The nation is undergoing its third transition of power, which should make Taiwan a member of the democratic community. However, there is neither a law nor a mature political convention that stipulates how government changeovers should be done, which has filled this unprecedented four-month long transition period with many variables.
President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) is not putting his mind to the responsibilities of a caretaker government, but to political manipulations, such as proposing to form a coalition Cabinet and visiting Itu Aba Island (Taiping Island, 太平島), leaving president-elect Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) and her Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) with no choice but to remedy the situation by themselves.
In addition to capitalizing on its advantage as the majority party in the new legislature, which was sworn in on Monday, and the power vested in the party by the electorate to counterbalance the Ma administration, another thing the DPP can do is to humbly review its previous term in office and experience of government changeover to draw lessons from those times.
The previous transition from Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) to DPP took place in 2000, when former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) took office. The duration of that transfer of government was about two months, but because it was the first time that power had been handed to the DPP, the process was even more precarious. The challenges that Chen had to face immediately after winning the election included:
First, he had to obtain sufficient and accurate intelligence from the National Security Bureau, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice’s Investigation Bureau so that he could get a grip on things.
Second, he had to work with the outgoing president so the transition could proceed smoothly and crises could be resolved.
Third, he had to carry out his manifestos on national security, diplomacy and cross-strait relations, or, in practice, make necessary adjustments in response to post-election situations.
Fourth, he had to ensure the allegiance and obedience of government agencies in charge of national security, foreign affairs, intelligence and national defense so that everything could run seamlessly when he took office.
Fifth, he had to organize a team for the transition, find prospective staff and form a new Cabinet, while sorting out his priorities.
Sixth, he had to effectively address problems that arose as the media, Taiwanese or others, discussed who might join the Cabinet and what important policies might be pursued by the new administration.
Seventh, he had to minimize wrong or inappropriate remarks and mistakes made by either himself or his staff.
Eighth, he had to effectively persuade the international community, while paving the way for his inauguration speech on policy priorities and strategies.
The main challenges that Chen faced in 2000 were:
First, could the military and intelligence ministries — which prior to that had treated anyone who was pro-Taiwanese independence as an enemy — pledge allegiance to a pro-independence president?
Second, the DPP of the time did not have people with sufficient experience to run the government.
Third, Beijing adopted a policy of closely watching every move of the new administration. Moreover, the US became heavily involved in ensuring that the nation’s democracy was bolstered and demanded, before the election day, that Chen promise to fulfill the “three noes” that were included in the “four noes and one without” pledge of his inauguration speech.
Chen and his transition team’s strategy was to cooperate with the transition group commissioned by former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) to assist the then-president-elect.
When Chen took office, he retained a number of Lee’s staff in his administration and appointed then-minister of national defense Tang Fei (唐飛), a KMT member, as his first premier; a move to pacify the military. Chen maintained close communication with former US president Bill Clinton’s government and continued to express goodwill toward Beijing. Chen’s “four noes” hinted at a probable future of “one China” and peaceful cross-strait ties. The situation was sensitive and volatile, and messengers dispatched by Chen and then-Chinese president Jiang Zemin (江澤民) were frequently sent across the Taiwan Strait, which for a time caused confusion due to mixed messages being sent.
Moreover, Chen won less than 40 percent of the vote, with the DPP a minority in the legislature. Nonetheless, with the assistance of Lee, massive support from the US and the DPP’s own soul searching, the first transfer of power was successful.
Tsai, on the other hand, has more advantages, including winning more than 56 percent of the vote and defeating her rival by more than 3 million votes, while the DPP has a majority in the new legislature.
In addition, the political situation is relatively stable, with few upheavals. The political culture in the national defense, foreign affairs and intelligence agencies are also more mature.
The downside is that the caretaker period has lengthened to four months, which might cause policies to stagnate.
Tsai promised diplomatic allies there would be consistency. Before the elections, the US maintained a neutral stance and did not intervene. After the elections, it immediately expressed support for Tsai, with US President Barack Obama even sending former US deputy secretary of state William Burns to meet her. At the same time, Washington sent high-level Department of State officials to Beijing to ensure that Chinese President Xi Jin-ping (習近平) would not misjudge the situation, but Beijing is still watching and has not responded to Tsai’s victory.
Although the challenges entailed in the transfer of power that the DPP faces this time are less significant than in 2000, there are still variables, the biggest of which are Ma and Beijing. On the evening of Tsai’s victory, Ma congratulated Tsai and immediately proposed the formation of a coalition Cabinet, sparking heated debate, which, along with former premier Mao Chi-kuo’s (毛治國) resignation, took public focus off the KMT’s rout.
Tsai and the DPP rejected Ma’s proposal on the grounds that it would not be constitutional, thereby defeating Ma’s attempt to manipulate the post-election political climate. However, Ma visited Itu Aba on Thursday last week, symbolically claiming sovereignty over the region, to which the US State Department said it was “frankly disappointed.”
Ma’s visit proved that his earlier proposal for a coalition Cabinet was fake, for if he truly intended to hand over power to the DPP and show respect to the president-elect, why did he insist on visiting Itu Aba? Why did he take advantage of Tsai by asking the DPP to send delegates to accompany him?
Comparatively speaking, the DPP’s challenges in the first transfer of power were the uncertainties of the system, whereas the challenges this time mostly have to do with how willing the outgoing president is to uphold democratic principles. Moreover, Beijing has not spoken yet. So the future is not entirely without hazards.
As there is a lengthier transition period for the DPP than last time, the nation must be vigilant and cautious with every step.
Liu Shih-chung is a former director of the Democratic Progressive Party’s International Affairs Department.
Translated by Ethan Zhan
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