Defend the islands
I am writing in response to Yao Chung-yuan’s (姚中原) article (“Taiwan needs new approach on islands,” June 30, page 8).
I concur fully with Yao’s assertion, and by extension that of Ian Easton, that the Ministry of National Defense should permanently station personnel on the outlying islands of Taiwan.
Despite periodic training, Coast Guard Administration personnel do not have the combat skills to engage in the defense of the islands.
Taiwan’s sovereignty is at stake, be it on the Pratas Islands (Dongsha Islands, 東沙群島), Itu Aba Island (Taiping Island, 太平島), Kinmen, Wuciou Island (烏坵), Matsu, Pengjia Islet (彭佳嶼) and all outlying islands under Taiwan’s control. All are tempting targets for China to grab, which would result in a huge loss of face for President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文).
The prevailing notion in the ministry that it would not defend the outlying islands because of logistical resupply difficulties and other excuses is unacceptable. Whatever happened to the spirit of the Berlin airlift?
Interpreted another way, it reads: “Yes, we know you are Taiwanese citizens, but do not count on us to defend you.” What a sellout.
For its part, the US needs to buttress its security commitment to Taiwan by resurrecting the Formosa Resolution which was rescinded in 1974.
The resolution authorized the US president to militarily assist in securing all territories and other possessions under the control of the Republic of China.
Some look upon the islands as worthless piles of rock and sand, totally dismissing their defensive value. Each island has its own strategic value. Dongsha, for example, sits at the southern tip of the Taiwan Strait and the northern entrance of the South China Sea.
Control of Dongsha would enhance China’s ability to block access to both waterways impeding rapid transport of Middle Eastern oil to Japan and South Korea, provide a convenient stage for launching a blockade of Kaohsiung, and ensuring passage for submarine launched ballistic missiles aboard Chinese submarines transiting the Bashi Channel into the Western Pacific.
Such submarine movement is of crucial importance to the US since it would put Hawaii and the US mainland into closer range of Chinese nuclear missiles.
Defend the islands.
Bill Sharp
Visiting scholar at National Taiwan University and Taiwan Fellow
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