Two recent visits by Chinese officials have provided ample proof of the lengths to which Beijing will take its carrot and stick approach to cross-strait ties — both of which appear equally indigestible.
First came China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits Chairman Chen Deming (陳德銘), with his barely veiled warnings that Beijing wanted to see the cross-strait service trade agreement inked in June last year implemented as soon as possible and progress made on other deals under negotiation, or else who knows what could happen once China’s all but signed free-trade pact with South Korea takes effect.
Next came former Chinese deputy minister of health Huang Jiefu (黃潔夫), with his offer on Friday last week to help “facilitate” the establishment of a cross-strait supply line of organs for transplants — after, of course, the pesky moral issue of China using organs harvested from executed prisoners is resolved by changing the law to bar their use. The dubiousness of the offer was enhanced by Huang’s reminder that in China’s eyes, Taiwan is just another “domestic territory,” so that it would be “quite normal for citizens to donate their organs to one another.”
Yes, there is a great need for organ donations in Taiwan, with more than 8,500 people on waiting lists — the vast majority needing a new kidney — and only about 200 donors annually. And yes, there are an ever-increasing number of people from Taiwan traveling to China to undergo organ transplants. However, despite comments from some people who should know better that the offer from Huang — who heads China’s organ donation committee — was “a good thing” and reflective of Beijing’s “benign intentions,” the idea is anything but benign and should be vigorously rejected.
To begin with, Huang made an offer that neither he nor China is in any position to meet now or in the foreseeable future.
Huang on Dec. 4 said that starting on Jan. 1, only organs voluntarily donated by civilians — ie, not executed prisoners — will be able to be used for transplants in China. However, he made the same promise in 2012 and in November last year said that the sourcing of organs from executions would be stopped by the end of that year.
The problem is that, according to Chinese state media reports, organs from executed prisoners have in the past accounted for anywhere between two-thirds and nine-tenths of transplants conducted in China, and there is no reliable source to make up that deficit once such a ban takes effect.
According to the BBC, Huang on Dec. 4 said that China’s donation rate is 0.6 per million population (pmp). Compare that to Spain, which last year topped the International Registry in Organ Donation and Transplantation chart for organs harvested from deceased donors at 35.1ppm, with Croatia right behind at 35ppm, while Turkey tops the chart for living organ donors at 46.6ppm, followed by South Korea at 36.6ppm. It is clear that China has a long way to go to meet its own needs, even without Huang adding that about 300,000 people are awaiting organ transplants in China, but just 10,000 operations are conducted every year.
Huang may think it is normal for citizens to donate their organs to one another, but he has been able to make little headway among his compatriots since helping to establish China’s national organ donation network in 2009. This is partly due to cultural norms, but China’s thriving black market in body parts also serves to deter would-be donors, even though Beijing outlawed organ trafficking in 2007 and declared it a crime in 2008. Surveys have found that some Chinese fear becoming organ donors because of the continuing illicit trade.
Huang’s offer is as much pie-in-the-sky as Beijing’s promises of endless benefits to Taiwan in the post-Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) era, and look were those have gotten Taiwan. He should make sure his own house is in order before trying to build a bridge out of body parts to Taiwan.
For three years and three months, Taiwan’s bid to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) has remained stalled. On Nov. 29, members meeting in Vancouver agreed to establish a working group for Costa Rica’s entry — the fifth applicant in line — but not for Taiwan. As Taiwan’s prospects for CPTPP membership fade due to “politically sensitive issues,” what strategy should it adopt to overcome this politically motivated economic exclusion? The situation is not entirely dim; these challenges offer an opportunity to reimagine the export-driven country’s international trade strategy. Following the US’ withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Two major Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-People’s Liberation Army (PLA) power demonstrations in November 2024 highlight the urgency for Taiwan to pursue a military buildup and deterrence agenda that can take back control of its destiny. First, the CCP-PLA’s planned future for Taiwan of war, bloody suppression, and use as a base for regional aggression was foreshadowed by the 9th and largest PLA-Russia Joint Bomber Exercise of Nov. 29 and 30. It was double that of previous bomber exercises, with both days featuring combined combat strike groups of PLA Air Force and Russian bombers escorted by PLAAF and Russian fighters, airborne early warning
Since the end of former president Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) administration, the Ma Ying-jeou Foundation has taken Taiwanese students to visit China and invited Chinese students to Taiwan. Ma calls those activities “cross-strait exchanges,” yet the trips completely avoid topics prohibited by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), such as democracy, freedom and human rights — all of which are universal values. During the foundation’s most recent Chinese student tour group, a Fudan University student used terms such as “China, Taipei” and “the motherland” when discussing Taiwan’s recent baseball victory. The group’s visit to Zhongshan Girls’ High School also received prominent coverage in
India and China have taken a significant step toward disengagement of their military troops after reaching an agreement on the long-standing disputes in the Galwan Valley. For government officials and policy experts, this move is welcome, signaling the potential resolution of the enduring border issues between the two countries. However, it is crucial to consider the potential impact of this disengagement on India’s relationship with Taiwan. Over the past few years, there have been important developments in India-Taiwan relations, including exchanges between heads of state soon after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s third electoral victory. This raises the pressing question: