For Greece, this is a crucial year. The key question in the months ahead for what was once the epicenter of the European credit crisis is: Will it turn the corner and wean itself of external aid like Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus — something the Greek government wants? Or will the bailout program, which ends on Aug. 20, be followed by a similar arrangement — as some observers expect?
“Things are looking better for Greece, having regained access to markets and with the recovery gathering speed,” HSBC Bank European economist Fabio Balboni said in a note to clients on Friday last week. “In 2018, the country might finally exit its bailout program, but a clean exit might prove challenging if the eurozone fails to deliver substantial and credible debt relief.”
Since 2010, Greece has had three lifelines from euro-area countries and the IMF, with stringent conditions in terms of fiscal consolidation and structural reforms.
Illustration: Mountain People
It has also gone through two debt restructurings. In the next six to eight months, the Greek government and the country’s creditors have to work through some thorny issues if they want to avert yet another bailout program.
Here are the 10 crucial items on Greece’s calendar before the end of the bailout program:
This week, the government plans to submit to parliament a bill to implement all the measures needed to conclude the third bailout review. New policies have to be voted on by Wednesday next week so that auditors monitoring the program can present Greece’s compliance report at the Jan. 22 Eurogroup meeting, which is then to approve the disbursement of the next bailout tranche.
Late this month, European banking authorities are to finalize the scenarios under which the balance sheets of Greek lenders are to be stress-tested. The banks have to conclude these audits of their capital adequacy earlier than their EU counterparts.
By early next month, Greece intends to issue a new bond, with a maturity most likely of three or seven years, as it strives to regain full market access after years in the wilderness.
During the first 10 days of next month, the European Stability Mechanism is expected to disburse the bailout tranche attached to the implementation of the third review’s conditions. The amount of money Greece is likely to get has yet to be agreed on, but it is expected to be at least 5.5 billion euros (US$6.6 billion), the Greek Ministry of Finance said.
Next month, Greek banks are to start sending data to the Bank of Greece and European authorities for the stress tests.
The Greek government expects that creditors would next month start discussing further debt relief measures.
In early March, the fourth bailout review is expected to begin. It is not yet clear when creditor representatives are expected to return to Athens, but the review has to start in March if Greece wants to complete another 82 measures on time.
One of the most important gatherings between creditors before the end of the bailout program is to take place in Washington on April 20 to 22. The IMF’s spring meetings would probably give creditors the opportunity to discuss debt relief and what is next for Greece.
In early May, the stress-test results are expected to be announced. This is to show if Greek lenders need more capital and, if so, how serious the problem is for them and for Greece.
By the end of May or June, both the Greek government and creditors want to conclude the fourth bailout review and strike a deal on the conditions for any further debt relief and the post-program life for Greece.
Greek authorities are ruling out any kind of new program, but Bank of Greece Governor Yannis Stournaras has said that a credit line after August would boost investor confidence.
European officials have also said that there would be some kind of “follow-up arrangement until 2022,” said a person with knowledge of the discussions, since Greece has committed to primary budget surpluses of 3.5 percent of GDP until then.
Exiting the bailout without any follow-up arrangement would create an annoyance for the country’s financial sector: It would mean junk-rated Greek banks would not be eligible for a waiver allowing them to pledge sub-investment grade sovereign assets as collateral for the European Central Bank’s normal refinancing operations, which provide the country’s lenders with about 13 billion euros in liquidity.
This means that once Greece is no longer in a bailout program, banks would have to convert some of that into emergency liquidity assistance, which carries a 150 basis point penalty over regular credit lines.
Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’ administration would have to fulfill a politically difficult privatization program as it seeks to boost growth and gain the trust of investors needed for a bailout exit.
The Greek government projects that this year it is likely to manage to get 2.73 billion euros from the sale of state assets.
However, creditor estimates are more conservative and see the government falling short of its expectations.
The country’s lenders are going to pressure the government to implement what has been agreed and bring in the projected revenues.
By June, the government has to launch the tender for the sale of 17 percent of Public Power Corp, or find some other way to monetize its stake in the utility.
By the end of the first quarter of this year, it has to do the same for the sale of 30 percent of Athens International Airport, 65 percent of state-controlled natural gas supplier Depa, 5 percent of Hellenic Telecommunications Organization SA and 35.5 percent of Hellenic Petroleum SA. Greek authorities have to complete key conditions needed for the start of the Hellinikon project by next month.
Failure to meet targets might jeopardize government efforts to seek additional debt relief, as creditors could demand that the government does its part for lightening its burden before agreeing to additional concessions.
“What Greece has to do is stay on top of the reforms and if it does that, it creates space for the European Commission and the Eurogroup to discuss the big questions,” London-based Eurasia Group director Mujtaba Rahman said.
Two major Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-People’s Liberation Army (PLA) power demonstrations in November 2024 highlight the urgency for Taiwan to pursue a military buildup and deterrence agenda that can take back control of its destiny. First, the CCP-PLA’s planned future for Taiwan of war, bloody suppression, and use as a base for regional aggression was foreshadowed by the 9th and largest PLA-Russia Joint Bomber Exercise of Nov. 29 and 30. It was double that of previous bomber exercises, with both days featuring combined combat strike groups of PLA Air Force and Russian bombers escorted by PLAAF and Russian fighters, airborne early warning
For three years and three months, Taiwan’s bid to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) has remained stalled. On Nov. 29, members meeting in Vancouver agreed to establish a working group for Costa Rica’s entry — the fifth applicant in line — but not for Taiwan. As Taiwan’s prospects for CPTPP membership fade due to “politically sensitive issues,” what strategy should it adopt to overcome this politically motivated economic exclusion? The situation is not entirely dim; these challenges offer an opportunity to reimagine the export-driven country’s international trade strategy. Following the US’ withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership
On Tuesday, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) issued a statement criticizing Song Siyao (宋思瑤), a student from Shanghai’s Fudan University, saying she had offended the sensibilities of Taiwanese. It also called for the Ma Ying-jeou Foundation — established by former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) — which had organized the tour group, to remind group members to be careful with their statements. Song, during a visit to a baseball stadium in Taichung, said that the tour group “would like to congratulate China, Taipei team (中國台北隊) ... we wish mainland China and Taiwan compatriots can be like the team Chinatrust Brothers and
“Integrated Diplomacy” (總和外交) is the guiding principle of Taiwan’s current foreign policy. It seeks to mobilize technology, capital and talent for global outreach, strengthening Taiwan’s international connections. However, without a robust information security mechanism, such efforts risk being reduced to superficial courtesy calls. Security clearance serves as the “entrance examination results” for government agency personnel in sensitive positions, qualifying them to access sensitive information. Senior aides in the US Congress must also possess security clearance to assist lawmakers in handling classified budgets. However, security clearance is not an automatic right or a blanket necessity for accessing sensitive information. Access is granted only