President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) on Monday returned from a visit to diplomatic allies Paraguay and Belize. At the same time, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army continues to conduct a series of military exercises in the Yellow Sea.
These exercises are obviously aimed at expressing Beijing’s disapproval of Tsai’s stopovers in the US and the improved Taiwan-US relations that they represent.
They are also part of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) wider strategy to counter his domestic opponents by maintaining a hardline approach against Taiwan.
Taiwan has consistently employed so-called “transit diplomacy,” regardless of which party is in office.
Presidents and other senior government officials usually transit through the US, highlighting the substantive relationship between the two nations, despite the unofficial nature of the ties.
To this end, China has gone on a spending spree to purchase the allegiance of Taiwan’s allies, seemingly as part of a plan to curtail Taiwan’s pretext for continuing to pursue transit diplomacy with the US.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs yesterday announced that the nation has lost yet another diplomatic ally to China, this time the Central American nation of El Salvador, which Beijing has reportedly been courting since June.
Taiwan’s presidents usually transit through the US while visiting allies in Africa and Central and South America, which is reasonable both politically and geographically.
However, if China hollows out Taiwan’s diplomatic relations in these regions, then the necessity of transits through the US will be reduced and make Beijing’s protests to Washington more plausible.
Therefore, maintaining diplomatic relations with nations in these regions are of great strategic importance to Taiwan.
For more than two years, the Tsai administration has maintained the “status quo” and refused to succumb to Beijing’s “one China” principle.
Despite this, China’s “truce” seen during former president Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) presidency immediately turned to “yuan diplomacy” following Tsai’s election.
In quick succession, Sao Tome and Principe, Panama, the Dominican Republic and Burkina Faso cut ties with Taipei and established ties with Beijing in exchange for huge amounts of Chinese financial aid, which should actually be called “debt trap diplomacy.”
All of this is certainly a setback for Taiwan, but it has also put the US on alert, because China is not only infiltrating the US’ backyard, but also laying an international political and economic ecology that is not conducive to US interests.
To US President Donald Trump, this might be more alarming than Xi’s removal of China’s presidential term limits.
Faced with a rising Chinese hegemony, Trump must apply new strategic thinking.
His trade war against several nations and the EU has gradually narrowed to aim squarely at China, indicating that the dispute is not purely economically motivated.
Seen from this perspective, the passage of the US’ Taiwan Travel Act takes on a more nuanced meaning.
In the past, Taiwanese officials were permitted to transit through the US on the way to a diplomatic ally to show the closeness of Taiwan-US relations.
China’s yuan diplomacy is reducing the pretext for Taiwanese officials to transit through the US.
To support Taiwan in its efforts to maintain its status as a sovereign, independent nation, the US Congress passed the act to encourage high-level meetings between the two nations, putting the ball firmly back in Taiwan’s court.
China’s frenzied theft of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies has actually boosted Taiwan-US interaction.
The question is, should this be interpreted as a success or failure of Xi’s Taiwan strategy?
Will this result be met with applause or suspicion within the higher echelons of power in Beijing?
Ever since the US established diplomatic relations with China, Beijing has tried to get Washington to say that Taiwan is a part of China in accordance with its “one China” principle.
Beijing also essentially regards the Three Joint Communiques as a kind of blood pact with the US, but it would be well advised to understand the realpolitik behind the communiques: The US’ real objective in signing them was to improve relations with China to contain the Soviet Union.
Since Beijing was a willing partner, the US gave its support to Chinese economic reforms, contributing in no small part to China’s rise and allowing it to participate in the international trade system.
However, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union no longer exists.
Back then, the US used Taiwan as a diplomatic bargaining chip, but Taiwan was not included as part of the trade.
However, things have changed, and now that former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger has reportedly advised Trump to improve relations with Russia as a way of containing China, Beijing is on even weaker footing to be making any extravagant demands of the US regarding its interpretation of Taiwan’s status.
The US National Security Strategy report released in December last year designated China as a strategic competitor, and the trade war between the two nations is more than just a trade war: It is the opening sally of a long-term strategic conflict.
A new dynamic has arrived and Trump will be looking to broker a new deal.
Some are theorizing that there is a much greater risk of large-scale conflict in East Asia than in other regions, while at the same time, the US’ ability to protect Taiwan is gradually declining, making Taiwan a ticking time bomb.
From how Trump dealt with the Korean Peninsula crisis, it is obvious that, despite seemingly making it up as he went along, he had a good grasp of the pros and cons of the situation and was eventually able to bring under control a potentially explosive situation by understanding what North Korean leader Kim Jung-un would deem acceptable.
Trump’s business instincts seem to tell him that it is fine if his competitor gets something, as long as he also benefits.
China and Taiwan could perhaps learn something from how the brinkmanship between the US and North Korea was resolved.
Despite the tensions in the Taiwan Strait, if both sides realize what they stand to lose if a conflict were to break out — and what they stand to gain if they pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence — then it might be possible for them to resolve their differences through more reasonable engagement.
Translated by Lin Lee-kai and Paul Cooper
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