The apparent popularity of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Kaohsiung mayoral candidate Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜) is puzzling, to say the least.
The so-called “Han tide” has been partly attributed to his unpolished, down-to-earth, gaffe-prone manner. This has allowed him to distance himself from the increasingly unpopular model of the smooth politician.
During a campaign event organized by a women’s association in Kaohsiung, Han was speaking about drumming up overseas investment to bring more jobs to the city when he said: “If overseas investment brings me 1,000 job opportunities, I’ll give you a kiss. If it brings 10,000 jobs, I’ll spend the night with you.”
He later apologized for what many took as misogynist remarks, saying that they were meant to be taken in jest. Comments that would ordinarily have damaged a candidate’s prospects might even have helped cultivate Han’s constructed image as a man of the people.
Does his popularity stem from his being a political “maverick?” Will he succeed by following the model of Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), the political novice who won four years ago?
The trouble with comparisons between Han and Ko is that, while they both might seem to be straight-talking and endearingly gaffe-prone, the former is certainly no newbie, nor is he particularly a maverick.
Han is a former KMT legislator, having served a constituency in then-Taipei County from 1993 to 2002, during which time he served as KMT caucus leader. From 2012 to last year, he was the head of Taipei Agricultural Products Marketing Corp, an organization long accused of working in the interests of the KMT. He vied for the party chairmanship last year, but was roundly defeated by KMT Chairman Wu Den-yih (吳敦義).
Where did the idea that he has not been tainted by the corrupting influence of politics come from? How has he suddenly come to be seen as the go-to campaign endorser for the KMT? Why is he so popular in Kaohsiung?
The KMT has not held the Kaohsiung mayorship since Wu left office in December 1998. It has been under Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) control for the past two decades and the special municipality is regarded as a green stronghold, deeply suspicious of the KMT.
Presidential Office Secretary-General Chen Chu (陳菊) held the mayorship for 12 years and was elected to her final term in 2014 with 68 percent of the vote, compared with just under 31 percent by her KMT challenger, and left with high approval ratings. That does not speak of an unpopular record in government.
DPP Kaohsiung mayoral candidate Chen Chi-mai (陳其邁) might lack the charisma of Chen Chu or Han, but it is unlikely that voters’ need for a change of face would be enough to give Kaohsiung to the KMT.
The focus on Han’s charisma might allow him to attract votes on that basis alone, without association with the KMT. After two years of unpopular reforms by the DPP government, a vote for Han might be seen as a vote of protest against the central government without necessarily signaling support for the KMT.
Whether he succeeds or not, the groundswell of support for Han would not necessarily be good news for the KMT. He would have two years to prove that his fanciful promises can work before the presidential elections in 2020 — if he performs badly, he would not be a good advertisement for the party.
More fundamentally, his support, despite his relatively outsider status from the KMT elite, augurs an incipient generational change within the party that could see the old guard — including former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and Wu — sidelined.
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