A defense research official has been given a demerit and reassigned after leaving a classified document in the basket of a rental bicycle in Taipei. While the Ministry of National Defense should be applauded for its transparency and for informing the public about the incident, the question is whether the official is at fault or has been made a scapegoat.
The Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology is a government research institute and the technology it develops is of crucial importance to the defense of a nation that faces an incessant threat from its aggressive, authoritarian neighbor China.
There are also somewhat regular arrests of Chinese operatives and retired Taiwanese officials sympathetic to China who are operating in Taiwan. In this type of environment, how could anyone be allowed to remove sensitive documents from a government research facility?
Minister of National Defense Yen De-fa (嚴德發) has asked the institute to review its classified information protocols, but more than a simple review is called for.
In the US, rules for handling classified information are set at a national level. The rules on classification were established under US Executive Order 13526, which was issued by former US president Barack Obama in 2009. The order modified certain provisions of the US Code of Federal Regulations and stipulates how classified information of different levels of sensitivity should be handled, with the most sensitive documents requiring two individuals with appropriate security clearance to be present at all times when the information is handled. While not all classified documents need to be handled with the same degree of protection, US law stipulates that all classified documents must be stored and handled only within specified secure facilities. If that information must be physically transported, there are protocols to dictate who can transport the information and how.
In Taiwan, the Enforcement Rules of the Classified National Security Information Protection Act (國家機密保護法施行細則) serve a similar function to the clauses on sensitive information in the Code of Federal Regulations, but are not as specifically defined.
For example, Article 28 says: “Classified information shall be stored and safeguarded in an office area, and cannot be carried out from the office area without obtaining a prior approval from the head of the agency or his or her authorized official,” and “shall be stored separately from non-classified information, and be safeguarded according to their respective classification designation.”
The rules do not specify the level of clearance, the type of vault or facilities where information should be kept, how information to be transported should be packaged and labeled, under what circumstances information can be removed from secure environments and other important considerations.
Article 32 of the Classified National Security Information Protection Act (國家機密保護法) calls for imprisonment for up to seven years and fines of up to NT$200,000 for mishandling classified information.
In the US, those found to have mishandled classified information relating to national defense can be tried for treason under the 1917 US Espionage Act. In 2015, former US military commander and CIA director David Petraeus was fined US$100,000 for the unauthorized removal and retention of classified material.
It appears that the issue is not considered as serious in Taiwan. However, nobody should be fined for mishandling secure information if standard operating procedures at research facilities allow officials to walk out of meetings carrying classified documents.
Given the government’s emphasis on indigenous weapons programs, China’s growing hostility and uncertainty about the US’ commitment to Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack it is imperative that the integrity of classified defense research be protected.
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