On the eve of the APEC summit in Beijing, China and Japan surprised the world by reaching an unexpected ice-breaking four-point principled agreement to improve bilateral relations. The agreement seemed to pave the way for a meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, but if the agreement can help improve Sino-Japanese relations, which have plumbed new depths since the sovereignty disputes over the Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台) began in 2012, it would also be very likely to affect the situation in East Asia.
That being so, Taiwan should not sit back and watch.
In terms of the four-point agreement, the Chinese are intoxicated with self-satisfaction that Abe finally is bowing his head to China, as they see it. However, a closer look at the agreement clearly shows the Abe administration is not really making any concessions, let alone bowing its head to Beijing.
The Diaoyutais and history are the two thorny issues behind the Sino-Japanese dispute. The historical issue that most vexes Beijing is Abe’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. The second point of the agreement states that the two countries have reached “some agreement” on overcoming political obstacles that are affecting bilateral relations, but the Japanese have made no promises that there will be no more visits to the shrine.
Among the agreement’s four points, perhaps the most notable part deals with the Diaoyutais. The Japanese government took two main positions on this issue in 2010: first, there is no territorial issue to be resolved; second, there is no consensus between China and Japan on shelving the sovereignty dispute over the islands.
The recent agreement also states that the two sides have recognized that their views differ regarding the tensions in recent years over the Diaoyutais and the East China Sea.
As a result, Chinese media simply interpret this as Japan finally recognizing the existence of the sovereignty dispute over the islands.
However, in 2010, then-Japanese foreign minister Koichiro Genba repeatedly stated publicly that there was a diplomatic dispute, not a sovereignty dispute, over the Diaoyutais. So the Japanese side simply reiterates their view that different views exist in the agreement, rather than recognizing that there is a dispute over sovereignty over the islands.
Therefore, although the two countries are to open up dialogue on the Diaoyutais issue in the near future, the scope of the dialogue is limited to building a crisis management mechanism and will not involve the sovereignty dispute.
To be honest, the ice-breaking agreement was not the result of concessions on behalf of the Abe administration. Rather, Beijing tried to avoid an embarrassing situation in which Xi would lose face if he met with Abe or be seen as impolite if he did not, and therefore used the agreement and Abe’s eager request for a meeting with Xi to find a way out of the dilemma.
As for the question of whether Taiwan is glad to see China and Japan improving their ties, the answer is not necessarily “yes.” It used to be said that if Sino-Japanese relations were good, so were cross-strait relations. However, in recent years, China and Japan have become hostile to each other, and after coming to power, Abe has clearly adopted a new diplomatic strategy of working with Taiwan to restrain China. Although there is a sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyutais between Taiwan and Japan, these changes mean that this dispute is unlikely to stop the two countries from building closer ties.
One example of this is that after the historical Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement was signed in April last year, relations between the two countries are the best they have been since the severing of diplomatic ties, as President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) said earlier this year. This serves as a good example for building closer ties.
Today, Sino-Japanese relations are expected to bounce back, and it seems that would be unsuitable to building stronger relations between Japan and Taiwan. However, China and Japan have repeatedly clashed, and this involves the unavoidable game for dominance and the reconstruction of regional order at a time when China’s national strength is rising and Japan’s national strength is falling. It will not be an easy task for them to resume their past friendship.
Moreover, Abe is very friendly to Taiwan and he is likely to be in office for the foreseeable future. There is still room for Taiwan and Japan to build closer ties, so now is not the time to panic.
John Lim is an associate research fellow in the Institute of Modern History at Academia Sinica.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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