The Double Ten National Day celebrations have come and gone, but an identity crisis that has confused Taiwanese for decades remains.
The confusion stems from the nation’s official title, the Republic of China (ROC). What does it represent for Taiwan and its people in this day and age?
More often than not, Taiwanese feel conflicted when asked about the connection between Taiwan and the ROC. Why are the terms used interchangeably when government officials are inaugurated or when Taiwanese present their passport at customs, even though they understand the historical context behind the title?
The roots of the ROC can be traced to the Wuchang Uprising against the Qing Dynasty in 1911. The uprising served as a catalyst to the Xinhai Revolution, which culminated in China’s last imperial dynasty being overthrown and the founding of the ROC.
Sun Yat-sen (孫逸仙), who was an instrumental figure in the revolution, in 1919 renamed the Tongmenghui (同盟會, “United League”) the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). The KMT continued to use the ROC title after losing control in China to the Chinese Communist Party and fleeing to Taiwan in 1949.
When trying to understand the historical context of the ROC title, it must be remembered that the KMT never formally gave up on reclaiming the “mainland” by force and viewed itself as the sole legitimate representative of “China” until 1991, when former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) renounced the so-called “period of mobilization for the suppression of Communist rebellion.”
Those days of a nation under the KMT’s rule trying to restore its right to the “China” title are long gone, and while older people who grew up under the KMT’s rule and are thankful for the developments it carried out in Taiwan have unquestioningly embraced the title, society at large has come to form, from generations of hard work and collective memory, a self-identity that is uniquely Taiwanese.
The clamor that the nation should change its title is especially voluble among people who want to keep a safe distance from China and those who resented the KMT’s oppressive party-state rule, its murder of Taiwanese who arrived here before it, and its inability to separate taxpayers’ money from its own, even after the end of the nation’s political tutelage period, which formally ended the KMT’s party-state rule.
These people have made it clear that they do not want Taiwan to have anything to do with the KMT’s history in China or the nation’s authoritarian past.
Theoretically, changing the nation’s title might also resolve the standoff between Taipei and Beijing over the so-called “1992 consensus.”
The consensus, a term former Mainland Affairs Council chairman Su Chi (蘇起) admitted to making up in 2000, refers to a tacit understanding between the KMT and the Chinese government that both sides of the Taiwan Strait acknowledge that there is only “one China,” with each side having its own interpretation of what “China” means.
By cutting “China” from the nation’s title, the premise for the fictional “consensus” would be conveniently removed and Beijing would not have a pretext to continue interfering with Taiwan’s international standing, unless it fabricates another lie.
Earlier this year, a survey conducted by the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation found that more than 80 percent of respondents considered themselves to be Taiwanese, suggesting that the nation’s title might be outdated and no longer reflects mainstream opinion.
Even though it might not be an ideal time for the government to propose changing the nation’s official title, due to an abrupt change in cross-strait ties the move would likely bring, there is no denying that such a demand is on the rise, and protests and discussions started in its wake should not be taken lightly.
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