US President Donald Trump is doing a huge favor for Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) — and he should keep doing it. His administration’s increasingly hard-nosed policies can steer China away from a course that is leading inevitably to outright conflict with the West.
Avoiding a US-China war would be a genuine win-win outcome, not another of the rhetorical charades that, up to now, have given China virtually all it wants in the economic, diplomatic and military realms — in return for few of the promised economic reforms and none of the anticipated political reform.
The US president and his savvy national security team have made it clear to Beijing that the old ways of doing business are over — no more cheating on currency and trade; stealing US technology; enabling North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs; aggressive moves in the East and South China seas; bullying democratic Taiwan; and, potentially, no more human rights outrages — or China will pay an increasingly heavy price, risking even the communist regime’s survival.
Call it a form of geostrategic tough love. Previous US administrations won Beijing’s plaudits — if not actual respect — for their indulgence and concessions, despite Beijing’s chicanery and aggression. However, without meaning to, they were setting the Chinese system up for ultimate failure and even self-destruction — like a parent giving a child everything they want without understanding that the real world will demand consequences at some point. (No, China is not the US’ child.)
A Chinese Communist Party comeuppance might be exactly what the Chinese people themselves want, which would explain Trump’s popular approval in China, possibly more than he enjoys in the US. It parallels somewhat the admiration of former US president Ronald Reagan among the populations in the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe, who looked to that US president as their hope for liberation from communist tyranny and incompetence. Some of Reagan’s policies were also more popular in those countries than they were at home.
The Trump administration has benefited from the maximum-pressure test run to get North Korea serious about eliminating its nuclear and missile programs. There are miles still to go to actual denuclearization, but the president is justified in believing the combination of credible military action, escalating economic sanctions and unprecedented focus on North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s human rights depredations as rendering the regime unfit to govern, were what moved the “Dear Leader” to make a fundamental rethink of his situation.
The same motivational elements can be applied to Washington’s overall relationship with Beijing, and the Trump administration has many more cards to play. The Trump-Xi personal rapport might afford some essential face-saving for the kinds of concessions and backing-off that Xi will need to undertake if a catastrophic showdown is to be avoided.
However, high-level sweet talk aside, only US clarity of purpose, unyielding will and credible economic, diplomatic and military preparedness will convince Chinese leaders that their 46-year free run is over and change is unavoidable.
One factor that is causing “confusion” in Beijing, according to some Chinese and US academics, is the sudden absence of a reliable back channel to the administration. Former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger, who perfected the back-door technique for “successful” diplomacy with both the Soviets and the Chinese, still has access to Trump and presumably recommends the same concessionary China policies he has advocated for almost 50 years. (He recently denied he had ever proposed a US-Russia collaboration against China.)
However, for the first time in nine administrations, Kissinger’s advice is no longer heeded on the fundamentals of the US-China relationship. Instead, Trump is crossing diplomatic red lines and doing what was unthinkable in the Kissingerian China world.
This is surprising, because Kissinger had carefully cultivated Jared Kushner, the president’s son-in-law and key policy operative, as the special inside contact for top-level US-China communications. However, Kushner is preoccupied with Middle East negotiations and a range of other presidential assignments, and the China portfolio has settled in the hands of seasoned officials well-versed in Asia matters.
Another likely go-between China has found highly useful in the past was former Kissinger subordinate Michael Pillsbury, who has described himself as a close, albeit informal, adviser to the president on China policy.
Trump recently referred to him as “the leading authority on China,” bringing Pillsbury to comment in a C-Span interview last week: “My fear is that this will cause further jealousy and envy by my fellow China hands.”
Pillsbury now is with the Hudson Institute, where US Vice President Mike Pence last month announced a strong administration policy against China’s transgressions. As a US Department of Defense official, Pillsbury was a self-described “panda hugger,” a perspective he acknowledges holding for 30 of the 40 years he has been observing China.
However, unlike Kissinger, whose regard for the Chinese Communist Party never has evolved, Pillsbury said he came to conclude belatedly in the past decade that, despite his and others’ “wishful thinking,” China’s reform was not possible.
He told C-Span: “I kind of confess I was wrong, and I’m sort of sorry for the advice I gave to a lot of presidents... We’re moving to a much more antagonistic relationship, with people in America not quite knowing who to believe anymore.”
A caller criticized his light-hearted “oops” demeanor on such a critical subject and he responded, even more jocularly: “That’s why you shouldn’t listen to me now. I might be wrong again ... but there was an element of Chinese deception in all this. We weren’t just stupid. The Chinese more or less promised ... free markets [and] elections.”
The president and his clear-eyed national security team should remain steady as they go. For both North Korea and China, pressure on human rights and the specter of regime change offer a non-kinetic way to convey the seriousness of the US’ intentions — a suitable card to be played in the “new cold war” environment Beijing has created.
Joseph Bosco served as China country director in the office of the US secretary of defense and taught a graduate seminar on US-China-Taiwan relations at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. He is a fellow at the Institute for Taiwan-American Studies.
The Cabinet on Nov. 6 approved a NT$10 billion (US$318.4 million) four-year plan to build tourism infrastructure in mountainous areas and the south. Premier Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰) on Tuesday announced that the Ministry of Transportation and Communications would offer weekday accommodation discounts, birthday specials and other domestic travel incentives beginning next March, aiming to encourage more travel outside the usual weekend and holiday peaks. The government is right to focus on domestic tourism. Although the data appear encouraging on the surface — as total domestic trips are up compared with their pre-COVID-19 pandemic numbers — a closer look tells a different
For more than seven decades, the Chinese Communist Party has claimed to govern Tibet with benevolence and progress. I have seen the truth behind the slogans. I have listened to the silences of monks forbidden to speak of the Dalai Lama, watched the erosion of our language in classrooms, and felt the quiet grief of a people whose prayers are monitored and whose culture is treated as a threat. That is why I will only accept complete independence for Tibet. The so-called “autonomous region” is autonomous in name only. Decisions about religion, education and cultural preservation are made in Beijing, not
Apart from the first arms sales approval for Taiwan since US President Donald Trump took office, last month also witnessed another milestone for Taiwan-US relations. Trump signed the Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act into law on Tuesday. Its passing without objection in the US Senate underscores how bipartisan US support for Taiwan has evolved. The new law would further help normalize exchanges between Taiwanese and US government officials. We have already seen a flurry of visits to Washington earlier this summer, not only with Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍), but also delegations led by National Security Council Secretary-General Joseph Wu
I recently watched a panel discussion on Taiwan Talks in which the host rightly asked a critical question: Why is the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) spearheading a robust global movement to reject China’s ongoing distortion of UN Resolution 2758? While the discussion offered some context, a more penetrating analysis and urgent development was missed. The IPAC action is not merely a political gesture; it is an essential legal and diplomatic countermeasure to China’s escalating and fundamentally baseless campaign to manufacture a claim over Taiwan through the deliberate misinterpretation of a 1971 UN resolution. Since the inauguration of Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) as
RSS