The solidarity shown worldwide with Hong Kong is a spectacular success regarding the internationalization of a nonviolent struggle for a common cause. Pro-democracy advocates on Sunday held peaceful rallies in multiple cities to support the territory, even though certain hostile groups threatened them verbally and physically.
Unlike the marches in Hong Kong, where people face the everyday danger of being tear gassed by riot police or randomly beaten up by gangsters, the pro-Hong Kong march in Lower Manhattan’s Chinatown was calm and orderly, despite sporadic disruptions caused by a group of Mandarin-speaking counter-protesters.
The rally sheds light on two intriguing features of the organizational networks and behavioral norms of pro-Beijing groups in New York.
First, Beijing has made a concerted effort to mobilize Chinese immigrants as sympathetic agents to advance its official perspective of Hong Kong in the US Chinese-language media.
The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, under the purview of the United Front Work Department, is in charge of Chinese citizens living abroad, calling on them to promote China’s soft power and influence local politics.
The counter-demonstrators seemed to be closely associated with the Tsung Tsin Association (崇正會), a native-place organization founded by Hakka-speaking immigrants in 1918.
Historically, conscious of the popular negative stereotypes of Chinese in the US at the turn of the 20th century, such native-place groups provided Chinese immigrants with assistance, showing them a clear path toward upward mobility at a time of rapid change.
Today, these organizations tend to use patriotism to strengthen their business and sociocultural ties with Beijing.
Gathering outside the Tsung Tsin building, dozens of counter-demonstrators waved the People’s Republic of China flag, shouted socialist slogans and accused Cantonese and English speakers from the Hong Kong rally of being traitors.
Several people stood on the balcony of the second floor of the premises, filming the Hong Kong rally in the public square. This created a great deal of anxiety, reminding people of the Chinese public security agents who photographed student demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in the spring of 1989.
It remains unclear whether the association will pass the footage to national security officials in China. If so, the organization would be operating as a foreign government agent, policing and intimidating New Yorkers concerned about the escalating crisis in Hong Kong.
Second, the generational profile has shaped the ways in which Beijing has co-opted overseas Chinese in its comprehensive propaganda campaign aimed at marginalizing Hong Kongers globally.
The majority of the counter-protesters were senior Toishanese and Fujianese male immigrants. Living in a parallel universe and ideologically dogmatic, they adhere to the discourse of Han Chinese nationalism and are eager to show their allegiance to Beijing.
They associate the ideational concept of China with the geopolitical, economic and ideological strengths of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and bitterly oppose any criticism of the regime.
Young Chinese were the most enthusiastic and confrontational counter-demonstrators. They followed the Hong Kong rally across the Manhattan Bridge to Brooklyn, attempting to disrupt a panel discussion with pro-democracy lawmakers and student leaders from the territory.
Reaping the benefits of a fast-growing Chinese economy, these well-dressed nationalistic youngsters are determined to be staunch defenders of China’s global outreach efforts. This explains why they publicly harass, silence and intimidate anyone critical of the Chinese state abroad.
Surprisingly, Chinese immigrants between the ages of 40 and 50 were largely absent from the counter-protest, but were quite visible in the Hong Kong rally. Perhaps this generation is disillusioned with the CCP after the brutal crackdown on civilians in Tiananmen Square 30 years ago.
The governance crisis in Hong Kong has become one of the most recognized news stories in the world, provoking intense discussion among overseas Chinese. As the political situation deteriorates by the day, Hong Kong’s pro-democracy advocates have to win the media war at home and abroad.
The months-long anti-China extradition protests have exhibited a transnational dimension, even though the ostensible reasons are different. Winning the support of overseas Chinese and Hong Kongers, and urging them to lobby politicians on behalf of the territory, is crucially important in the upcoming elections in Taiwan, Canada and the US.
Only by doing so can Hong Kongers sustain the momentum of their pro-democracy movement and pressure Beijing to come to the negotiating table.
Joseph Tse-Hei Lee is professor of history at Pace University in New York City.
When Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) sits down with US President Donald Trump in Beijing on Thursday next week, Xi is unlikely to demand a dramatic public betrayal of Taiwan. He does not need to. Beijing’s preferred victory is smaller, quieter and in some ways far more dangerous: a subtle shift in American wording that appears technical, but carries major strategic meaning. The ask is simple: replace the longstanding US formulation that Washington “does not support Taiwan independence” with a harder one — that Washington “opposes” Taiwan independence. One word changes; a deterrence structure built over decades begins to shift.
Taipei is facing a severe rat infestation, and the city government is reportedly considering large-scale use of rodenticides as its primary control measure. However, this move could trigger an ecological disaster, including mass deaths of birds of prey. In the past, black kites, relatives of eagles, took more than three decades to return to the skies above the Taipei Basin. Taiwan’s black kite population was nearly wiped out by the combined effects of habitat destruction, pesticides and rodenticides. By 1992, fewer than 200 black kites remained on the island. Fortunately, thanks to more than 30 years of collective effort to preserve their remaining
After Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) met Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) in Beijing, most headlines referred to her as the leader of the opposition in Taiwan. Is she really, though? Being the chairwoman of the KMT does not automatically translate into being the leader of the opposition in the sense that most foreign readers would understand it. “Leader of the opposition” is a very British term. It applies to the Westminster system of parliamentary democracy, and to some extent, to other democracies. If you look at the UK right now, Conservative Party head Kemi Badenoch is
A Pale View of Hills, a movie released last year, follows the story of a Japanese woman from Nagasaki who moved to Britain in the 1950s with her British husband and daughter from a previous marriage. The daughter was born at a time when memories of the US atomic bombing of Nagasaki during World War II and anxiety over the effects of nuclear radiation still haunted the community. It is a reflection on the legacy of the local and national trauma of the bombing that ended the period of Japanese militarism. A central theme of the movie is the need, at
RSS