Every January, I try to craft a forecast for the coming year. Economic forecasting is notoriously difficult; but, notwithstanding the truth expressed in former US president Harry Truman’s request for a one-armed economist — who would not be able to say “on the other hand” — my record has been credible.
In recent years, I correctly foresaw that, in the absence of stronger fiscal stimulus — which was not forthcoming in either Europe or the US — recovery from the Great Recession of 2008 would be slow. In making these forecasts, I have relied more on analysis of underlying economic forces than on complex econometric models.
For example, at the beginning of last year, it seemed clear that the deficiencies of global aggregate demand that have been manifest for the past several years were unlikely to change dramatically. Thus, I thought that forecasters of a stronger recovery were looking at the world through rose-tinted glasses. Economic developments unfolded much as I anticipated.
Not so the political events of last year. I had been writing for years that unless growing inequality — especially in the US, but also in many countries throughout the world — was addressed, there would be political consequences. However, inequality continued to worsen — with striking data showing that average life expectancy in the US was on the decline.
These results were foreshadowed by a study last year, by Anne Case and Angus Deaton, which showed that life expectancy was on the decline for large segments of the population — including the US’ so-called angry men of the Rust Belt states.
However, with the incomes of the bottom 90 percent of Americans having stagnated for close to a third of a century — and declining for a significant proportion — the health data simply confirmed that things were not going well for very large swaths of the US. While the US might be at the extreme of this trend, things were little better elsewhere.
However, if it seemed clear that there would be political consequences, their form and timing were far less obvious. Why did the backlash in the US come just when the economy seemed to be on the mend, rather than earlier? Why did it manifest itself in a lurch to the right? After all, it was the Republicans who had blocked assistance to those losing their jobs as a result of the globalization they pushed assiduously. It was the Republicans who, in 26 states, refused to allow the expansion of Medicaid, thereby denying health insurance to those at the bottom. Why was the victor somebody who made his living from taking advantage of others, openly admitted not paying his fair share of taxes and made tax avoidance a point of pride?
US president-elect Donald Trump grasped the spirit of the time: Things were not going well and many voters wanted change. Now they will get it: There will be no business as usual. However, seldom has there been more uncertainty. Which policies Trump will pursue remains unknown, to say nothing of which will succeed or what the consequences will be.
Trump seems hell-bent on having a trade war, but how will China and Mexico respond? Trump might well understand that what he proposes would violate WTO rules, but he might also know that it would take a long time for the WTO to rule against him, and by then, the US’ trade account might have been rebalanced.
However, two can play that game: China can take similar actions, although its response is likely to be more subtle. If a trade war were to break out, what would happen?
Trump might have reason to think he could win; after all, China is more dependent on exports to the US than the US is on exports to China, which gives the US an advantage. However, a trade war is not a zero-sum game. The US stands to lose as well. China might be more effective in targeting its retaliation to cause acute political pain. In addition, China might be in a better position to respond to US attempts to inflict pain on it than the US is to respond to the pain that China might inflict on the US. It is anybody’s guess who can stand the pain better. Will it be the US, where ordinary citizens have already suffered for so long, or China, which, despite troubled times, has managed to generate growth in excess of 6 percent?
More broadly, the Republican/Trump agenda, with its tax cuts even more weighted toward the rich than the standard Republican Party recipe would imply, is based on the idea of trickle-down prosperity — a continuation of former US president Ronald Reagan era’s supply-side economics, which never actually worked. Fire-breathing rhetoric, or raving 3am tweets, might assuage the anger of those left behind by the Reagan revolution, at least for a while, but for how long? And what happens then?
Trump might like to repeal the ordinary laws of economics, as he goes about his version of “voodoo economics.” However, he cannot. Still, as the world’s largest economy leads the way into uncharted political waters this year and beyond, it would be foolhardy for a mere mortal to attempt a forecast, other than to state the obvious: the waters will almost certainly be choppy, and many — if not most — pundit ships will sink along the way.
Joseph Stiglitz, recipient of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2001 and the John Bates Clark Medal in 1979, is a University Professor at Columbia University.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
As the war in Burma stretches into its 76th year, China continues to play both sides. Beijing backs the junta, which seized power in the 2021 coup, while also funding some of the resistance groups fighting the regime. Some suggest that Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) is hedging his bets, positioning China to side with the victors regardless of the outcome. However, a more accurate explanation is that China is acting pragmatically to safeguard its investments and ensure the steady flow of natural resources and energy for its economy. China’s primary interest is stability and supporting the junta initially seemed like the best
In honor of President Jimmy Carter’s 100th birthday, my longtime friend and colleague John Tkacik wrote an excellent op-ed reassessing Carter’s derecognition of Taipei. But I would like to add my own thoughts on this often-misunderstood president. During Carter’s single term as president of the United States from 1977 to 1981, despite numerous foreign policy and domestic challenges, he is widely recognized for brokering the historic 1978 Camp David Accords that ended the state of war between Egypt and Israel after more than three decades of hostilities. It is considered one of the most significant diplomatic achievements of the 20th century.
Numerous expert analyses characterize today’s US presidential election as a risk for Taiwan, given that the two major candidates, US Vice President Kamala Harris and former US president Donald Trump, are perceived to possess divergent foreign policy perspectives. If Harris is elected, many presume that the US would maintain its existing relationship with Taiwan, as established through the American Institute in Taiwan, and would continue to sell Taiwan weapons and equipment to help it defend itself against China. Under the administration of US President Joe Biden, whose political views Harris shares, the US on Oct. 25 authorized arms transfers to Taiwan, another
The US election result will significantly impact its foreign policy with global implications. As tensions escalate in the Taiwan Strait and conflicts elsewhere draw attention away from the western Pacific, Taiwan was closely monitoring the election, as many believe that whoever won would confront an increasingly assertive China, especially with speculation over a potential escalation in or around 2027. A second Donald Trump presidency naturally raises questions concerning the future of US policy toward China and Taiwan, with Trump displaying mixed signals as to his position on the cross-strait conflict. US foreign policy would also depend on Trump’s Cabinet and