During his speech at the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 19th National Congress, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) vowed to “never forget the original spirit of the party when it first started and always remember its mission.”
Speaking of the party’s goals, Xi highlighted the importance of perfecting and promoting “Chinese wisdom” and “Chinese solutions” by strengthening the party’s confidence in its chosen path, theoretical basis, political system and culture, and of realizing China’s rational rejuvenation through the diplomatic strategies of a power big enough to expand its global influence.
Xi hopes to lead China into heading the world political and economic order, a goal that, if realized, would mark a new high for the nation.
Considering that his diplomatic strategies include plans to bring unification across the Taiwan Strait, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration should carefully assess his Taiwan policy, including its potential challenges and opportunities.
Xi made it clear that there are to be no changes to Beijing’s policies of “peaceful unification” and “one country, two systems.” It is a continuation of the “nine principles for peaceful unification” proposed on Jan. 1, 1979, by China’s then-National People’s Congress chairman Ye Jianying (葉劍英).
Xi’s remarks show his confidence in China’s rising global influence, as he has made no fundamental adjustments to his Taiwan policy, despite Taiwan’s transition of power last year.
This is presenting a challenge to the DPP government, as it is attempting to bring about a thawing of cross-strait relations.
Although the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) naturally rejects Beijing’s cross-strait programs and principles — it has responded by saying that Taiwan “will not succumb to pressure,” an attitude that is shared by most Taiwanese — the potential opportunities that those programs and principles might offer should be understood.
In addition to clarifying Beijing’s position on the Taiwan issue, Xi’s reiteration of Beijing’s bottom line is an attempt to calm war hawks in China. As long as President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) administration remains friendly, keeps its promises and continues to avoid conflicts with Beijing, and as long as no significant changes occur in Taiwan, Beijing would prefer peaceful unification over invasion.
On the other hand, while most Taiwanese are primarily concerned with Xi’s remarks that Beijing will “never allow anyone, any organization, or any political party, at any time or in any form, to separate any part of Chinese territory from China,” the DPP should focus on Xi’s emphasis on promoting integration across the Taiwan Strait, a key aspect of his Taiwan policy.
Xi’s remarks at the 19th National Congress on promoting cross-strait integration are an extension and elaboration of former Chinese president Hu Jintao’s (胡錦濤) remarks on enhancing peace and cooperation across the Taiwan Strait at the 18th National Congress.
Under Xi’s plan, China is to focus more on promoting economic, cultural and social exchanges that would be beneficial to integration. It is a way for Beijing to bypass the Taiwanese government while still reaching a wide spectrum of Taiwanese despite the political standoff between the CCP and the DPP.
As part of a program to promote cross-strait integration, Xi said his government would take the lead in sharing opportunities in China’s development with Taiwanese “compatriots,” specifically by allowing Taiwanese to live in China and enjoy the same benefits as Chinese citizens in studying, working and starting businesses.
The specific steps that Beijing is taking to achieve this goal have already become apparent in the past few years.
These measures are expected to attract many of Taiwan’s young people trapped in the nation’s stagnant economy, with an increasing number of young Taiwanese searching for opportunities in China.
The DPP should analyze whether these high-level unilateral measures, which are aimed squarely at the party’s main supporter base, could ultimately bring about a shift in public opinion and perhaps even affect the results of elections.
Strongman Xi and the rising power of China is a phenomenon that will affect not just Tsai’s presidency, but all of Taiwan for the next 30 years.
The uneasy “cold peace” between the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China will not continue into the future. Taiwan will be unable to avoid the “China factor” as it seeks to strike out an independent course in the world. Taiwanese must therefore read between the lines of Xi’s speech to ascertain whether a new model for relations between Taiwan and China can be adopted.
While Hu vowed to “insist on the ‘one China’ principle” at the 18th National Congress, Xi chose a less strong expression at the 19th National Congress by describing the “one China” principle as the “political basis” for cross-strait relations.
Despite his emphasis on opposition to Taiwanese independence, Xi said that when the Taiwanese government “acknowledges the historical fact of the ‘1992 consensus’” and accepts that both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to “one China,” the two sides “can begin to have a dialogue and work on solving problems that are important to people across the Strait, and there will be no more obstacles between the mainland and any political parties or groups in Taiwan.”
The softer tone suggests that Xi might have adjusted his approach to better appeal to the DPP government.
In addition, Xi’s remark that the party should “adhere to the idea that people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are one big family and respect Taiwan’s current social systems and the Taiwanese people’s way of living” reveals more flexibility than before, despite appearing to be a reiteration of old ideas.
The MAC’s response to Xi’s speech is praiseworthy.
Although, like Xi, the Tsai administration reiterated its position on cross-strait issues, it showed great composure and restraint as it continued to avoid provoking China while keeping its promises and friendly attitude.
The MAC even used Xi’s wording as it urged cooperation across the Taiwan Strait, saying that the two sides should “never forget the original spirit” that initiated cross-strait exchanges 30 years ago.
That they are expressing similar ideas and quoting each other shows that both sides still desire and expect to work together, but a new model for cross-strait communication will not invent itself, as the history of the last 30 years has shown.
Before then-Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) chairman Koo Chen-fu (辜振甫) and China’s then-Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) chairman Wang Daohan (汪道涵) had their key meeting in 1993, representatives from the two groups had held many discussions in Hong Kong and elsewhere. Their communication built the political foundation for the meeting.
Similarly, the meeting between former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and Xi in 2015 was only made possible by years of communication between officials from both sides, including several cross-strait visits by the heads of the SEF and MAC, and China’s ARATS and Taiwan Affairs Office, which helped build trust and mutual understanding.
It is hoped that the DPP and the CCP can and will find new and subtle expressions that will reopen dialogue and that they will work together to find a new model of cross-strait relations.
Hong Chi-chang is a former chairman of the Straits Exchange Foundation.
Translated by Tu Yu-an
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