One ‘consensus,’ two views
In his New Year’s address, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) redefined the so-called “1992 consensus” to mean: “An agreement based upon the foundations of the ‘one China’ principle that both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to ‘one China.’”
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) responded by saying that Xi’s version of the “1992 consensus” does not correspond to the consensus reached between the two parties at the time.
Wu said that the “1992 consensus” means: “one China, with each side of the Taiwan Strait having its own interpretation.”
This is an odd state of affairs. If a consensus really was reached between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party following talks in 1992, how is it that the parties’ leaders are now unable to agree on the wording? When did the consensus stop becoming a consensus?
For a consensus to exist, following negotiations, both parties must agree on a common viewpoint. That is what “consensus” means. Xi talks of a “1992 consensus” based on the “one China” principle, while Wu adds that the “consensus” is founded on each side being able to hold their own interpretation of what “China” means.
Xi and Wu’s idea of what the “1992 consensus” means clearly differ considerably.
However, this discrepancy also extends to differing definitions of the “1992 consensus” on Web sites on either side of the Taiwan Strait.
The Chinese-language Wikipedia lemma for “1992 consensus” defines it as “one China, each side with its own interpretation.”
However, China’s online encyclopedia, Baidu Baike, says that it is a consensus on the “one China” principle, which is adhered to on each side of the Taiwan Strait.
The Baidu Baike entry adds that the core meaning of “consensus” is that the “mainland” and Taiwan both belong to “one China,” and that the cross-strait relationship is not a state-to-state relationship.
As for local politicians, each has come up with their own twist on the meaning of the “1992 consensus,” although the Taiwanese public does not fully understand what it is and what it means. As the vast majority of the public, if asked, would be unable to explain what the “1992 consensus” means, how can it be asked to accept this poorly defined “consensus?”
When former American Institute in Taiwan chairman Raymond Burghardt met with then-president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) at an airport in Alaska in 2008, Burghardt said that according to his understanding, the so-called “1992 consensus” presented by the KMT does not actually exist. He was not wrong.
Hsu Li-te
Taipei
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus in the Legislative Yuan has made an internal decision to freeze NT$1.8 billion (US$54.7 million) of the indigenous submarine project’s NT$2 billion budget. This means that up to 90 percent of the budget cannot be utilized. It would only be accessible if the legislature agrees to lift the freeze sometime in the future. However, for Taiwan to construct its own submarines, it must rely on foreign support for several key pieces of equipment and technology. These foreign supporters would also be forced to endure significant pressure, infiltration and influence from Beijing. In other words,
“I compare the Communist Party to my mother,” sings a student at a boarding school in a Tibetan region of China’s Qinghai province. “If faith has a color,” others at a different school sing, “it would surely be Chinese red.” In a major story for the New York Times this month, Chris Buckley wrote about the forced placement of hundreds of thousands of Tibetan children in boarding schools, where many suffer physical and psychological abuse. Separating these children from their families, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) aims to substitute itself for their parents and for their religion. Buckley’s reporting is
As Taiwan’s domestic political crisis deepens, the opposition Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) have proposed gutting the country’s national spending, with steep cuts to the critical foreign and defense ministries. While the blue-white coalition alleges that it is merely responding to voters’ concerns about corruption and mismanagement, of which there certainly has been plenty under Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and KMT-led governments, the rationales for their proposed spending cuts lay bare the incoherent foreign policy of the KMT-led coalition. Introduced on the eve of US President Donald Trump’s inauguration, the KMT’s proposed budget is a terrible opening
Last week, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), together holding more than half of the legislative seats, cut about NT$94 billion (US$2.85 billion) from the yearly budget. The cuts include 60 percent of the government’s advertising budget, 10 percent of administrative expenses, 3 percent of the military budget, and 60 percent of the international travel, overseas education and training allowances. In addition, the two parties have proposed freezing the budgets of many ministries and departments, including NT$1.8 billion from the Ministry of National Defense’s Indigenous Defense Submarine program — 90 percent of the program’s proposed
RSS