To contend that elections in Taiwan are a money pit would meet little challenge. There is little doubt, either, that major financial groups play the role of banker in the background, funding campaigns — either willingly or under duress — through political donations.
Generally speaking, the political philosophy of such institutions goes something like this: Political donations should be seen as purchasing insurance. They dole out the cash to the political parties and candidates with whom they see eye-to-eye, while being careful not to tread on the toes of those with whom they do not agree, for they do not want to create any political enemies if they can help it. This is akin to third-party insurance.
For the parties or candidates that do not quite make the grade, so long as they show their face, they will not be rejected either. This is like accident insurance.
Of course, all of this transpires out of sight, behind closed doors. For the people involved, the less the public is privy to it, the better. No clues are left, there is no paper trail to follow. To reveal how much was donated, and to which party, would be breaking a major taboo for the financial institutions.
Business magnates like Taiwanese smartphone maker HTC Corp chairwoman Cher Wang (王雪紅), senior Ting Hsin International Group executive Wei Ying-chun (魏應充) and Hon Hai Group chairman Terry Gou (郭台銘) all praise the anticorruption efforts of President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) government, saying how they are good for the public and good for business, and then put their name to events supporting Ma’s presidential ticket, giving talks up and down the country.
The brazen way in which they go about this serves to demonstrate that these people do not just represent any ordinary corporation, they have a major cross-strait conglomerate behind them. They and their chums in the leadership on either side of the Taiwan Strait are all in this together.
How does the saying go? “Let the moneyed contribute money, let the strong put forth their strength.”
However, are these millionaires and billionaires simply offering their services and not contributing any money? The major financial institutions are the main source of political donations. Does it make sense to suggest that the billionaires behind them are merely putting in the time, and not putting their hands deep into their pockets? If they are donating money, are they really keeping to the NT$3 million (US$93,759) limit for political donations as stipulated in the Election and Recall Act (公務人員選舉罷免法)? Ma says that Wei did not make any political donations whatsoever. Is that credible?
On Dec. 25, before even taking office, then-Taipei mayor-elect Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) announced that the exclusive bus lanes along Zhongxiao W Road in front of Taipei Railway Station would be demolished. Three days later, at 11.40am, all five lanes along that stretch of road were once more in use, with traffic flowing both ways. Former Taipei mayor Hau Lung-bin (郝龍斌) had decided to do this exact same thing on three occasions during his eight years in office, but for some reason was much more timid in his approach. In the same way, Ko achieved this with just over NT$4 million, compared to the NT$10 million that Hau had projected it would cost. How do you even begin to account for such a huge difference?
What Hau wanted to do in eight years he never did achieve. Ko got the job done within a couple of days. Clearly, the difference was the person in the driving seat. Perhaps what happened with the bus lanes reveals a lot about corruption in government when political donations are such a large part of the equation.
Chang Kuo-tsai is a retired National Hsinchu University of Education associate professor.
Translated by Paul Cooper
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