The Formosa Alliance is holding a demonstration on Oct. 20 to call for a referendum on opposing annexation by China. The Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) Central Standing Committee adopted a resolution that no civil servants affiliated with the party or its candidates should attend the event or participate in the mobilization.
The DPP’s Electoral Strategy Committee put forward a motion saying: “As the international community becomes aware of the global threat posed by China’s ascendancy, it is paying attention to President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) and her administration’s diplomatic and cross-strait policy coordination. Not only does it insist on upholding Taiwan’s independence and sovereignty, it also pays equal consideration to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. As a result, the US, Japan and other international allies have praised and expressed their firm support for Taiwan.”
Former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) commented on the issue on Facebook: “Perhaps they fear that it will detract attention from the election campaign’s focus on reform. I think they should worry about losing more votes rather than blurring the campaign focus.”
Putting aside the alliance’s demonstration to call for a referendum on opposition to annexation by China, there is a striking difference between Tsai’s and Chen’s political thinking, which has led to drastic differences in how the two DPP administrations have ruled the nation.
A look at their differences and similarities shows that the DPP does not yet have a stable approach to major policy issues. As a result, the public and the international community have yet to grasp its policy direction, because the two leaders handle the same issue differently.
By contrast, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has a solid basic policy orientation when formulating major policies, so there is a consistency in the performance of its leaders. After all, the KMT is more than a century old. On the other hand, it is more difficult for a party with a long history to make quick adjustments to deal with fickle public opinion.
Chen never made it clear why his “one country on each side” discourse would have a positive impact, while avoiding all negative consequences by mobilizing people at a time when external conditions were not yet mature.
As a democracy, Taiwan tolerates all kinds of political stances, but every political position should clearly map out a course and a route, and let supporters and opponents see both the opportunities and risks.
Advocates of a position should also explain whether existing methodologies could be used to minimize potential risks and make the best use of opportunities, so as to achieve steady progress according to the directions mapped out by the plan. There may be bumps in the road, but given steady progress, everyone would feel that we are all in this together.
Chen is a traditional DPP figure, charming and skilled at mobilizing public support. Tsai is not a typical DPP figure, overcautious, meticulous and relatively mild-mannered. Chen instinctively understands ethnic mobilization against a shared enemy to achieve political goals, while foreign policy is not a priority. Indeed, a few of Chen’s unexpected moves resulted in US misunderstanding and paved the way for the descendants of the party-state regime to return to government.
Many of Chen’s supporters share his passion, but one lesson learned from the DPP’s first term in power is that high-spirited political mobilization does not necessarily affect international politics.
Now that the DPP is in power for a second time, world politics has changed, but its policy of maintaining the “status quo” does not explain why, now that external conditions are more mature, it remains stuck in its old ways when it comes to the nation’s normalization, rectification of the nation’s name, drafting a new constitution and holding a referendum on joining the UN under the name “Taiwan.”
The US has shown its support for Taiwan through the Taiwan Travel Act and the National Defense Authorization Act, as well as by conducting freedom of navigation exercises through the Taiwan Strait. By comparison, supporters of the policy to maintain the “status quo” have yet to take concrete action. Perhaps Tsai clearly understands international realities and therefore refrains from radical initiatives.
For Tsai, taking advantage of the reaction against China to enhance Taiwan-US ties and strengthen the nation’s defenses is a safer bet, and it is undeniably a safer option that puts the majority of the public at ease. Nevertheless, not addressing the question of the nation’s status and sustaining Taiwan’s “abnormal” status will have costs.
Taiwanese voters are getting smarter and no longer think a vote is a blank check that allows politicians to behave as they wish.
When Chen, Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and Tsai were first elected, they were immensely popular, but after their honeymoon period, public fury emerged, showing that voters would no longer tolerate political parties and their leaders reneging on their pledges. Instead of pursuing a consensus, members of the same party engaged in intraparty factional conflicts, which has led to uncertainty and doubt. The KMT infighting between Ma and then-legislative speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平) and its loss of control of the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan are good examples.
Although there are differences between Chen and Tsai, the public’s inability to understand the DPP’s policies is a challenge.
Gaining control of both the executive and legislative branches of government is just the beginning. The DPP must move on by forming a mature party line, a party charter, a policy orientation by integrating the experience of two distinctively different governing experiences.
The DPP and the KMT are both ruled by people rather than by party principles. The KMT has a stronger party spirit, but it is haunted by its inability to rid itself of the “Chinese burden” and become a Taiwanese party.
The DPP, having ruled the nation twice, must be capable of managing many variables; its national policy must not be dependent on individual politicians. The party must improve its reputation both domestically and internationally by doing what has to be done and not doing what should not.
Its policies must be governed by a consistent logic and the rest should depend on the political skills of individual leaders.
In short, the DPP — as well as the KMT — must mature and become a responsible governing party.
Translated by Chang Ho-ming
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