The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and China shared similar views on the nine-in-one elections last week. They both tried to dismiss a link between the rout suffered by the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) China policy. The rarely seen agreement exemplifies that the DPP remains caught in an awkward position as far as cross-strait relations are concerned, as it always will be.
Under the orders of DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) — the most likely DPP candidate for the 2016 presidential election after the party scored its unprecedented victory in the election — DPP Secretary-General Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) wasted no time in flying to Washington the next day with a message that the election should not be seen as a defeat for the cross-strait relations policies of the Ma administration, because the issue was not debated in the campaign.
The DPP’s view was different from the mainstream analyses that the electoral outcome was primarily a result of the “China factor” at play in the growth of skepticism among Taiwanese — especially the younger generations — over greater economic integration with China championed by the Ma administration, but was virtually identical to that held by Beijing that Ma’s handling of domestic issues was more to blame for the KMT’s defeat in the election than his pro-China stance.
Likely to return to power in 2016 with its capability to handle cross-strait relations being viewed with suspicion by Washington — which was believed to have played a part in the DPP’s defeat in 2012 — the reason why the DPP tried to play down the China factor in the election results was understandable.
When Tsai was running for president and visiting Washington to explain her cross-strait policy position to US officials, an unnamed US official told the Financial Times that Tsai “left us with distinct doubts about whether she is both willing and able to continue the stability in cross-strait relations the region has enjoyed in recent years,” which was seen as a blow to Tsai’s chances.
The DPP’s interpretation of the elections could be seen as an olive branch delivered to Beijing to help pave the way for future interactions. Clearly it was an attempt to show that if the party regains power in 2016, it would be a rational player in dealing with the nation’s relations with China, rather than handling cross-strait issues according to partisan or ideological politics, as the DPP administration led by former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) did. It also aimed to imply that a new DPP administration would not totally repudiate the cross-strait policies of the Ma government.
Signs emerged before the election that Beijing had allowed leeway for dialogue with the opposition camp when the cross-strait relationship enters the post-Ma era, probably because it had predicted the KMT’s rout in the election.
While Beijing explicitly stated its hope prior to the poll that every candidate be committed to the so-called “1992 consensus,” it did not go further by warning about the consequences of not adhering to the principle, as it did in 2012. That may have been because the elections were only at the local level, a level at which China adopts a more flexible stance to manage cross-strait relations. Another reason that cannot be ignored is that Beijing, which has been consistently studying the state of Taiwan’s public opinion, is adjusting the way it approaches Taiwan after the Sunflower movement in March and April showed widespread Taiwanese anxiety over China and the recent events in Hong Kong further fostered a change in the attitudes of Taiwanese youth toward China.
The DPP has learned its lesson from 2012, so it was eager to address the “distrust” the US has in the party, but it seemed that it did not get the message people sent via their ballots if Wu’s statement was truly the party’s take on the election. The DPP’s awkwardness in managing cross-strait issues has always been because it always puts political calculation ahead of people.
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