Although Beijing has been refusing to interact with the Democratic Progressive Party government, suspending official cross-strait communication mechanisms and reducing the number of Chinese tourists allowed to visit Taiwan, its “united front” tactics have continued unabated.
Following the conclusion of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 19th National Congress on Tuesday last week, Beijing’s united front work toward Taiwan and Hong Kong has been re-energized.
Hong Kong’s Sing Tao Daily yesterday reported that former Fujian Province CCP secretary You Quan (尤權) is likely to be named as the new director of the party’s United Front Work Department, “with emphasis on young people and the so-called elites as its main targets.”
It is no secret that China has prioritized engaging Taiwan’s grassroots voters and young people in its united front strategy. Chinese National People’s Congress Standing Committee Vice Chairman Zhang Baowen (張寶文) in July even openly mentioned that more than 200 “unification promotion” groups have been established worldwide to bolster the unification agenda and quash those calling for Taiwanese independence.
The emphasis on engaging Taiwan’s grassroots voters and young people came in the wake of the Sunflower movement in 2014, during which many of the participants expressed anxiety that their future would be increasingly dictated by China.
However, the thriving and extensive political and commercial exchanges under former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) did not guarantee success in winning the hearts and minds of Taiwanese. Realizing this, Beijing has adjusted its tactics to focus on the “three middles and the youth” — residents of central and southern Taiwan, middle and low-income families, small and medium-sized enterprises, and young people — and “one generation and one stratum” — the younger generation and the grass roots.
Aside from targeting Taiwanese students with various sorts of pretenses for them to visit China in a bid to indoctrinate them, China has also recruited Taiwanese educators to participate in its united front strategy.
This was seen in the summer, when scores of school principals and teachers went on exchange trips to China. While on the surface the visits were billed as educational exchanges, the frequency of such invites no doubt paves the way for Chinese educators to visit Taiwan — a brilliant strategy that allows Chinese officials to directly interact with Taiwan’s grassroots groups under the pretense of educational exchanges.
While such exchanges are certainly welcome, as they promote mutual understanding and harmony, they are only healthy to cross-strait development when the Chinese participants harbor sincerity and goodwill toward Taiwanese. It is a different story when they have a hidden political agenda to promote unification or other political objectives aimed at undermining Taiwan’s democracy.
In short, China’s intangible united front work bears more destructive potential than its tangible military threat. As such, the government and public alike must be vigilant in the face of Beijing’s hypocrisy masquerading as harmless exchanges.
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