leaders’ meeting, People First Party Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜), has described China as behaving like “Big Brother.” Meanwhile, Environmental Protection Administration Minister Lee Ying-yuan (李應元) was last week blocked by Beijing from attending a meeting at the UN Climate Change Conference in Bonn, Germany.
Just as some Taiwanese pored over the official report of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 19th National Congress with a fine-tooth comb, trying in vain to unearth a gesture of goodwill toward Taiwan, those deluded by China will receive a rude awakening once they find themselves on the receiving end of Beijing’s brutal political machine.
Soong clearly tried his best in his capacity as President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) envoy, but Beijing did not show him the slightest respect.
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) Taiwan policy centers on wielding a big rod and a small stick. The big rod involves destroying Taiwan’s economy, terrifying Taiwanese with the threat of military invasion and waging an all-out diplomatic offensive. The small stick involves hitting Taiwan’s underbelly with its “one generation and one stratum” (一代一線) — the younger generation and the grassroots stratum — policy, which aims to purchase the loyalty of Taiwan’s teachers, gut its talent pool and appropriate its commercial secrets.
To survive, Taiwan must be ruthlessly pragmatic and avoid becoming caught up in romantic and fanciful daydreams.
No public incident occurred during the APEC meeting, but cross-strait interaction nevertheless took a turn for the worse. The type of representation that Beijing is prepared to accept at these international forums is becoming ever more restrictive.
Last year, there were at least one-minute and 10-minute-long disputes; at this year’s APEC meeting, even handshakes and simple greetings were a rare sight.
While interacting with national leaders, Soong could be seen giving it his all, doing his best to fulfill the task entrusted to him by Tsai. However, there was no need for Soong to expend too much energy trying to improve the cross-strait relationship — although there was a very good reason for taking this approach.
At last month’s CCP congress, Xi cemented his position as China’s supreme leader and US President Donald Trump seemed to get along well with Xi during his visit to Beijing last week. As Xi’s power and authority have reached an apex, he might simply have laughed in Soong’s face had he attempted an introduction.
However, a White House statement issued after last week’s meeting between Xi and Trump said Trump told Xi that Washington would continue to supply Taiwan with defensive weaponry. Trump has refused to get sucked into Beijing’s long-term, high-decibel protest against arms sales to Taiwan.
Former US president Barack Obama’s “Asia pivot” policy and Trump’s “Indo-Pacific” concept show that democratic Taiwan is an indispensable strategic ally of the US.
Successive US governments have been clear that although they do not support a “two Chinas” model, a “one China, one Taiwan” model or Taiwanese independence, they categorically oppose Taiwan becoming a part of China.
Taiwanese and US national interests are sometimes in alignment and sometimes at odds. The government should make full use of common interests in its pursuit of the regularization of Taiwan as a normal country.
During the APEC meeting, hosted by Vietnam, Soong said that in the 1940s, he was still an infant and China and Japan were still at war with each other. When he was 20, Soong traveled to the US to study, at which time the US and North Vietnam were at war.
Soong said that today the US, Vietnam, Japan and China use peaceful discussion to solve tomorrow’s problems.
History should be a mirror that is used to reflect on past actions, not an executioner’s noose, Soong said.
What Soong did not mention was that at the end of World War II, General Order No. 1 — issued by Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces general Douglas MacArthur — stipulated that all Japanese forces north of the 16th parallel surrender to Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石).
Chiang’s forces accepted the Japanese surrender in North Vietnam and Taiwan, but simply performed the same function as the occupying forces they had replaced — it had nothing to do with sovereignty.
Prior to the war, Vietnam — which then formed part of French Indochina — was a French colony. During the colonial period, Vietnam had already formed its own independence movement; it split into separate countries — North and South — at the end of the war.
By contrast, Chiang’s army stayed in Taiwan, and in 1949 he moved his Republic of China (ROC) government to Taiwan, following defeat at the hands of the Communists.
This is why Taiwanese have the present contradiction of a democratic Taiwan that sits within the framework of the ROC.
History can also be viewed as a long, winding path.
First, the ROC lost its seat as the representative of China at the UN and the US severed formal diplomatic ties with Chiang’s government. Years later, Taiwan held its first direct presidential election, which was later followed by legislative elections and a series of peaceful reforms that gradually nudged the ROC toward becoming the democratic Taiwan that Taiwanese know today.
During the first direct presidential election in 1996, China attempted to threaten Taiwan both verbally and militarily, serving to make the demarcation between China and Taiwan ever more explicit and rigid.
The history of the democratization and regularization of Taiwan as a normal country is still being written. It is a modern day Romance of the Three Kingdoms, with Taiwan, China and the US as the main protagonists.
Whether or not China pursues a policy of peaceful unification, military unification or anti-secessionism, the most critical factor in facilitating Taiwan’s path to becoming a bona fide nation state is the US.
The Three Joint Communiques that form the US’ “one China” policy pertain to the representative authority of China in relation to the ROC and the People’s Republic of China. The Taiwan Relations Act forms the basis of a deterrent against any actions from China that could jeopardize Taiwan’s autonomy.
US policy has created a distinct dividing line between Taiwan and China that is clear for all to see.
The cross-strait relationship formed by US’ “one China” policy places importance on dialogue and a stable Taiwan Strait. Dialogue relies on the two sides feeling things out and finding a way forward by themselves, while stability could be enforced through US military intervention.
Beijing’s claim that both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to “one China” is not a primary concern for the US.
Both Xi and former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) are well aware that the US’ “one China” policy — which guarantees Taiwan’s de facto independent status — is different from their own “one China” principle, but they nevertheless deliberately choose to misinterpret the policy.
Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party government should therefore pursue a “Taiwanese dream” and avoid becoming ensnared in Xi’s “Chinese dream,” which he is attempting to extend to Taiwanese.
The Tsai administration will do all that it can to engage in peaceful dialogue with China, ensure stability in the Taiwan Strait and engage in mutually beneficial trade and exchanges.
However, Taiwanese have no appetite for the “one China” political stitch-up between the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the CCP — neither is it in the interest of the US, the wider Asia-Pacific region or the US’ Indo-Pacific strategic allies.
Taiwan’s normalization will never be gifted by Beijing, no matter how many compromises it might make.
The interplay between Taiwan, China and the US is in essence one big performance. Tsai must act out Taiwan’s part as per the script, but she should never allow herself to believe that the “one China” farce is anything other than fiction.
Translated by Edward Jones
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