In a time of so much political change and uncertainty, it makes good sense to take stock of some enduring features of US foreign policy. Failure to do this, given the size and power of the United States, could lead to critical misunderstandings, and potentially conflict.
First, the United States is a democracy. It is a simple statement, but one with profound implication for the way the American government conducts itself internationally. With Congressional elections every two years and Presidential elections every four, there is always a degree of uncertainty in American foreign policy. When one party consolidates command of both branches, policy is more predictable, but this is never a permanent condition. Consequently, it behooves our friends and partners, and even our adversaries, to better understand where the political trend lines are pointing.
There is a positive side to this dynamic, too. Of course, depending on your perspective, sometimes change is good. Any particular Congress or administration may change things to your liking. On the other hand, if you don’t like the change, you need only hold on for another two to four years.
Second, the US has very strong institutions. Democratic change in American foreign policy is bracketed by institutional equities, and any change in policy, even in an era of disruption, is marginal in the short term and evolutionary in the longer term. How else to explain a China policy that has remained essentially unchanged for over nine presidencies? Or the American commitment to a forward deployed military almost 30 years after the end of the Cold War? Similarly in an area like trade policy, where there seems to be so much disruption, there are forces, in Congress, in the business community, in the bureaucracy, in the White House, in our alliances, pushing back. Whether the world will wait for us to work this out is another question, but one thing is certain: When all is said and done, there will be less change than proponents of it promise.
When we think about foreign policy institutions, we are accustomed to thinking almost exclusively about the executive branch. But Congress is another. In fact, Congress often acts as storehouse of American interests. Take the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), for example. Consider how the faces of Taiwan’s friends have changed since 1979, from Goldwater, Dole, Zablocki and Wolff to Royce, Gardner, Rubio, and Cruz. Yet, the TRA is alive and well. Recall the spark that led to its creation: bi-partisan outrage over Carter’s disregard for Congressional input and his half-hearted approach to continued relations with Taiwan. Remember the pro-ROC stalwarts that predate the TRA, members of what was once called the “China-lobby,” and people like America’s great “missionary for freedom,” Walter Judd.
Third, US foreign policy cannot but focus on human rights. There may have been a time where specific concerns about the conduct of allied governments were subsumed by the cause of defeating global communist tyranny. But that has not been the case now for several decades. Today, there is no equivalent strategic objective to justify turning a blind eye to abuses.
There is a false narrative out there that the Trump administration is turning away from this American commitment to liberty. There is an extraordinary amount of evidence to contradict it, but take one of the most recent, Secretary of State Pompeo’s remarks at the release of his department’s annual report on international religious freedom. “Religious freedom,” he said on May 29, “is not only ours. It is a right belonging to every individual on the globe. President Trump stands with those who yearn for religious liberty. Our Vice President stands with them, and so do I.”
There is an important corollary to this values-based feature of American foreign policy. It involves America’s transatlantic relationship. The US and Europe are going through a bit of a rough patch. Our governments today disagree on a number of policy approaches, especially on trade, but also on climate, Iran, and others. But these differences should not cloud the much deeper connection the US and Europe share. It is not an ethnic connection; the complexion of nations change. It is a cultural connection, one that encompasses agreement on fundamental liberal values. In the end, these values will always unite us in ways that supersede our relationships with countries that do not share them.
The fourth enduring feature of US foreign policy is the flip-side to the focus on human rights. As a sovereign state in an international system, the first responsibility of American foreign policymakers is to safeguard the national interest. They can approach this in the most enlightened way possible; prioritizing the national interest does not mean that the ends justify the means. Neither does it mean that our alliances are relationships of convenience. Common values and habits of cooperation we have with our NATO partners, with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others shape the way we conceive solutions to global problems. It does mean, however, that we cannot address human rights issues the same way in every place and time. Sometimes, in fact, it means compromise with governments we may otherwise find objectionable.
Former secretary of state Rex Tillerson made this point in a much mischaracterized address to State Department employees in May, 2017, and then went on to explain:
If you condition our national security efforts on someone adopting our values, we probably can’t achieve our national security goals or our national security interests. If we condition too heavily that others must adopt this value that we’ve come to over a long history of our own, it really creates obstacles to our ability to advance our national security interests, our economic interests. It doesn’t mean that we leave those values on the sidelines.
This was not a new direction in American foreign policy, but an overdue, honest recognition of reality.
Of most immediate relevance to Taiwan, this means the US requires a serviceable relationship with Beijing. As long as China is ruled by the Communist Party, it will never be a “good” relationship. But it must be a productive relationship and one that is capable of avoiding worst-case scenarios. China is too important to the global economy, too important to US prosperity, too important to regional peace and stability for the United States to treat as an adversary. This does not mean that the US should not speak out about human rights abuses in China or the autocratic nature of the Chinese government; it does mean that in doing so, it preserves the ability to work with China in areas where we have common interests. It also requires a continuing commitment to America’s unique one-China policy.
We live a boisterous age. It is sometimes difficult to see through all the political rhetoric, breaking news and social media. Headline writers often shape the way we string together developments. But if the world is to avoid major conflict and continue on its remarkable prosperous path, it is necessary to look beyond the excitement. This goes for understanding any nation’s politics. But given its role in the world, it particularly applies to the United States. To do this, one must focus on the fundamentals.
Walter Lohman is director of the Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center.
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