At the end of the six-day 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the approximately 2,200 delegates decided to add “Xi Jinping (習近平) Thought on the new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics” to the party’s constitution, and it became official: The era of Xi has begun.
Only two previous Chinese leaders, Mao Zedong (毛澤東) and Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平), have had their personally branded ideology enshrined in the CCP’s charter.
Xi’s two predecessors, Jiang Zemin (江澤民) and Hu Jintao (胡錦濤), did not have their names linked to any ideological doctrine, much less one elevated to such a high status.
Chinese leaders are eager to confirm what the world already knew: Xi’s authority now equals that of the CCP’s heaviest heavyweights.
Besides symbolically catapulting Xi into the pantheon of the founders of the People’s Republic of China, the congress delivered him two substantive political victories.
First and foremost, Xi stalled the designation of a successor, thereby leaving open the possibility that he could serve a third term as president.
All five new members of the CCP’s Politburo Standing Committee, the party’s top decision-making body, are in their 60s — too old to be groomed to take over for Xi in five years, given the party’s unofficial retirement age of 68.
Had one or two new Politburo Standing Committee members younger than 55 been promoted, Xi would be expected to step down in 2022, when he is to hit the two-term limit, just as Jiang and Hu did. The alternative would be to purge the designated successor, as Mao and Deng did. Neither scenario is appealing.
However, with no successor, the possibility that Xi will serve a third term — at least — should decisively alter the political calculations of both his loyalists and those still hedging their bets. Loyalists will reiterate their allegiance, while those on the fence are likely to hop on the Xi bandwagon. As for Xi’s rivals, they must be thoroughly demoralized.
Xi’s second major victory at the congress was the promotion of two close allies to the Politburo Standing Committee. First, his chief of staff, Li Zhanshu (栗戰書), is taking over the National People’s Congress (NPC). The NPC, which has never been much more than a rubber stamp for party decisions, will now have its legislative agenda dictated by Xi himself.
Li’s leadership of the NPC could turn out to be the key to dismantling one of the last barriers to Xi’s political ambitions: the constitutional two-term limit for presidents.
While nothing prevents Xi from retaining a party title, such as CCP general secretary, he will need to amend the constitution if he wants to remain China’s head of state. With Li in charge, such an amendment would sail through the NPC.
Another trusted loyalist, Zhao Leji (趙樂際), is taking over from the 69-year-old Wang Qishan (王岐山) as CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection secretary — a crucial position responsible for keeping the CCP in check.
Wang has overseen Xi’s anti-corruption drive — which has purged many of Xi’s rivals and consolidated his power — since it began. By appointing Zhao, Xi has effectively put every senior leader on notice.
Xi’s triumph at the congress has fueled widespread speculation that his now-formidable power will enable him to impose his vision of hardline authoritarian rule, underpinned by Chinese nationalism, in the coming years.
That is a possibility, but it is far from guaranteed.
The reason is simple: Although the CCP’s internal power dynamics have not changed much in the past few decades, Chinese society has moved far beyond the Maoist or even the Dengist era. Few Chinese, including members of the party, genuinely believe in any official doctrine.
Economically, the private sector accounts for more than 60 percent of China’s output and the CCP has become practically irrelevant in the daily lives of ordinary Chinese.
This is the paradox of power in the era of Xi. Yes, he is the most powerful leader that the world’s largest one-party state has had in decades — but his ability to shape Chinese society could turn out to be far more limited than he, his allies and most outside observers expect.
Minxin Pei is professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and a non-resident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the US.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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