Sat, Aug 27, 2016 page8

• SID’s dissolution is long overdue

  • By Wu Ching-chin 吳景欽
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  Minister of Justice Chiu Tai-san (邱太三) said that the ministry’s Special Investigation Division (SID) — set up by former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) to investigate major corruption and economic crimes — will be abolished.

  Prosecutor-General Yen Ta-ho (顏大和) has questioned whether the District Prosecutors’ Office will be able to take over the unit’s tasks — given the department’s staff and resources — whether it will be able to counteract corruption and crime among top-level officials and whether it will be able to resist political interference, saying that these require careful consideration. The evidence suggests that if district prosecutors are insufficiently independent, even the SID will be unable to avoid coming under the thumb of politicians.

  According to Article 63-1 of the Organic Act for Courts (法院組織法), targets of SID investigations and prosecutions should include not only large-scale economic crimes or activities harmful to social order, but also corruption or negligence involving high-level public officials, such as the president, vice president or the directors of the five government branches — legislative, executive, judicial, control and examination — in addition to cases of electoral fraud involving the president and legislators.

  These types of cases, if they do not involve individuals in key government positions, invariably involve wealthy businesspeople. If a new special investigation unit is set up under the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office, since the prosecutor-general’s term in office is fixed at a single term of four years, the prosecutor-general would therefore be well-positioned to carry out investigations without fear of consequences. In addition, due to the pooling of resources, the unit would be able to investigate and prosecute large criminal cases more efficiently and quickly.

  It is impossible, through examining past cases, to prove whether the SID has more investigatory powers than the District Prosecutors’ Office. For example, taking the recent investigation into alleged financial irregularities at CTBC Financial Holding Co, this kind of economic crime is not committed overnight, but the SID only issued subpoenas in June to gather evidence and question people in connection to the case.

  Whether investigators missed a golden window of opportunity to collect evidence is a question that has caused a great deal of discussion. The SID even waited two months before reopening the investigation, which has led some observers to question the professionalism and effectiveness of the organization.

  Furthermore, the only real “success” that the SID can be said to have had to date is the corruption case involving former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). Indeed, to investigate and prosecute a former president after he left office was not only in accordance with the original aims of the unit, but also helped to assert the supremacy of the system, while establishing the impartiality of the SID.

  However, eight years on, despite the SID having brought a large number of charges against Chen, in how many of these was Chen found guilty and in how many was he found innocent? How many are still in the process of being heard or even still being investigated? A thorough examination of the outstanding charges against Chen is required.

  Moreover, during the course of the judicial process against Chen, there were rumors of witnesses having criticized prosecutors for inciting and pressuring them to commit perjury to secure a conviction. Such a serious flaw in the judicial process reflects badly on the SID, and it is difficult not to come to the conclusion that there was some political interference in the proceedings.

  Furthermore, during the political skirmishes that took place in September 2013, the SID, true to form, became a political tool. Not only has the SID been completely stripped of its original purpose — to exercise impartial investigatory powers — but it has also failed to prevent government interference by providing the prosecutor-general with certain privileges, which means the SID can no longer be taken seriously.

  The argument that only the SID is able to investigate and prosecute corruption or negligence involving high-level public officials is equivalent to calling into question the independence of every district prosecutors’ office and the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office and their professional ability to enforce the law.

  This clearly demonstrates the ineffectualness of the SID’s functions and the problems associated with its very existence. As long as the prosecutorial system falls short in terms of neutrality and objectivity, even elevating the SID to a higher status within the machinery of government would be useless.

  This is why abolishing the SID has become inevitable. This is not to say that the chief prosecutor and the prosecutor-general cannot, in important cases and in accordance with the spirit of Article 64 of the Organic Act for Courts, assemble a team of prosecutors and civil servants similar to the special investigations unit at Japan’s Tokyo District Prosecutors’ Office.

  Finally, even more attention should be given so that prosecutors are responsible for the investigation, prosecution, summing up and sentencing of criminal cases. Therefore, a large amount of power is concentrated in their hands, but without a necessary system of checks and balances. Given this, the central problem that must be addressed during any reform of Taiwan’s prosecutorial system is how to prevent the frequent promotion of frivolous lawsuits and abuses of power.

  Wu Ching-chin is an associate professor and chair of Aletheia University’s law department.

  Translated by Edward Jones
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