In 2016, almost 20 billion cubic meters (about 15 million tonnes) of liquefied natural gas (LNG) were imported to Taiwan, while Japan imported roughly 100 billion cubic meters. That year, Taiwan’s population totaled about 23 million, while Japan’s population was 126 million, slightly more than five times Taiwan’s population.
In other words, the per capita consumption of LNG in Taiwan and Japan was quite similar in 2016.
There are only nine LNG storage tanks in Taiwan, six of which are in the receiving terminal at Yungan (永安) port in Kaohsiung, while the other three are in the receiving terminal at Taichung Harbor. However, there are 186 LNG storage tanks in Japan, which amounts to more than 20 times the number of tanks in Taiwan.
It is not difficult to see that there is a lack of LNG storage tanks and related operational facilities in Taiwan.
Both nations are situated on a convergent plate boundary, where tectonic plates converge and earthquakes are frequent. As a long-time observer of the groundwater radon gas concentration — the change of which is a forewarning of possible earthquakes — in central and southern Taiwan, as well as in the southern parts of the Coastal Mountain Range, I have noticed recent abnormalities of groundwater radon gas and a subsequent possibility of future earthquakes in central and southern Taiwan.
Taking this into account, the number and capacity of the LNG storage tanks need to be appropriately expanded to enhance the nation’s ability to deal with natural disasters.
Kuo Ming-ching is a professor in the Department of Resources Engineering at National Cheng Kung University.
Translated by Chang Ho-ming
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