The battle for the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chair has started, with former vice president Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) openly questioning the party’s new platform and asking whether the so-called “1992 consensus” refers to “one China, different interpretations” (一中各表) or “one China, same interpretation” (一中同表).
On the surface, this might look like a difference of opinion on the party’s direction, but deep down it is a struggle for the chair.
Speaking of KMT Chairwoman Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱), Wu said: “This is her being out of sync with the KMT, not about me being out of sync with her.”
In so doing, Wu is setting Hung outside of the party.
There are three things about the “1992 consensus” that need to be clarified: whether it exists; what it is; and how it will develop in the future.
Despite former Mainland Affairs Council chairman Su Chi (蘇起) admitting he invented the term and the KMT’s unshakable belief in its existence, what exactly was agreed upon depends on whom you ask.
The original formulation was: “The 1992 consensus of one China, with different interpretations” (九二共識，一中各表),” and this is what the KMT understood it to be and agreed with. However, while the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) agreed with the “1992 consensus” part, it only accepted “one China,” not the “different interpretations” part.
During former president Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) eight years in office, he catered to China’s stance on the issue, and KMT government officials, be they city or county heads, as well as senior party officials, were not to utter the words “Republic of China” or “different interpretations” in the presence of CCP officials.
Even Ma, during his meeting last year with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) in Singapore, spoke of the “1992 consensus,” but did not mention “different interpretations.”
By neglecting to utter the words “different interpretations” and speaking only of “one China,” Ma inadvertently buried the “1992 consensus” himself.
To secure her re-election as party chairwoman, Hung has sought to differentiate herself from the Democratic Progressive Party’s cross-strait policy and, in anticipation of having the opportunity to meet Xi herself at a future CCP/KMT forum, has proposed the new policy platform and its “1992 consensus minus-different interpretations” formulation. Hung is doing this to pander to China, hoping to use Beijing’s influence to consolidate her own status within the party and within the country.
Hung’s strategy of leveraging China to win over the public is doomed to fail, and it will be a hard sell even to her own party. Mainstream public opinion has spoken during the presidential election: Ma’s pro-China policies had run their course and had been rejected by the electorate. Hung’s blatantly pro-
Beijing stance is just old wine in a new bottle.
There are forces at work within the KMT other than the pro-China factions. Many pro-localization groups are advocating the maintenance of peaceful, mutually beneficial relations without having Taiwan sacrifice its sovereignty in the process. These factions were behind the move to replace Hung as the party’s presidential candidate in the lead-up to the election.
Even though Hung was able to secure the chairwomanship after the election and the localization factions failed to get their choice, former acting chairperson Huang Min-hui (黃敏惠), elected, these initial sallies by Wu have made his intentions clear. Hung has the party machinery at her disposal, but Wu remains considerably influential within the party.
The “1992 consensus” is a consensus in name only. There is no consensus on the “consensus” between the CCP and the KMT; neither is there a consensus on it between the ruling and opposition parties in Taiwan. There is not even a consensus on the “consensus” within the KMT. The only consensus that does exist is that there is no consensus on the “1992 consensus.”
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