With negotiators from the UK and the 06 meeting in Brussels this week, Brexit is said to be entering its endgame. This is not an ordinary endgame though: All the major pieces are still on the board and pretty much the full range of potential outcomes — from no deal to no Brexit, and everything in between — remain possibilities. Mapping the potential outcomes is not easy.
As the two-year countdown to Brexit ends on March 29 next year and any deal requires British and EU parliamentary approvals, the window for a bargain effectively closes in the next few months.
Either Britain will leave the EU with a negotiated agreement; or it will exit with no deal at all, upending a vast array of trading relationships and complicating future negotiations with the EU and other countries.
Illustration: Tania Chou
A new paper from the Institute for Government helpfully laid out five scenarios that could unfold this autumn. The upshot is that “the risks of either a deliberate or an accidental no-deal are quite high, given the apparent stalemate in the negotiations, the precariousness of the prime minister’s parliamentary position and the defaults now incorporated in the system.”
Of the five scenarios, only one envisions a relatively smooth route to an orderly Brexit: It posits a successfully negotiated withdrawal agreement and parliamentary approval. The other four carry a very high risk of a no-deal Brexit.
For example, British Prime Minister Theresa May could strike a deal that parliament then rejects on the grounds that it leaves Britain a “vassal state,” as Brexiter Jacob Rees-Mogg put it. May could try to renegotiate, of course, but she might run out of time or get turned back by Brussels, and parliament might still reject whatever alternative she proposes.
Although the bias in parliament is clearly to have a deal, there is no agreement on what kind. Even if May fails to reach an agreement and parliament rejects the no-deal option, it is not clear how the legislature could get to a better outcome. And even if Parliament did manage to nudge the government back to the negotiating table, it is not clear that it would get an approvable option back.
What makes this particularly devilish is that the old “Leave” versus “Remain” division has effectively become a deal or no-deal division.
There are many Leavers who do not like May’s proposed deal, but who would still favor an agreement of some kind, because they think parliament might reject a no-deal result, throwing Brexit itself into doubt. Then there are Remainers who do not like May’s proposal, but who would support it as preferable to the cost and chaos of no deal at all.
Against that possible coalition of the disgruntled-but-willing is a potentially stronger force: Remainers who oppose May’s deal, because they find it too great a compromise and hope that they can cancel Brexit altogether; and Leavers like Rees-Mogg who oppose it as a sell-out.
If that is not confusing enough, party affiliation is no guide here. There are Labour Party lawmakers whose main priority is ensuring Britain does not leave without a deal and others whose chief interest is in overthrowing the government, whatever happens with Brexit. While May has won key votes with the help of some Labour Leavers, it is unclear if she would be able to count on them.
It is the same, pretty much, on the Tory side: There are those who want to get over the line on Brexit with a deal of some sort, those who see May’s proposed deal as an economy-killer and others for whom only a total break with all EU structures is acceptable and who believe that May must be relieved of her position in the process.
The Conservative Party conference next month is likely to be a beauty parade of would-be prime ministers touting their alternative Brexit visions.
And yet, even these scenarios do not account for the full range of possibilities. Say May gets an agreement. Parliament must pass a motion to endorse it and then must pass the withdrawal agreement bill for it to go into effect.
However, disgruntled members could at any point seek to wreck the deal or hamstring future talks with amendments.
Not enough scenarios? If parliament rejects the deal, the government could seek to extend the Article 50 deadline — which requires unanimous EU approval — to allow more time to renegotiate.
While unlikely, lawmakers could also try to force the government to call a second referendum, a route that is fraught with problems of its own. And then there is EU approval: The European Council needs to obtain the European Parliament’s approval — by a simple majority — before it can conclude the withdrawal agreement.
Expect a frenzy of activity from both deal and no-deal camps. Former UK Independence Party leader Nigel Farage has announced a grassroots tour to oppose May’s Brexit plan. Another hardliner, Arron Banks, is encouraging Brexiters to join the Tories in the hope of bouncing May into a hardline Brexit or replacing her.
On the other side, there will likely be more anti-Brexit protests and pleas from businesses to minimize the pain.
A Brexit soft landing, it seems, is as much a question of luck as negotiating skill at this point.
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