In 2001, then-US president George W. Bush’s administration agreed to a major arms sale to Taiwan. Approved for sale were marine-patrol aircraft, anti-ship missiles, self-propelled howitzers, minesweepers and destroyers. The US also agreed to help Taiwan obtain new diesel-electric submarines to modernize its underwater forces. At the time, the Republic of China Navy had two ex-Dutch Zwaardvis-class boats, built in the 1980s, and two ex-US Navy Guppy-class boats built at the end of World War II.
Thirteen years later, Taiwan’s submarine arm still consists of two ex-Dutch submarines and two boats most of whose peers are now museum exhibits. Years of on-again, off-again discussions have not resulted in an actual sale from the US or any other nation. More seriously, there has also been no movement in facilitating US shipwrights’ and experts’ engagement with their Taiwanese counterparts to allow Taiwan to build its own boats.
An island nation, Taiwan is one of the most densely populated territories on earth, with more than 630 people per square kilometer. Its 23 million people are heavily reliant on imports for food and energy.
Equally important, Taiwan’s security depends on its ability to challenge the ability of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to cross the Taiwan Strait and mount an invasion, or impose a blockade that would leave the residents starving and in the dark. The PLA’s main planning guidelines appear to focus, still, on taking Taiwan. The PLA’s best forces, and much of its strategic and operational thinking, appear to be oriented toward either taking Taiwan or countering any US attempt to prevent such Chinese actions.
Because of the disparity in physical size, economy and geography, Taiwan’s maritime security in the face of the Chinese threat is a challenging problem. China has the wherewithal to simultaneously bombard Taiwan (especially with its large arsenal of short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles), while also being able to deploy forces farther afield of Taiwan’s immediate environment. For Taipei, the key to a successful defense of the nation is to hold out long enough for the US to intervene decisively. Taiwan’s military must therefore be able to simultaneously defend the island, while also being able to deny the Chinese regime the ability to easily or rapidly isolate it.
Submarines have long played a role in Taiwan’s defense calculations. Given the relative weakness of China’s anti-submarine warfare capabilities, submarines would pose a significant threat to any amphibious force.
Indeed, the record of the British Royal Navy during the Falklands would suggest a disproportionate effect from even a handful of modern submarines. On the one hand, the sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano led the Argentine to withdraw all naval forces from the British-declared exclusion zone.
At the same time, however, even though the Royal Navy was considered the premier anti-submarine force in NATO, it failed to find the Argentine sub ARA San Luis. That boat managed to remain at sea for more than a month, and despite the best efforts of NATO’s premier anti-submarine force, was apparently able to operate relatively unhindered. The Royal Navy expended substantial amounts of ordnance against a variety of false contacts, depleting its stocks for no real effect. Indeed, but for problems with its fire control system, that Argentine sub might well have changed the course of the battle, as it repeatedly achieved firing solutions on elements of the British task force.
In light of the importance of submarines and given Taiwan’s aging fleet, the US in April 2001 committed to helping Taiwan acquire up to eight diesel-electric submarines. This commitment was complicated by the reality that the US has not built diesel-electric submarines since the 1950s, as the US Navy transitioned to an all-nuclear power submarine force. As the US has no intention of transferring nuclear-powered subs to Taiwan, it was, in effect, promising to help Taiwan acquire such systems from third parties.
However, the European shipbuilders who were expected to provide the designs and the hulls were subjected to intense pressure from Beijing not to supply Taiwan with such systems. At the same time, major political clashes between then-president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT)-controlled legislature raised issues about funding and Taiwan’s commitment to acquiring the submarines. Consequently, the US has had to rethink its approach.
In 2006, then-US deputy undersecretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs Richard Lawless indicated that Washington was open to a two-phase approach to explore the possibility of indigenous production of diesel-electric submarines by Taiwan. The first phase would involve determining a design for these boats, while the second would involve actual construction and subsequent operations and maintenance. A formal congressional notification for the first phase was prepared in early 2008, but it has remained stalled in the US Department of State for the past six years.
Increasingly frustrated by the lack of US action and with no prospect of sales by any European manufacturers, Taiwan began its own two-pronged approach: In 2011, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) formally requested that US President Barack Obama’s administration approve the first phase for submarine production, which would allow US corporations to enter into discussions with their Taiwanese counterparts over design and source selection.
When the submarine program was still not included in the September 2011 arms sales notification to the US Congress, Taiwan began to explore the possibility of completely indigenous design and manufacturing.
Bringing together elements from Taiwan’s military, major shipbuilders and key design centers, a Taiwanese task force produced a submarine program feasibility study. This led to a plan, forwarded to the legislature in October last year, whereby Taiwan’s Ship and Ocean Industries Research and Development Center would design the vessels, China Shipbuilding Corp would manufacture the boats and the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology would provide the key weapons and sensors.
Unfortunately, such a program would cost about US$4.9 billion for the first four vessels. This would consume a significant portion of the nation’s overall defense budget. Nor would this address the reality that Taiwan’s shipbuilders have no experience building a submarine, which entails working with specialized steel and integrating a variety of sensors and weapons in ways very different from surface combatants.
Yet, given the lack of progress on the US side in fulfilling its prior commitment and the unwillingness of European nations to risk antagonizing Beijing, it is understandable why Taiwan would choose this option since it has no other real choices.
It is in the US’ security interests to ensure that Taiwan maintains a sufficiently robust defense that can deter Chinese aggression, especially as China has become increasingly assertive throughout the East Asian littoral in recent years. The relatively quiet state of the Taiwan Strait may well change after Taiwan’s presidential election next year, particularly given likely Chinese reaction to a DPP victory. Recent Chinese actions toward Hong Kong have probably torpedoed any prospect of the “one country, two systems” approach that Beijing has long proffered to Taiwan.
The US should:
‧ Allow the “Conception Definition and Design Source Selection” phase to proceed promptly. Congress should direct the Department of State to either allow this to move forward, or provide a formal explanation on why it is failing to do so.
‧ Allow US shipbuilders and weapons manufacturers to cooperate with Taiwanese corporations in assessing Taiwan’s capabilities and forward bids on relevant sensors and weapons systems. At the same time, the US should also allow the sale of additional submarine weapons (eg, submarine-launched Harpoon missiles) that are already in the Taiwanese inventory.
‧ Continue to encourage other manufacturers of conventional (diesel-electric) submarines to cooperate with Taiwan. The prospect of Japan engaging in arms sales, and specifically the export of submarines to Australia, raises the possibility of additional, non-traditional suppliers who might be additional sources of either submarine technology, or even completed boats.
Taiwan’s defense would be strengthened with more modern submarines. The US, as Taiwan’s best, and often only, friend, should help Taipei acquire an underwater force, which would benefit not only Taiwan, but the US’ defense posture in the western Pacific. To this end, the US should provide options that enable Taiwan to meet its requirements in the most cost-effective way possible, because leaving Taiwan with a single — extremely costly — option for fulfilling its defense needs puts Taiwan’s democracy and defense in a very precarious position.
Dean Cheng is senior research fellow in the Asian Studies Center of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy at the Heritage Foundation in Washington. The original version of this article appeared on the foundation’s Web site on Monday last week.
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