The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ decision to merge and streamline the nation’s overseas representative offices to better utilize its budget and personnel has raised grave concerns about whether it is wise for a nation dogged by constant diplomatic predicaments and periodic setbacks to prioritize money over its presence overseas.
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Legislator Tsai Shih-ying (蔡適應) quoted Minister of Foreign Affairs David Lee (李大維) as saying on Monday that the ministry has selected four representative offices to close in the first phase: Norway; Guam; Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; and Hamburg, Germany.
The reason given was that three of the four offices’ functions could easily be taken over by a nearby overseas mission, while the Oslo office was selected due to the Norwegian government’s apparent lack of interest in opening a representative office in Taipei.
Taiwan has 117 representative offices overseas, which reportedly cost the ministry NT$9.5 billion (US$302.6 million) a year. Lee told a legislative session that this number is higher than that of larger nations, such as Canada and Australia, despite Taiwan having just 22 diplomatic allies.
The plan to shut what the ministry regards as “idle and unnecessary” overseas offices could not only negatively affect Taiwanese tourists abroad, but could also set back Taipei’s decades-long endeavors to enhance the nation’s international profile and increase its global presence.
The ministry’s Web site lists a number of services that overseas representative offices provide to Taiwanese tourists and expats, including replacing lost passports, providing assistance in the event of an emergency and notarizing documents.
Following the nation’s 2011 inclusion in the EU’s Schengen visa-waiver program, which allows tourists to stay for up to 90 days, Taiwanese have become more willing to travel to Europe, with Taiwanese tourist arrivals in the region reaching 161,529 last year, according Tourism Bureau statistics.
Guam is also a popular tourist destination, with the number of Taiwanese visiting increasing by 6.3 percent from 47,904 in 2013 to 50,924 in 2014, the Guam Visitors Bureau’s 2014 Annual Report showed.
If the ministry carries out its plan, Taiwanese visiting the nations where offices have been closed could find themselves stranded, with nowhere to turn should they lose their passport, be robbed or succumb to an illness that requires emergency treatment.
Given China’s relentless efforts to stifle Taiwan’s international space, opening a new representative office overseas used to be considered a diplomatic breakthrough. It is easy to undo those efforts, but it would be harder to re-establish the shuttered offices.
Some critics have dismissed some of the overseas offices as “symbolic,” but the same could also be said of the nation’s 22 diplomatic allies.
A nation can hardly call itself a sovereign state without having at least a handful of diplomatic allies, an objective that has become increasingly difficult to maintain.
It is no secret that the nation’s ties with its 22 diplomatic allies have not exactly been conducive to Taiwan’s development, whether in terms of economic growth or its presence in the international arena, yet the ministry allocates a budget of close to NT$10 billion each year to offer financial assistance to these “symbolic” allies.
Such generous financial aid has long been frowned upon by the public, with 56.2 percent of respondents in a survey released by the Association of Foreign Relations on Aug. 19 saying that the assistance is not worthwhile.
While President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) administration is seeking to maximize the nation’s limited resources and be frugal when spending taxpayers’ hard-earned money, it should refrain from being short-sighted and think long-term.
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