lower court’s penalty as too lenient and lacking a deterrent effect, but do sentences of three months, one year or even 25 months for endangering national security have the desired deterrent effect?
What penalties might lie in store for Ho Jianghua (何建華), head of the China Unification Promotion Party’s women’s department, and her aide, Pao Ke-ming (包克明), who were indicted on Dec. 7 by the Taipei District Prosecutors’ Office for their alleged involvement in setting up a spy network for Beijing?
Under the June 2019 amendments to the National Security Act, people found guilty of recruiting others in Taiwan under the direction of the Chinese government would be subject to at least seven years in prison and a fine of up to NT$100 million (US$3.51 million), yet the courts appear reluctant to impose the full penalties.
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and other pan-blue camp members called the Anti-infiltration Act, and amendments to the Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (臺灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例), the Criminal Code, the Classified National Security Information Protection Act (國家機密保護法) and the National Security Act — all pushed by the Democratic Progressive Party government — as “returning Taiwan to the White Terror era.”
While the KMT’s doom-and-gloom pronouncements should be dismissed as pure hyperbole, not to mention hypocrisy, it appears that the government might have, if anything, been too timid in its efforts to legislate tougher penalties for espionage and threats to national security.
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